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The Opening Address at the ATRS 2003 Conference, Toulouse, France
By
Professor Tae Hoon Oum,
President, Air Transport Research Society, and
UPS Foundation Chair in Transport and Logistics,
University of British Columbia, Canada
July 11, 2003
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen! It gives me a great pleasure to welcome all
of you to the ATRS World Conference being hosted jointly by Groupe ESC (Toulouse
Business School) and the ENAC (Ecole Nationale de Aviation Civile).
Today and tomorrow, in addition to the Opening and the Closing Plenary sessions, 112
papers will be presented on virtually all aspects of air transport and related topics.
2003 is a particularly challenging year to air transport policy makers, aviation executives
and researchers as most of the major network airlines are experiencing unprecedented
level of financial difficulties in the 100-year history of aviation. But I am reminded of
Mr. Georges Clemencau, the French Leader during the first World War. He said "our
country advances ONLY through crisis and in tragedy". Likewise, I am confident to
predict that air transport industry will also advance through these crises. Airlines are
succeeding in restructuring their service networks, and streamlining their operations to an
unprecedented level, and start to listen to what their customers and markets are telling
them more closely. Most major network carriers in the United States and Canada have
achieved a unit cost reduction of about 25% via their recent restructuring efforts. They
will be coming out of these crises with resounding success in order to serve the rising
demands for efficient and cost effective services. Now, I believe it is turn for the airports
and air traffic control systems to do a restructuring comparable to what airlines have been
doing in recent years. In this regard, I am particularly happy to see many papers and
presentations in this conference are focusing the airports and air traffic control systems.
As a final note, on behalf of the ATRS, I would like to express sincere appreciation to
Mr. Herve Passeron, Director of Groupe ESC-Toulouse, and Mr. Grrard Rozenknop,
Director of the ENAC, and above all, Professor Sveinn Gudmundsson for their
tremendous efforts to organize this conference so successfully. I also like to express our
appreciation to AirBus Industries, City of Toulouse, Toulouse Chamber of Commerce,
Aeroport Toulouse-Blagnac, and EQUIS for their active participation in this program and
for their financial supports.
I look forward to a stimulating conference in the next couple of days.
Thank you very much.
The Air Transport Research Society (ATRS)
World Conference
July 10-12, 2003 Toulouse, France
THE CONFERENCE
The ATRS held its World Conference in
Toulouse, France, in July 2003.
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Consumer expectations of capacity constraints and their effect on the
demand for multi-class air-travel
Bryn D. Battersby"
Abstract
This paper argues that a consumer's decision on ticket class takes into account the
expected likelihood of obtaining a seat in a particular class which, in turn, partially
depends on an optimum "transaction cost". Taking into account the preferences of the
consumer and the information that the consumer is endowed with, the consumer will
select a ticket that includes its own optimal transaction cost. This motivates the inclusion
of the capacity constraint as a proxy independent variable for these consumer
expectations Tb_is the___forms the basis of a model of air-travel demand with specific
reference to Australia. A censored likelihood function allowing for correlation in the
disturbance term across k classes is introduced. The correlation in the disturbances arises
as a result of the interdependence of the capacity constraints in k different ticket classes
on each flight.
KEYWORDS: Travel demand, airline markets, limited de_t variables.
° Bryn D. Battersby is a Phi) student at Charles Sturt University, Wagga Wagga, Australia, and is an
economic analyst at the Commonwealth Treasury m Canberra, Australia. The views expressed m this
paper are the author's own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Commonwealth Treasury.
The author acknowledges the conm'bution of Steven Yen of the University of Tennessee who provided the
QML Gauss code which was the base of development for the solving of the multivariate distribution
problems in this paper.
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Introduction
This paper advances the research that was presented at the Air Transport Research
Society Conference in Seattle in 2002. The purpose, here, is to present empirical findings
for demand on one particular route in the State of New South Wales, Australia, that
utilizes capacity both in terms of an indicator of the expected probability of availability
for a particular ticket and as an upper bound in the econometric estimation of demand for
the route.
This paper's core objective is to estimate demand for seven different ticket classes on one
regional route in Australia. The data is captured over one year where all seat sales on
each flight for one of the airlines on the route have been made available. Further, the
capacity constraint for each class is derivable through the setting that the airline uses for
the class. Complexity enters the problem through the interaction of the demands for
each of the ticket classes. That is, it should be expected that there will be a correlation
between the demands for each of the ticket classes on individual flights. The interaction
of the capacity constraints for each of the different ticket classes adds a further dimension
of intricacy.
There has been a significant body of research on air-travel demand, particularly as a
component of yield management research. The analyses traditionally have focused on
aggregate data which does not allow a sufficiently robust analysis of different consumer
types - an integral factor in the price discrimination practiced by the airlines. This paper
seeks to take another step towards a deeper understanding of consumers and their
responses in the air-travel market. While individual consumer data is not available, the
availability of data on individual flights has encouraged the exploration of alternative
estimation procedures and allowed the extraction of a number of interesting results.
The econometric models that are analysed are broken down into two categories. In the
first category, the entire data set is estimated together to gather outcomes that otherwise
would not be attainable because of unmoving data values - for instance, price in each of
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the classes does not change over the course of the year and the only way to gather a
useful price effect is to estimate an overaU model of demand at the flight level. The
second category of models examines demand at the class level. At this level, variation is
only high in the variables of sales and capacity. Nonetheless, value can be found,
particularly through a model that estimates demand for each class as part of a demand
system. In this paper, a quasi-maximum bivariate Tobit system is also used so that
correlations between the classes can be evaluated. This evaluation of the correlations
should also allow for more efficient parameter estimates of the variables in the model.
This paper is divided into a number of sections. The next section reviews some of the
recent work done in this area - particularly focussing on the role of the capacity
constraint and transaction cost in the consumer's utility function. The third section
reviews the econometric approaches that are used in the creation and analysis of the
demand models with the fourth section briefly outlining the data and manipulation
required prior to estimation. The fifth section presents the results l_om this initial work
and the sixth section focusses on some directions for further work in this area.
The _-L_-trave! eonsumer_ the capac__: constraint and the transaction cost.
In 2002, a model of consumer choice was presented at both the Air Transport Research
Conference in Seattle and at the Australian Conference of Economists in Adelaide (see
Battersby, 2002a and 2002b). This model noted that consumers are now becoming more
capable in their understanding of the pricing methods used by the airlines and this
provided for the interaction of an expectation on capacity. This section briefly
summarises those ideas as a basis for the empirical outcomes that are discussed in this
paper.
As consumers become more aware of the methods used by airlines to discriminate
between them, their ability to form expectations on the availability of different types of
tickets improves. If we let _xrepresent the expected probability of seat availability in
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ticket class i for consumer n, and _ represent the expected capacity or number of seats in
that ticket class, then we can form a simple equation that relates the two:
It,, = f(_,, ri, , di,) Equation 1
In this model, two other variables are included that also help to explain the expected
probability of seat availability for the consumer. They are the expected demand for those
seats by other consumers in the market, d, and the expected transaction cost involved in
procuring a ticket in that ticket class, x.
This last component deserves some further explanation. The transaction cost is
effectively a method for the consumer to manipulate their expected probability of
availability for a particular ticket class. In a comparative statics analysis, it would be
expected that the higher the transaction cost, the higher is the probability of availability.
Indeed, the transaction cost concept is similar to the concept of manipulability by
consumers in rationing schemes (see Benassy, 1993). By entering the queue for a ticket
earlier, paying in advance for the ticket, or by having someone else organise the ticketing
for them, the consumer spends resources in the attempt to maximise the probability of
acquiring a particular seat.
The consumer will not, however, endlessly spend on these transaction costs. It turns out
that the consumer will have an optimal transaction cost for each of the available choices
If we define the consumer choice problem as a random utility model, the basic model
would suggest that the consumer, n, will most likely be observed to choose the alternative
i from the choice set C that has the highest of the random utilities, U:
P(ilC')=P_U(x_"m-P"'e_')=maxU(x"'m-P"'eJ') lj=|...k'] '] ' _J_Cn Equation 2
B. BATTER_Y 5
Where x is the vector of the various attdbmes of the ticket and characteristics of the
consumer, m is the budget constraint, p is the price of the ticket and s is the randomness
associated with the observation of the choice probabilities.
If we incorporate the concept of the expected probability of ticket availability, the
consumer will make a choice under a modified framework:
P(ilC,)=P_#,,U(x,,,m-p,,-r,,c,,)=maxrc. U(x.,m-p.j=L.__" _' r-r_,,e_)], Vj_C, Equation 3
Using this approach, it can be seen that the choice that the consumer makes depends on
the product of the expected probability of ticket availability and the expected utility of the
ticket. Moreover, it can also be seen that the expected utility of the ticket incorporates
the expected transaction cost for that ticket.
Because the transaction cost has a negative effect on the utility function while positively
affecting the expected probability of ticket availability, the consumer will not try to
maximise the expected probability of ticket availability. Rather, the consumer will
endeavour to optimise the transaction cost such that the expected probability of
availability and the expected utility combined produce the highest result. Their optimal
transaction cost for a particular ticket, then, will be that transaction cost where the
negative change in utility from an increase in the transaction cost is equal to the positive
change in expected probability of ticket availability.
The question then arises as to how this affects the way demand is observed in the market.
Clearly, if consumers are factoring in the transaction cost in their choices, then an
empirical model of demand should somehow take account if this. Equation 1 highlights
the inter-activity of the transaction cost with the expected probability of availability and
consequently the expected capacity constraint and the expected level of demand. Before
proceeding it is worthwhile to note the implications of the information endowment of the
consumer in their decision making process.
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It is fair to assume that, up until recently, consumed were relatively naive in their
understanding of the pricing and capacity policies of the airlines. This naivety has two
clear impacts on the model presented. First, the consumer may not have full information
on the available choice set and secondly, the consumer may have little information on the
effect of their transaction cost on the expected probability of fulfilment. While this paper
does not detail the interaction of information availability 1, it can be assumed that as the
information endowment of the consumer increases, so too does the available choice set
and their understanding of the interaction of the transaction cost with the expected
probability of availability.
In terms of empirically examining this and noting that the expected transaction cost can
be considered a partial function of the expected capacity for a particular ticket, a useful
solution becomes evident. Hence, it should be expected that the consumer has become
more responsive to the actual capacity constraint over time as their information
endowment has improved. But the methodology of examining this is not straightforward,
capacity imposes an upper limit in the econometric model as well as being explanatory of
demand and the demand for any particular ticket class is understandably correlated with
the demand for the other ticket classes. As such, the rest of this paper is dedicated to
providing a workable approach to empirically examining outcomes based on this
approach to understanding consumer choices in the air-travel market.
Establishing empirical outcomes in the face of consumer expectations on the
capacity constraints
This research focuses on a number of approaches that are useful when sales and capacity
data are available at the ticket level for one fn'm and all other data is sourced from
standard areas. If more disaggregated data were available, the techniques associated with
the random utility model such as the multinomial logit would serve quite well. Here,
however, the approach recognises the lack of individual consumer data and instead
1The presentationof the research that examines the interaction of the information endowment of the
consumer inrelation to the expected probability of fulfilment and the transaction cost is forthcoming.
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provides a number of alternative options. In this analysis, we presuppose that there are
seven ticket classes with unique capacity constraints, which are tied to various ticketing
restrictions.
There are two broad approaches that can be taken, and, t_om within those, there are at
least two techniques that can be applied to examine the data. The first approach is to
estimatea model acrosspooleddataand thesecondapproach entailsestablishingdemand
equationsforeach oftheclasses.Both approacheshave theirstrengthsand weaknesses.
The firstenablesan inspectionoftheinteractionofpriceinthedemand forair-travelon
therouteunder inspectionand alsoallowsa comparisonoftherestrictionsand theireffect
on demand. Thisapproach alsoallowsageneralanalysisoftheinteractionof the
capacityconstrainton overallair-traveldemand.
The second approach involves the creation of individual demand functions for each of the
classes. While there is no price variability in these classes (therefore making the price
effect impossible to deduce), there is regular variability in the capacity of the classes. It
is possible, using this approach, to examine the sensitivity of demand for tickets in a
pa_Jcu!ar class to the capaci_W constrai__t and therefnre dech_ce some outcx_me_ relating to
the transaction cost involved in purchasing tickets for that particular class. Moreover,
recognising that in any one flight, it is highly likely that the demand equations for each of
the seven ticket classes will be correlated, it is possible to create a system of equations
that accounts for this correlation.
In this paper, findings of the censored approach are developed using a tobit specification.
In this ease, a straightforward tobit model application with upper censoring is used on the
pooled data where di is the demand for the observation on class i, x is a vector of the
attributes of the ticket and the characteristics of the consumer, _ is the capacity constraint,
k is the number of classes and u is a residual:
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di= _'i otherwise.
Equation 4
Such that the likelihood function is:
L= Equation 5
Wheref(di) is the density function for di. If we assume the standard Tobit with normal
distributions ( • representing the normal distribution function), the log-likelihood is:
IY, fl:(, ,83 _ ..
ln(2zr) + In 0. 2 -_ u
0. 2
+ _ 1-@ -
Equation 6
An alternative way to examine the problem is, as mentioned, by individual classes. In
this case, estimation is required for k likelihood functions similar to those in equation 8
but for individual classes only. The key difference is that the data is partitioned into each
individual class which creates the undesirable characteristic of invariability across many
of the independent variables. Nevertheless, there is significant variability in the
capacities of the classes and this does allow for the development of some useful results.
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The system of independent classes would then be:
d,, = fllxi, + fl2_, + fl3ff j, + u,, Vj * i ifd,, <(_
d,, = _'_ otherwise
Equation 7
for class i e C. at observation t. Here, P3 I'_I_S_lts a vector of coefficients conformable
to the vector of class capacities, (:. The system of likelihood fimcfions would therefore
be:
d_.<.% d,=(, -
d_<,fj, d_ =g'_ "
Equation 8
The log-likelihood for each of the equations in the system is as equation 9.
The probability becomes apparent, however, that each of these likelihood functions is
correlated became the total demand for seats on a particular flight is the sum of the
demands for each of the individual classes and those individual demands are partially
explained by a class capacity constraint which is, itself, constrained by a total capacity
constraint. That is, each of the capacity constraints sum to the total aircraft capacity 2. To
account for these expected correlations, the system of equations may be estimated
somewhat differently.
The approach that is used here parallels that used by Yen and Lin (2002) which examines
approaches to overcome the numerical difficulties inherent with multiple probability
integrals that arise in this type of censored problem. The approach that Yen and Lin
2 In fact, the sum of the capacities may actually exceed the capacity constraint of the aircraft if the settings
used by the airline creates that effect. Nonetheless, the interrelated nature of the capacity conslraints
continues to produce correlative pressure across the individual demand functions.
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suggest follows the quasi-maximum likelihood method that has been used in multivariate
probit estimations. In this case, however, the quasi-likelihood function is used in a tobit
estimation so that the cross-equation error correlations are taken into account, therefore
improving the efficiency of the model.
Following Yen and Lin (2002), the quasi-likelihood function is therefore specified as:
k i-I
L = I-II-[ L_ Equation 9
i=2 j=l
Where Lu is the bivariate tobit likelihood for di and dj specified as:
ao
L_.: 1-[ i ig(d"dj)ddj ddi
a,_, ,a j=¢ j ¢, (,
oo
x I"[ f(d,)._f(dj)ddj
di<_i "djm_J (1
oo
× l-[ f(ajlIf(a, lad,
d,_, .dj<_j ¢i
x H f(dj).f(d,)
d,<_,.dj<_!
Equation 10
Yen and Lin (2002) fred that this approach is useful as an akemative to full information
maximum likelihood (FIML) in the case where there are three alternatives. In the case
under investigation in this paper there are seven alternatives and the derivation of a full
information maximum likelihood result is not possible because of the intractability of the
equation. Yen and Lin (2002) also suggest the use of simulator methods for the
calculation of higher dimension FIMLs.
In this paper, the quasi-maximum likelihood estimation is carried using the Broyden-
Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno descent algorithm. The standard errors for the parameter
estimates are calculated using White's (1982) covariance matrix.
i •
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Data and Market Backeround
The route under analysis in this research is the Wagga Wagga to Sydney one-way
regional route in New South Wales, Australia. Wagga Wagga is located on the Sum
Highway, which connects Sydney and Adelaide, and on the Murmmbidgee River. It is
also located on the train line that connects Sydney and Melbourne. The city is also
regarded as the gateway to the Riverina, one of the richest agricultural areas in New
South Wales.
Sydney, the other city in the pair under examination in this study, is the largest city in
Australia and is the capital of New South Wales. Sydney is internationally known as one
of the key cities in Australia and is also recognised as the international gateway to
Australia. While Sydney has a number of airports, Sydney Kingsford Smith International
airport is the only one that offers services by the primary airlines.
Usefully, at the beginning of this researchproject, KendeU Airlines provided a series of
,__m for _e !997 fin____n___c.ia!ye___rwh_jichco_njai_neda record of sales for each class on each
mgm ofihe year. The iesp_five set'_gs for _c -' .......... ' ..... " a
capacity constraint information could be developed. The method outlined in Battersby
(2002a) for the calculation of the capacity constraint for individual classes based on
settings data is used in this paper.
Kendell Airlines also provided information on the prices for each of the classes. No
variability in the prices was recorded over the financial year. This has a key implication
for the single class models as it becomes impossible to determine a useful price elasticity.
Nevertheless, in the pooled data analysis, the variability across classes provides some
feedback on broad response to price. Income data is the average weekly employee
earnings in New South Wales.
A dummy variable is used to identify whether there is a significant event on in Wagga
Wagga on the day of the flight. Events such as major race meetings, commercial events
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and government events were recorded from the regional newspaper, the Daily Advertiser.
A level of arbitrariness was used in defining which events were appropriate. Other
dummy variables are also included for Monday and Friday flights, weekend flights,
public holidays, and school holidays.
In the pooled data, further dummy variables were used to control for the various
restrictions on the each of the ticket classes. These dummy variables included the
requirements to book 21 days, 14 days and 7 days in advance, non-refundable ticket type,
availability only to senior citizens, and the transferability of ticket restrictions (seasonal
or completely flexible).
A summary of the pooled data is presented in Table 1 while Table 2 presents a summary
for data at the individual class level. It should be also pointed out that sales equals the
capacity constraint in 3280 (32.17%) of the observations. In the individual class data, the
following ticketing class regime exists:
Class 1
Class 2
Class 3
Class 4
Class 5
Class 6
Class 7
Fully flexible airfare. Highest priced.
$
m
Restrictive Airfare. Lowest priced. 21
day advance requirement. Not refundable.
L
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Table One
Summary, of Pooled Data
sa_s (SALES)
Capacity (CAP)
Ticket Price (PlUCE)
Weekend (WEEKEND)
Monday or Friday (MONFRI)
21 days advance purchase (21DAY)
14 days advance pmrdvm (14nAY)
7 days advance purchase (7DAY)
Not refundable (NOREFUND)
Available to senior citizens (SNRCn')
Completely flexible (FLEX)
Flexibility restricted to season (SEASFLEX)
Average Weekly Earnings (AVEARN)
Major Event in Wagga (WGAEVENT)
Public Holiday (PUBHOL)
School Holidays (SCHHOL)
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
3.394 4.630 0 34
10.983 7.919 0 34
139.578 29.693 93 186
0.286 0.452 0 1
0.286 0.452 0 1
0.143 0.350 0 1
0.143 0.350 0 1
0.143 0.350 0 1
0.714 0.452 0 1
0.143 0.350 0 1
0.143 0.350 0 1
0.143 0.350 0 1
573.133 4.102 568.5 580
0.041 0.199 0 1
0.036 0.185 0 1
0.231 0.421 0 1
10193 J
Table Two
Summary, of Individual Class Data
Sales Class One (SALES1)
Sales Class Two (SALES,?.)
Sa_s CLus Three (S,M.ES3)
Sales Class Four (SALES4)
Sales Class Five (SALES5)
Sakm C_ss S_ (SALES6)
Sales Class Seven (SALEST)
Capacity Class One (CAP1)
Capacity Class Two (CAP2)
Capacity Class Three (CAP3)
Capacity Class Four (CAP4)
Capacity Class Five (CAPS)
capacity ckm Six (CAPS)
Capac_ Cless Seven (C..N_
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS I CLASS
Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
9.7445 6.6561 0 34
.46_0 _ .8803 0 22
1.0137 1.4549 0 21
0.9464 1.2869 0 16
1.4478 2.123 0 20
4.4732 3.7867 0 21
4.7685 4.1056 0 26
19.886 5.8956 0 34
4.3764 4.5992 0 24
3.5 4.346 0 23
13.0934 5.8536 0 25
13.6078 5.6103 0 25
16.6236 4.8485 5 24
5.5357 4.5408 0 26
leSS I
Results
The results presented in this section are preliminary. At this stage, diagnostic testing on
each of the models has not taken place and there remain a number of key issues
surrounding the computation of the quasi-maximum likelihood model. Central to these
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latter issues are a discovered "bug" in the underlying calculation of distribution functions
at extreme values in the software that is used. Nonetheless, the results do provide some
useful insights into the multi-class environment and are instrumental in defining the
future direction of this research.
The results for the pooled data set are presented in Table 3. These results are particularly
useful because they highlight the increasing cost of the restrictions - particularly the
advance purchase restrictions. More importantly, however, is the effect of an increase in
the capacity constraint.
Table Three
Tobit Application over Pooled Data
ONE
PRICE
CAPACITY
OTHERCAPACITY
EARNINGS
WGAEVENT
MONFRI
WEEKEND
DAY21
DAY14
DAY7
FLEX
SEASFLEX
PUBHOLS
SCHHOLS
SALES
14.2193"**
(3.11o)
-0.1928"**
(-34.786)
0.4500***
(61.546)
-0.9997***
(-89.463)
0.0518"**
(6.604)
0.0481
(0.305)
0.0955
(1.247)
0.4297***
(5.644)
-19.0323"**
(-60.411)
-15.9514"**
(-76.754)
-11.1109"**
(-79.614)
2.2297***
(7.34o)
2.1875"**
(12.049)
0.0612
(0.321)
0.0429
(0.539)
Note: Figures m brackets indicate Standard Error/Estimate. *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. *
indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
Both of the capacity variables have signs as expected suggesting that an increase in the
capacity for a particular class, other things held constant, will increase the demand for
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that class. The cross capacity coefficient further supports the theoretical base suggesting
that an increase in the capacity- in an alternative class -_ill have a negative knpact on
demand for the class under analysis.
Table 4 presents findings from the tmivariate Tobit models. In this case, models are
estimated for each of the classes in the choice set. Price is left out of the model because
therd is no variability throughout the year in the price of the tickets within each ticket
class.
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One of the clear outcomes using this approach is the differing parameters for the cross
capacity conslraint estimates. Indeed, the own capacity coefficient is significant for all of
the seven classes. One of the other interesting outcomes is that, in some cases, there are
positively signed cross-capacity coefficients. This may be a result of the correlations that
exists between the demands in each of the classes, in which case controlling for this
correlation may provide more efficient and understandable estimates.
The remaining variables provide their own indications on their relationship with the sales
v_dab!e. There is also some use in examining these results in conjunction with those
results in table 3.
At the time of writing, a significant problem had been discovered in the estimation of the
multiple bivariate Tobit model using QML. This problem was not a result of the
specification, but rather the result of a discovery of a "bug" in the mathematical software.
This bug was related to the calculation of the log of the distribution function. Dialogue
with the soRware developer estabhshed that:
"After some investigation it appears that some functions are not terminating their
loops as promptly as they should for extreme arguments." (Horecny, 2003)
Nonetheless, the QML multiple bivariate Tobit model was estimable using three classes
and a highly constrained independent variable set. These results are presented in table 5.
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Comparison results for the three individual classes using the same specification under the
univariate approach are presented in table 6.
Table Four
Univariate Tobit Estimates
SALES1 SALES2 SALES3 SALES4 SALES5
-0.3753"**
(-20.691)
SALES6 SALES7
0.9585***
(119.931)
-2.0372
(-0.263)
ONE
0.5867*** -0.3235*** -0.2831"** -0.1497"** -0.0277*** -0.0616"** -0.5419"**
CAP1
( 182.30) (-23.541 ) (-25.476) (- 16.007) (- 8.009) (- 11.456) (- 19.925)
-0.5622*** 0.4646*** -0.4454*** -0.0068 0.0026 -0.0060 -0.3216"**
CAP2
(-12.006) (24.710) (-29.917) (-0.498) (0.520) (-0.767) (-7.436)
-0.3009*** -0.3834*** 0.5459*** 0.0247 -0.0149"** 0.0437*** -0.1711"**
CAP3
(-5.743) (-18.829) (34.762) (1.629) (-2.651) (5.000) (-4.075)
-0.0786 0.1088"** 0.1671"** 0.1367"** -0.9253*** -0.0841"** 0.4846***
CAP4
(-1.274) (3.441) (6.545) (7.325) (-134.920) (-8.135) (9.528)
0.0548 0.0630* 0.0261 0.0275 0.9528*** -0.9007*** -0.0116
CAP5
(0.897) ( 1.977) ( 1.011) (1.486) (140.830) (-86.606) (-0.219)
CAP6
-0.1327"** -0.0231"** -0.0614"** 0.4518"**
(-12.450) (-5.850) (-10.011) (20.080)
-0.1357'** -0.1241"** -0.1323"**
CAP'/
(-3.714) (-7.652) (-10.029)
EARNINGS
0.0038
(0.425)
-0.0044
(-1.511)
0.8102 0.3548 0.1484 0.0076 -0.0676 -0.0963 0.0856
WGAEVENT
(1.512) (1.627) (0.855) (0.048) (-1.168) (-1.059) (0.342)
0.2027 -0.2166"* -0.2891"** -0.0047 0.0080 0.1322"** 0.7839***
MONFRI
(0.794) (- 1.967) (-3.176) (-0.064) (0.289) (3.077) (5.102)
0.8820*** -0.2329** -0.5331"** 0.1161 -0.0493 0.9106"** 0.9234***
WEEKEND
(3.035) (-2.012) (-5.814) (1.370) (-1.573) (18.638) (6.366)
-0.6230 -0.1936 -0.2586 -0.1313 0.0492 0.0048 0.2258
PUBHOL
(-0.963) (-0.582) (-0.974) (-0.695) (0.703) (0.045) (0.628)
-0.5826*** 0.3950*** -0.2167 -0.1994"* 0.1059"** 0.0425 0.1538
SCHHOL
(-2.038) (-3.381 ) (-2.298) (-2.380) (3.421 ) (0.881 ) (1.151 )
Likelihood -3893.439 -1198.404 -894.053 -2226.128 -828.497 -1455.053 -290.064
Note: Figures in brackets indicate Standard Error / Estimate. *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05
level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table Five
QML Estimates
ONE
CAP1
CAP2
CAP3
p21
p31
p32
SALESI SALES2 SALES3
-1.4800"** 0.5453***
(-3.675) (3.717)
0.7708*** -0.0804***
(30.927) (-7.348)
-0.6627*** 0.6160"**
(-I0.670) (!3.021)
-0.5040** -0.4795***
(-s.191) (-1o_s55)
-0.3775***
-0.5188"**
0.8897***
-0.0267
(_.!8_
-0.0245***
(-2._2)
-0.2690***
(_.7_)
0.4191"**
_.o40)
Note: Figures in brackets indicate Standard Error / Eslimate. Log-Likelthond = -9606.38. *** indieiates significance at the 0.01 level.
** radiates significance at the 0.05 level, pij identifies the estimated correlation coefficient between i and j.
Table Six
Comparative Univariate Tobit Specification to QML Estimates
ONE
CAP1
CAP2
CAP3
SALESI
0.0605
(0.143)
0.7362***
t.*a .o._._l
-0.6463***
(-12.703)
-0.5666***
(-10.736)
Log-Likelihood -4248.875
SALES2
6.3854***
(22.435)
-0.1526"**
(: :279)
0.4210"**
(16.310)
-0.6222***
(-24.303)
-1289.875
SALES3
5.8145"**
(23.538)
-0.1143"**
-0.4814"**
(-22.517)
0.3310"**
(15.6o7)
-1109.613
Note: Figures in brackets indicate Standard Error / Estimate. *** indiciates significance at the 0.01 levd. ** indicates significatr.e at
the 0.05 level
It is important to note that the QML estimates are from a joint estimation. The estimates
for p21, p31 and p32 indicate the correlations between the three equations. There is a
clear positive correlation between class one and class three while the other two
combinations have a negative correlation coefficient. Unfortunately, because of the
constrained size of the number of classes and variables, more detailed information is
unavailable at this stage.
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While this paper give some theoretical motivation for the use of the QML method in this
type of estimation, the preliminary nature of the results suggest that further work is
required on this modelling approach to validate its use.
Conclusion
This paper has presented three different approaches to examining consumer demand in a
multi-class capacity constrained discrete choice environment. Those three approaches
were based on the premise that consumers carry some expectations on the probability of
having their choice fulfilled. That probability depends on the expected capacity, the
expected demand and the optimal transaction cost for the particular choice.
The three approaches to examining demand in this environment were a Tobit panel
approach, a series ofunivariate Tobit models for individual choices, and a quasi-
maximum likelihood approach that corrects the univariate Tobit models for the
correlations that exist between each of the individual class demands. While the results
provided some insights into the usefulness of the various approaches, there remain a
number of issues surrounding the computational application of the quasi-maximum
likelihood method.
The direction of this research is to refine the QML method for more than three classes
and many independent variables. Further, the research is currently undertaking the
construction of a model that utilises a maximum simulated likelihood approach to
simulate the high dimensional integrals present in the multi-class system.
B. BAT'I'ERSBY 19
References
Battersby, B.D. (2002a) "'A Model of Demand for Regional Air Travel in New South
Wales." Paper presented at Air Transport Research SocieD' Conference, July 2002,
Seattle, WA.
Battersby, B.D. (2002b) "Utility maximisationina multi-class ticket environment with
capacityconstraints:The caseoftheair-travelmarkeL" Paperpresentedat the2002
AustralianConferenceof Economists,October2002,Adelaide.
Benassy, J. P. (1993) "Nonclearing Markets: Microeconomic Concepts and
Macroec_nomic Applications" Journal of Economic Literature, XXXl, 732-761.
Horecny, G. (2003)Personal Communication.
Yen, S.T., and Lin, B.H. (2002) "'Beverage Consumption Among U.S. Children and
Adolescents:Full-lnformationand Quasi Maximum-Likelihood Estimationofa Censored
System."European Review ofAgriculturalEconomics.29,I,85-103.
White, H. (1982) "Maximum likelihood estimation of misspecificd models",
Econometrica, 50, 1, 1-25.
An airline-based multilevel analysis of airfare elasticity for passenger demand
Lorenzo Castelli & Walter Ukovich
DEEI - University of Trieste,
Via A. Valerio 10, 34127 Trieste, Italy
Tel: +39 040 558 7134/7135, Fax: +39 040 558 3460
eastelli_its.it & ukovich_ts.it
Raffaele Pesenti
DIAl - University of Palermo,
Viale delle Scienze, 90128 Palermo, Italy
Tel: +39 091 481119, Fax: +39 091 427940
pesenti(-q_mipa.it
Abstract
Price elasticity of passenger demand for a specific airline is estimated. The main drivers
affecting passenger demand for air transportation are identified. First, an Ordinary Least Squares
regression analysis is performed. Then, a multilevel analysis-based methodology to investigate
the pattern of variation of price elasticity of demand among the various routes of the airline under
study is proposed. The experienced daily passenger demands on each fare-class are grouped for
each considered route. 9 routes were studied for the months of February and May in years from
1999 to 2002, and two fare-classes were defined (business and economy). The analysis has
revealed that the airfare elasticity of passenger demand significantly varies among the different
routes of the airline.
KEY"WORDS: Price Elasticity, Passenger Demand, Multi-level Analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
The liberalisation of the aviation sector and the continuously increasing demand for air
transportation have determined a deep transformation in the air transport market, particularly
characterised by the access of many new airspace users. In this context, customers of air traffic
services show very different behaviours and characteristics (see, e.g., [10] and [11]). Moreover,
their reactions to exogenous factors might be very different. In this framework, the careful
understanding of the characteristics of the final demand for passenger air transportation plays a
key role to assess and predict the behaviours of airspace users.
Passenger attitudes, and in particular price elasticity of demand for air transportation, vary
essentially because they fly for different reasons; a broad distinction is generally made between
business travellers and leisure travellers. Leisure travellers aim to maximise the utility derived
from the air travel and from the associated holiday experiences, subject to a given budget
constraint. Business travellers use air travel as an input to final production; generally, comfort
and time constraints play a key role in their decisions for flights. The different marginal utility of
the air travel for the two categories yields different sensibilities to factors affecting demand for it;
in particular, many studies have pointed out that demand for business travel tends to be less price
elastic than demand for leisure travel [3], [18], and [19].
This paper addresses the issue to determine price elasticity for passenger demand for a
specific airline. Airfare elasticity of passenger demand is generally estimated with respect to a
specific market (e.g., domestic, international, European, North-American) considering the
aggregate demand to all the airlines operating in that market. Our study differs from this
approach because it focuses on the passenger demand of a single airline.
First, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis is proposed. It takes into account
usual drivers affecting passenger air transportation demand. Then the different behaviours
passenger demand may show on routes with different characteristics are investigated. To this end,
a statistical multilevel approach is used. To the best of the authors' knowledge, no similar
methods have been reported in the literature for air transportation problems. In particular, we
determine fare elasticities for each route considered in the OLS sample. It turns out that their
values largely vary form one route to another one, and such a variation is statistically significant.
This is a relevant result as it implies that the passenger behaviour may significantly differ for
different routes of a same company. In turn, the reaction of an airline to perturbations of the
values of the driver factors, and especially of prices, may be expected to sensibly vary for
different routes. In particular, this means that routes on which a larger share of business
customers mav be expected, not only have lower elasticity, as everyone would expect, but also
that such a difference can be numerically large (experienced elasticities more than double) and
statistically relevant, even within a same company. Such a wide spread of elasticity values is a
meaningful and not ob_dous result of the study.
The paper is organised as follows. A literature analysis on the methodologies to assess
passenger demand elasticity and on the main drivers affecting demand for air transportation is
proposed in Section 2. Section 3 describes the general model, introduces the main factors taken
into account, and presents the network under study and the available data. In Section 4 the OLS
model is specified,the resultsare shown and discussed.Section 5 introduces the multi-level
model, and analysesitsresults.Finally,Section 6 concludes thepaper.
2. LI_mATtlRE REVIEW
Literature provides many studies where determinants of air travel demand are investigated
and methodologies to assess their influence are proposed. Important works in this field include,
among others: Abrahams [2], Fridstr6m and Thune-Larsen [7], Oum, Waters and Yong [19],
Ghobrial and Kanafani [8], Jorge-Calder6n [12], Abed, Ba-Fail and Jasimuddin [1], Brons, Pels,
Nijkamp and Rietveld [3].
Abrahams [2] presents an _:onometric model to estimate the air travel demand for the
domestic USA market. Unlike previous studies, besides gco-cconomical factors, demand is
expressed also in terms of quality of service and intermodal competition terms. Coefficients are
determined using a two-stage least squares procedure. Results suggest that demand is elastic with
respect to airfares. In particular, long-haul routes demand is more price elastic than short-haul
routes demand and vacation traffic demand is more price elastic than business one.
The study of Ffidstr6m and Thune-Larsen [7] presents an econometric air travel demand
model for the entire conventional domestic network of Norway. In addition to population and
income factors, airfares, travel time and inter-modal competition factors are taken into account
and short-medium and long term demand elasticities are estimated. Demand results inelastic in
the short-medium term (estimated elasticity: -0.69) and elastic in the long term (estimated
elasticity: -1.63) with respect to airfares and elastic with respect to travel time.
Oum, Waters and Yong [19] carry out a survey on the state-of-the-art of the research in the
estimation of transport demand price elasticity. After a theoretical introduction of the concepts of
elasticity, a survey on price elasticity of demand for various transportation modes is presented
and the influence of some factors on demand is discussed. It turns out that demand for business
travel is less elastic with respect to prices than demand for leisure travel and that price elasticity
estimates from cross-section data generally are higher than those from time-series data.
The study of Ghobrial and Kanafani [8] presents an econometric model for the intercity air
travel demand in USA. The model incorporates some quality of service measures as explanatory
variables and coefficients are estimated using post-deregulation data. A distinction is made
between services offered by airlines in peak and off-peak hours and a dummy variable is
introduced for capacity-constrained airports. Results suggest that demand is elastic with respect
to airfare (estimated elasticity: -1.2) and highly dependent on flight schedule and travel time.
Jorge-Calder6n [12] presents a demand model for scheduled airline services for the entire
network of international European routes in 1989. The model includes variables describing both
geo-economic characteristics of the area where transportation took place and patterns of airline
services. Flight data are also divided in three sub-samples by distance of the end-points. Results
suggest that demand is inelastic respect to fares on shortest sectors and price elasticity increases
with distance. In addition, short haul markets seem to be more sensitive to frequency of flights.
Abed, Ba-Fail and Jasimuddin [1] provide an econometric analysis of international air travel
demand in Saudi Arabia. As explanatory variables they consider only macro-economic and
demographic indicators and a detailed description of the steps followed for the development of
the model is given. Results suggest that population size and total expenditures are the main
determinants of international demand in Saudi Arabia.
Brons, Pels, Nijkamp and Rietveld [3] present a meta-analysis of the price elasticity estimates
of demand for passenger air travel. Atter a description of determinants of demand for passenger
air transport, they carry out a comparative re-evaluation of previous research on price elasticities
for passenger air transport. They find an overall demand mean price elasticity of-1.146 with
passengers becoming more price sensitive over time. Business passengers show lower price
sensitivity, with an average price elasticity of-0.8. Passengers are becoming more price sensitive
over time.
To the best of authors' knowledge, the multilevel analysis introduced in this paper is a new
methodology in the air transportation context.
3. MODEL DESCRIPTION
Demand for air transportation between two cities is assumed to be dependent on two main
groups of drivers [7] [8] [12]. The first one is composed of the gco-economic variables
determined by the _.onomic activities, the population and the geographical or locational
characteristics of the two cities between which the transportation takes place. The second group is
composed of the service-related factors, determined by the quality and price characteristics of the
air transport system connecting them.
The functional form selected for the estimating model is generally log-linear, as suggested
among the others by [7], [8], and [12]. The relationship between demand for air transportation D
and the explanatory variables is asstmled to take the following functional form:
D = Ax I-I G#_" x ]-[ S_" (1)
g s
where A is a constant, and G_ and S, represent the geo-economic and serwce-reiatecl factors,
respectively. Taking the logarithm on both sides, equation (1) becomes linear in the exponents of
the factors. This allows the use of linear regression techniques for their assessment. The values of
the parameters J3gand Ys represent the variation rate of the demand with respect to the percentage
variation of the corresponding factors, all other conditions being equal.
3.1 DEP_'D_ VARIABLE
The dependent variable used in the model is the number of passengers D0_ travelling on route
i in the fare-class f at day t. For this specification of the dependent variable, the demand
considered is the sum of demands for all the flights on a given route and fare-class in a day. In
this model a distinction is made between two main groups of fare classes, as it is explained in
subsection 4.2. Moreover, here we aggregate both origin-destination and transfer traffic. As
discussed below, dummy variables were included to explain the extra-traffic expected in hub
airports, where the volume of transfer traffic is supposed higher. Finally, the model is non-
directional: no distinction is made between origin and destination city. This is justified by the set
of data used, which revealed no significant difference in the passenger flows of the two directions
of the route.
3.2 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
According to the literature, population and regional Gross Domestic Product per capita have
been introduced in the model as proxies for socio-economic characteristics of the passengers on
the different routes. In our model we consider population of the total metropolitan area served by
the airports. Population factor POP has been defined as the product of the populations of the two
airport catchment areas. Also for GDP per capita in the two airport catchment areas, their product
has been chosen as the explanatory factor GDP. As geographical and locational factors of the two
cities, many explanatory variables have been tested in the model. According to the literature, the
distance between the two airports was introduced (DIST). To take into account the inter-modal
competition, a measure of the cost faced by the travellers in other modes of transportation has
been taken into account. The direct competitor of airline services in the routes considered is the
car (except in one case .where the substitute of aeroplane is the ferry). The costs of alternative
transportation modes have been considered in the ALTCOS factor.
Service-related variables were also included in the model. As explanatory of the service
quality provided, daily frequency of flights (FREQ) and aircraft size used for each flight (CAPA)
were inserted. A dummy variable HUB was introduced to identify _thubbing activity_, and was
set to one for routes from or to a hub airport for the considered airline. This variable was
expected to have a positive effect on demand as hub airports handle a relevant part of transfer
traffic. As regards pricing patterns, a variable FARE was included in the model. Since the
dependent variable is demand for each fare-class in a given day, the corresponding fare
introduced in each sample was the average airfare paid by travellers of the given fare-class.
Moreover, a dummy variable COMP was introduced to identify direct intra-modal
competition. The dummy ,,'affable was set to 1 for airport pairs among which other airlines
perform direct flights. A dummy variable WEND was introduced and set to i for flights
performed on Saturdays or Sundays and a dummy variable MA Y was introduced and set to 1 for
flights performed in May (see Subsection 3.3). Finally, a control variable YEAR has been
included in the model to capture the influence of the year of observation on the demand.
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Figure 1: Drivers of air travel demand
3.3 NETWORK AND PERIOD OF TIME UNDER STIYaY
Daily passenger demand for air transportation was considered using data about 9 routes of Air
Dolomiti (the largest Italian regional carrier, partner of Lufthansa), for the months of February
and May in years t_om 1999 to 2002 and l$om 1999 to 2001, respectively. The 9 mutes used for
the analysis are: Ancona-Munich, Bareelona-Torino, Barcelona-Verona, Cagliari-Genova, Paris-
Verona, Frankfurt-Verona, Genova-Munich, Munich-Trieste and Munich-Venezia. These routes
present different characteristics, considering Air Dolomiti network structure and market position.
Some routes have, as end-point cities, one of the hubs of the airline: Munich and Frankfim.
Moreover, a group of routes is directed to a holiday resort or touristic destination. On some routes
there was also a direct competition with another airline serving with a direct link the same cities.
The choice to analyse passenger demand in the months of February and May has been done to
captttre the seasonal variation of demand, characteristic of the air travel market (to see this trends
for year2000in theoverallEuropeanair marketsee[6]). Februaryis amonth of low passenger
demand,while May is a monthwith a high level of demand;to cope with that, Air Dolomiti
scheduleandpassengeroffer is different in thesetwo months.Moreover,the unavailability of
datafor the passengerdemandin anelectronicform haslimited theanalysisto dataaboutflights
performednotbefore 1999.
3.4DATA SOURCES
Data of passengers flown in each fare-class, airfare paid by each passenger, aircraft used and
frequency of flights have been provided by Air Dolomiti for the 9 routes. Geo-economic data
(GDP per capita in the catchment area of the airports, cost of fuel) and demographic data
(population in the area served by the airports) have been taken from the National Institutes of
Statistics and other Statistical organisations of the countries which the respective airports belong
to (see [4] for details). Distance between two cities was considered as the length of the shortest
segment between pertaining airports.
3.5 AGGREGATION OF FARE CLASSES
The available data give the detail of the number of passengers for each fare-class in each
flight on the routes considered in the sample. Moreover, for each passenger they give the fare
paid for the flight. The data have been first aggregated by fare-class and day: the demand for each
fare-class on the same origin-destination pair has been grouped through the various flights of
each day. The regression analysis carried out using these aggregated data gives many unreliable
coefficient estimates with an overall low explanatory power of the regression. The key factor for
these bad results is that data are too much dispersed. In fact, the analysis reveals that on average
there are 7-8 different fare classes per flight, a kind of"dispersion" that is mainly due to revenue
management strategies of the airline, and not to substantial differences in passenger service
offered. To cope with this problem, we decided to collapse all these fare-classes in only two
"usual" groups: business classes and economy classes. This final aggregation is reasonable and
easy to implement, since there is a clear distinction between "economic" fare-classes and
"business" fare-classes. The corresponding airfare variable is the average airfare paid by
passengers travelling on that class.
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4. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES MOREL
When OLS regression analysis is performed, multi-collinearity and endogeneity issues may
arise. In our case, multi-collinearity analysis proved DIST and ALTCOST to be redundant factors,
and therefore they have been dropped. As regards the endogeneity of factors, possible
endogenous problematic variables could be frequency of flights [2] [12], airfares [8] [12] and
aircraft size [12]. In our analysis we consider both airfare and aircraft size as exogenous factors
affecting demand. Frequency of flights has been considered endogenous (see [4] for details).
4.1 MODEL SPECIFICATION
The estimated model is displayed in equation (2); it has been linearised taking the logarithm
on both sides of the equation, as shown in (3):
D_ = A x POP:' x GDPf _ x FREQ_ x FARE._" x CAPA_' x YF_.A_'×
x exp(y1HUB i + Y2TOUR, +ysCOMPn + y4W'ENDt +ysMAYt +_:)
(2)
lnD¢ = a + fl_ lnPOP_, + f12 In GDP_ + fls InFREQ_, + fl,, ln FARE ¢ + fls In CAPA,, +
+ f16 lnYEAR, +y_HUBi +Y2TOUR_ +ysCOMP_, +y4WEND, + ?'sMAY, +e
(3)
where subscript i represents route, f represents fare-class ("business" or "economy") and t is a
progressive index that indicates the day of the observation. Greek letters are the estimated factors.
Coefficients ft. of the n quantitative variables represent the direct elasticity of demand with
respect to a change in the corresponding factor, y_ are the coefficients of the m qualitative
variables, a is the constant term and e is the error term of the estimation.
4.2 EMImUC_ RESULTS
The results of the OLS regression analysis are presented in Table 1.
Explanatory variable Coefficient Estimated coefficient t-statistic
Constant
Population (POP)
GDP per-capita (GDP)
Frequency of flights (FREQ)
P2
-1.226
0.128
0.127
0.862
-1.680
6.285
3.342
31.884
Airfare (FARE)
Aircraft seatcapacity(CAPA)
Year (YEAR)
Hub airport(HUB)
Touristmarket(TOUR)
Direct competition(COMP)
Weekend(WEND)
May (MA Y)
Observations
R2adj
71
72
73
74
75
6700
0.627
Fisher Test 1024.59
-1.058
0.636
0.070
0.241
0.312
-0.088
-0.442
0.080
-71.479
13.936
4.164
3.564
4.598
-3.227
-25.566
5.198
Table 1: Estimation results
The adjusted multiple determination coefficient R_j, that indicates the percentage of variance
in passengers demand explained by the selected drivers, is 62.7% for our model. This result,
although lower than the ones found in [2] and [12], is higher than the values found in [8] and only
slightly lower than the results in [7]. The Fisher Test value F, that indicates the overall
significance of the estimated regression line, is 1024.59. Considering such value for the F Test,
the F distribution, with 10 (k-l) and 6689 (n-k) degrees of freedom, allows the rejection of the
null hypothesis, i.e., all partial slopes are simultaneously equal to zero or, alternatively, R 2 = 0.
The results of the regression analysis show that all the estimated coefficients are of the
expected sign and all are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In the following, the impact on
the passenger demand of the main drivers is described in more detail.
4.3 ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
4.3.1 Price Elasticity
With regard to prices, the estimated elasticity of passenger demand for air transportation with
respect to airfare is -1.058. This coefficient is associated to a very high value for the t-test
Otl > 70) that implies a very high significance of the elasticity coefficient. The literature provides a
sli _:htly higher value for the overall market; a recent meta-analysis [3] [13] indicates that studies
published on this topic reveal a mean price elasticity of-1.146. Nevertheless, Air Dolomiti is an
airline oriented to the business travellers, which is a segment less sensitive to changes in airfares
than the leisure travellers. In fact, studies focused on business class passengers on the past years
revealed an average price elasticity of travel demand of-0.8 [3]. However, this latter figure refers
to the whole business passenger market. Instead, competition reasons imply that the price
elasticity of demand for a single company is generally higher than the price elasticity of demand
for the whole market where it operates. Moreover, in the latter years, faced with the liberalisation
of the European air market [11] and an increased choice of airlines and prices, the business travel
market is becoming more and more price sensitive. Recent studies indicate an increasing
tendency for business travellers to travel economic and discounted classes, as it is also proved by
the fact that and airlines are developing various economic measures and marketing strategies to
maintain their loyalty (frequent flyers programmes, web check-in, etc.) [14] [15].
4.3.2 Other factors
Frequency of flights on a route is found to have a positive effect on passengers demand, with
an elasticity coefficient of 0.862. GDP per-capita and Population factors have a small positive
effect on passenger demand. The estimated coefficient of aircraft seat capacity is 0.636. All these
elasticity results are in line with the findings in [8] (see [4] for more details).
4.3.3 Dummy Variables
Dummy variables to characterise hubbing activity and holiday resort destinations have a
positive coefficient that indicates the presence of a larger volume of traffic due to the role of
connecting point of the hub and the attractiveness of tourist destinations respectively. Both
coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level, but the t-test coefficient is not high, thus implying a
large variance in the coefficients estimation.
The dummy variable introduced to take into account the direct competition with another
airline on the same rotrte has, as expected, a negative coefficient of-0.088. Also in this ease, the
considerations about the low value of the t-test coefficient apply.
The dummy variable introduced to consider flights performed in the week-ends has a
coefficient of-0.442. This implies that, other conditions being equal, the demand for air
transportation on Saturdays and Sundays is 35.7% lower than in the other days of the week.
Finally, MAY dummy variable reveals an 8.3% increase in passenger demand during the
month of May respect to February. Moreover, there is a positive trend in passenger demand for
air transportation for Air Dolomiti (all other conditions being equal) during these last years.
5 A TwO-LEVEL MODEL FOR AIR TRAVEL DEMAND
According to the analysis of the literature and also to the results of the OLS model estimation
performed in Section 4, it turns out that passenger demand for air transportation seems to be
elastic with respect to airfares. Then, in order to refine these findings, we study the pattern of
variability of price elasticity of demand along the different routes of the airline. In our analysis of
Air Dolomiti data, airfare paid by passengers explains more than 30% of the variance in the
passenger demand. Therefore, for our qualitative "route-variability" analysis we decided to focus
our attention only on the effect of the paid airfares on the passenger demand for air travel on each
route. In this framework, the multilevel structure in the data sample must be considered. The final
daily passenger demands on each fare-class, that constitute the level 1 units of the population, are
grouped in a level 2 units defined by the pertaining route to which demand is referred. Therefore,
our model can be seen as a two-level model. The level 2 macro-units are the routes of the airline
network, while the level 1 units are the daily demand for a given fare-class on the route. For the
analysis of such a model, multilevel statistical methodologies are used [ 17], as described in the
following.
5.1 MODEL SPECIFICATION
The purpose of this investigation is to consider the pattern of variation among the Air
Dolomiti routes of price elasticity of passenger demand. To this end, our approach is to consider
only the effects of a single predictor x, airfare, to the response variable y, passenger demand.
According to the exponential functional form selected in the previous analysis (see subsection
4.1), the two variables are subject to a logarithmic transformation. Since price elasticity is
represented by the slope of the regression line in the (x,y) graph, the multilevel functional form
selected for the model has to allow both intercepts and slopes of the predicted regression lines to
vary across level 2 units. Therefore, the mathematical specification of the model is the following:
Yiff = aj + bjxii f + E O.
with
aj = a + uoj
by= b + uly
and
.2L%J ,o, ]
e_
where y/_is the logaritlma of passenger demand for a given fare-class fin the day i on routej and
x_ is the corresponding logarithm of average airfare paid for the transportation. Subscripts j on
the coefficients a and b denote that both intercept and slope of the regression line are allowed to
vary across the level 2 units, i.e., the different routes.
5.2 EMPmlCAL RESULTS
The empirical results of the multilevel regression analysis are presented in the following
equations:
y_¢ = a/+ bjx_ + e,_
aj = 8.366(0.483) + uoj
by = -1.031(0.092) + u_j
/['u°J]/ ~ N 0_.__1.986(0.989) -0.337(0.178)]
Lulj j " _ L-0.337(0.178) 0.072(0.036) .]
The estimated mean price elasticity coefficient, b, is -1.031 (with a standard error 0.092
indicated within parentheses) and does not differ significantly from the value of-1.058 found in
the multiple OLS regression analysis. The individual route slopes vary about this mean with a
variance estimated as 0.072 (standard error 0.036). The intercepts of the individual route lines
also differ. Their mean is 8.366 (standard error 0.483) and their variance is 1.986 (standard error
0.989). In addition there is a negative covarianee between intercepts and slopes, estimated as -
0.337 (standard error 0.178), suggesting that routes with higher intercepts tend to have lower
slopes (in absolute value). The observed passenger demands vary around their routes' lines by
quantifies eiff, whose variance is estimated as 0.466 (standard error 0.008).
The estimated regression lines for each route are also plotted in the Graph 1 where the x axis
represents the logarithm of the average airfare paid and the y axis represents the logarithm of the
demand.
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Graph 1: Price elasticity of the demand for each route
The analysis of Graph 1 reveals that demand for flights involving a hub for the airline
(Munich or Frankfurt) is relatively more price inelastic than demand'for other, point-to-point,
routes. This is probably due to the fact that the point-to-point flights attract more leisure
travellers, whose price sensitivity is higher. A peculiar case is constituted by the Barcelona-
Torino route, which is a point-to-point route for Air Dolomiti and shows a relatively low price
elasticity of passenger demand, typical for business routes. This is due to the fact that between
the Barcelona and Torino areas there are many important industrial and commercial links, which
generate a peculiarly higher demand for business travels between the two cities.
For flights from or to a hub, it should also be considered that a significant fraction (over 40%
on the average) of their traffic is transit traffic, in connection with other flights. Then it must be
pointed out that the elasticity figures derived in this chapter are based on fares paid for the Air
Dolomiti connection only, and not on the total cost of the whole route of transit passengers,
which involves other flights, operated by other airlines.
In Table 2 the estimated passenger demand price elasticity coefficients for the various routes
are provided.
Route Estimated passenger price elasticity of demand
Munich-Trieste (MUC-TRS) -0.746
Barcelona-Torino (BCN-TRN) -0.821
Munich-Venice (MUC-VCE) -0.866
Franlffurt-Verona (FRA-VRN) -0.868
Genova-Munich (GOA-MUC) -0.884
Paris-Verona (CDG-VRN) -1.103
Ancona-Mtmieh (AOI-MUC) - 1.122
Cagliari-Genova (CAG-GOA) -1.243
Barcelona-Verona (BCN-VRN) - 1.624
Table 2: Price elasticity of passenger demand for the various routes
5.3 ANALYSIS OF TIlE RESULTS
Table 2 shows that there is a great variability among the estimated values of airfare elasticity
of passenger demand on the sampled routes ranging fi-om -0.746 for the Munich-Trieste route to -
1.624 for the Barcelona-Verona route. In order to investigate in deeper detail the significance of
the differences in the airfare elasticity of passenger demand among the different considered
routes, the confidence intervals arotmd the values presented in the table above have been studied.
The overall mean slope coefficient (i.e., the airfare elasticity of passenger demand) estimated
,v, ta_ ,_,u,e data set was -1.031. The residuals, ,-.,_lr.,,I,_-M _ear _r.h rome, we defined as _e
difference between the slope coefficient found for the route (reported in table 2) and the overall
mean value; for example, the residual for the Ancona-Munich route was -0.091. Around these
residuals (whose mean is zero), the 95% confidence intervals have been calculated. To this end,
in [9] and [16] Goldstein, Rasbash et al. discussed the circumstances where the value of 1.4
rather the conventional 1.96 standard deviation is used to calculate 95% intervals. They pointed
out that to analyse whether a route is significantly different from the overall mean, the
conventional 1.96 interval can be used in terms of whether or not it overlaps the zero line.
Conversely, if intervals are used to make comparisons between pairs of routes, then we can judge
significance at the 5% level by whether or not the 1.4 times standard error intervals overlap.
In Graph 2, the residuals for the slopes are ordered form smallest (-0.593 for the Barcelona-
Verona route) to larger (0.285 for the Munich-Trieste route). Then the 1.96 standard deviation
intervals are calculated.
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Graph 2: Residual confidence intervals (1.96 standard deviations)
It turns out that the confidence intervals for the Barcelona-Verona route (on the extreme left)
and for the Munich-Trieste and Barcelona-Torino routes (on the extreme right) do not overlap the
zero line and, therefore, with more than 95% of probability they differ from the overall mean
value of-1.031.
If we consider the 1.4 standard deviation, the confidence intervals around the residuals
(ordered from smallest to larger, as in the previous case) are presented in Graph 3"
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Graph 3: Residual confidence intervals (1.4 standard deviations)
Graph 3 evidences that the routes in the sample could be clustered in three distinct groups,
with similar characteristics in terms of airfare elasticity of passenger demand. The first group is
constituted by only the Barcelona-Verona route, whose confidence interval does not overlap any
other one for the other routes. A second group is constituted by the Cagliari-Genova, Ancona-
Munich and Paris-Verona routes, whose slope coefficient is higher than one (in absolute value).
The third group is finally constituted by Genova-Munich, Frankfurt-Verona, Munich-Venice,
Barcelona-Torino and Munich-Trieste routes, whose price elasticity of demand with respect to
airfares is lower than one (in absolute value).
From the analysis of Graphs 2 and 3 we could also note that the Cagliari-Genova route shows
larger confidence intervals for the residual than other routes. This is due to the smaller data set
used (flights on that route in past years were performed only Ibr two days per week) that also
makes the intercept and slope coefficients more "sensible" to outlier observations.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents an application of an Ordinary Least Squares model to assess passenger air
transportation demand for a single airline. The model follows the main guidelines described in
the literature taking into account usual drivers affecting passenger air transportation demand.
However, the attention is not focused on passenger air travel demand for a given market (as it
generafiy happens, see Section 2), but on the passenger demand of a single airline. The model has
been verified and validated on a relatively large sample of flights taken from the Air Dolomiti
network. According to the statistical tests performed, the obtained results do not vary from the
expected theoretical ones and prove the correctness of the proposed approach.
However, for most airlines passenger price sensitivity may be different (on the average) on
different routes. OLS analysis only provides an aggregate view and earmot capture these effects.
Hence a multilevel statistical upproac_ has been used to analyse the airfare elasticity of
passengers demand on the different routes of the Air Dolomiti data set. The analysis has revealed
a significant variability of the elasticity of passenger demand for air transportation with respect to
the airfares paid among the different routes of the airline, ranging from --0.746 for the Mtmich-
Trieste route to -1.624 for the Barcelona-Verona route. The study has also been extended through
the analysis of the confidence of the results obtained. Their analysis has revealed that the routes
in the sample could be clustered in different groups, with different characteristics in terms of
price elasticity of passenger demand and, therefore, different expected behaviours of the airline.
The results obtained by the innovative application of the multilevel analysis in the air
transportation context seem to be encouraging and suggest to extend the study to more complex
models with further explanatory variables and a larger sample of routes. Furthermore, analyses
could be led to a more detailed level to investigate, e.g., the effect on fare elasticities of the fact
that a larger share of passengers flying to a hub may be expected to continue their journey on
other flights, paying a cumulative fare.
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Abstract
This study addresses the need for measuring the effect of enlarging seating room in
airplane on passengers' preferences of airline in Taiwan. The results can assist Taiwan's
domestic air carriers in better understanding their customers' expectations. Stated choice
experiment is used to incorporate passengers' trade-offs in the preferred measurement, and
three major attributes are taken into account in the stated choice experiment: (1) type of
seat (enlarged or not), (2) price, and (3) brand names of airlines. Furthermore, a binary logit
model is used to model the choice behavior of air passengers. The findings show that the
type of seat is a major significant variable; price and airline's brand are also significant as
well. It concludes that air carriers should put more emphasis on the issue of improving the
quality of seat comfort.
Keywords: Passengers' preference, Enlarged seating room, Stated choice experiment,
Binary logit model.
1. INTRODUCTION
Aitcr the deregulation of air transportation market, and due to expectations of
increasing demand, most airlines place as many seats as possible in each plane. As a result,
the seating space for each passenger, including legroom, arm rest room, and so on, was
sacrificed. Consequently, airlines offer a poor standard of passenger comfort service.
However, air travelers are concerned about the service quality of seating comfort during
their journey in the sky, especially for long-haul trips.
Based on the results of some reports, most airline passengers considered the seat
legroom, armrest space, and personal seating room to be quite important. Especially for
business travelers, they viewed the quality of seating room as a critical index of the total
service quality of airlines (Toynbee, 1994; Flint, 1995). In the study of Alamdari (1999),
the author also indicated that airline passengers considered the quality of seating room as
one of the important factors when selecting an airline. Fiorino (1999) revealed that the
uncomfortable seating configuration in coach class is the root of much passenger
discontent. Hence, there are more and more airlines, including United Airlines, American
Airlines, British Airways, Virgin, and Singapore Airlines, etc., that direct a lot of effort into
reconfiguring seating and expanding legroom so that they can provide better seat comfort
to passengers (McDougall, 2002).
In Taiwan, some local researches also showed that the service quality of seating room
is one of the most important factors when travelers select a domestic airline. However, the
quality of seat comfort that air passengers actually received falls far behind their
expectations. Obviously, it can be seen that if airlines in Taiwan pay more attention to
improving seat comfort, the passengers may attach higher values of total service quality to
an airline, and might change their preference. In other words, the effect of a seating
environment should not be ignored when passengers choose an airline.
What is more, due to the gradual decline in passenger load factor in recent years, it
appears to be the time to discuss the policy of passenger-maximization thoroughly. In other
words, if airlines can decrease the total seat numbers by adjusting the cabin configuration,
or rather, enlarging the seating space of each seat, and promote different price strategies,
they will probably raise the load factor as well as revenue. The aim of this study is to
explore the change in air passengers' preferences, in a situation where service quality has
improved (in terms of seating room), through enlarging the size of seat. Stated choice
method (Louviere, et al., 2000) is used to administrate an experimental design, that
includes three variables (attributes): passenger seat type, price, and brand (airline). Then a
binary logit model is used to describe the choice behavior of air passengers. Though the
focus of this issue is on Taiwan's domestic air passengers market, the results also can be
applied to the marketing practice of international airlines. Especially those domestic
airlines in Taiwan that are well prepared to service the route between Taiwan and Mainland
China_ Thus the result of this study could provide some positive suggestions for an
improvement in passenger service.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the background of Taiwanese
Domestic Air Passenger Market. Section 3 introduces the stated preference experiment
strategy of this study. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of empirical analysis.
Finally, Section 5 offers brief concluding comments.
2. BACKGROUND - Taiwan's domestic air passengers market
The air transportation market in Taiwan has grown rapidly over the past two decades,
especially after deregulation in 1988. Air transportation in Taiwan services about two
percent ofintercity traffic. Among them, passengers who make a round trip between Taipei,
the political and economical center of Taiwan, and Kaohsiung, the biggest metropolitan
city of southern Taiwan, is the major dement of air transportation. In 2001, there were
almost four million passengers, 33 percent of Taiwanese air transportation traffic, between
Taipei and Kaohsiung.
However, in recent years, due to drastic expansion and the falling economic
environment, the passenger load factor has gradually declined. In 2001, the passenger load
factor was only about 56 percent. The trend described above also can be observed in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. The growth trends of the air passengers market in Taiwan.
At present, there are four domestic airlines in Taiwan: Far Eastern Air Transport,
Trans Asia Airways, Uni Air, and Mandarin Airlines. Their individual market share of the
Taipei-to-Kaohsiung route is shown in Fig. 2. The figure shows that Far Eastern Air
Transport dominates the air passengers market on this route, with Trans Asia Airways and
Uni Air following behind.
These four domestic airlines provide two classes of cabin configuration, business
class and economic class. However, the number of seats on business class is no more than
12 (only about five percent of total seats on each plane). That means that only 12
passengers actually sit in business class on each flight, some times even fewer. Thus nearly
95 percent of domestic passengers have no choice but to sit in the very crowded economy
class seats.
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Fig. 2. The market share: The Taipei-to-Kaohsiung route
Moreover, these business class seats are frequently used as rewards for frequent flyers.
Hence, the revenues from business class seats do not do much help to these air carriers.
In short, Taiwan's domestic air passenger market is undoubtedly shrinking. It is
necessary to promote new marketing strategies to induce latent demand. Meanwhile,
several studies also indicate that the service quality, in terms of cabin seating, is a fairly
important factor when air passengers select an airline. As a result, strengthening the service
quality of cabin seating, such as stretch out length; and expanding the width of seating
space, should be given a higher priority. Consequently, it is suggested that the policy of
enlarging seating room could be a new marketing strategy, and its effects on air passengers"
preference of airlines should be analyzed.
3. STATED CHOICE EXPERIMENT
There are many factors that affect passengers' choice of airlines: time schedule,
number of flights, frequency, number of direct-flights, airlines image, punctuality, in-flight
services, seat comfort, passengers" attit-ades, passengers' purpose of _p, and passengers'
satisfaction with the airlines, etc. (Proussaloglou and Koppelman, 1995; Ghobrial, 1989;
Ippolito, 1981). A conceptual figure, shown in Fig. 3, can describe passengers' choice of
behavior. However, the effects of seat comfort and airlines' image are rarely quantified.
Hence, the relationship that is presented as solid line in Fig 3 is the major concern of this
study. Due to lack of revealed preference of seat comfort for market presence, a stated
choice experiment is used to present a choice game and analyze the quantified effects of
those variables.
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Fig. 3. The conceptual framework of passengers' choice of airlines
Let us first define the attributes and associated levels in the stated choice experiment.
Here, we selected three attributes in constructing the stated choice game. The attributes and
associated levels are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Three attributes and associated levels used in the study
Variables Levels
Sea-Type
Price
Brand
(1) The sea-size is the as same as the market practice.
(2) 50 percent of total seats are enlarged seas.
(3) 100 percent of total seats are enlarged seats.
(1) 10 percent higher than market average.
(2) Market average.
(1) Far Eastern Air Transport.
(2) Trans Asia Airways.
(3) Uni Air.
(4) Mandarin Airlines.
The first attribute is the type of sea, and has three levels: (1) the size of seat is same as
market practice and, (2) 50 percent of total seats given on each flight are enlarged seats (the
rests are the same as on the standard economic class seat) and, (3) 100 percent of total seats
given on each flight are enlarged seats. The second attribute is ticket price with two levels:
(1) 10 percent higher than market average and, (2) same as market average. The last
attribute is the brand name of airline. As there are four airlines in the domestic air
passenger market in Taiwan, four levels of brand name attribute are given as follow, (1) Far
Eastern Air Transport (FEAT), (2) Trans Asia Airways (rAPt), (3) Uni Air (UA), and, (4)
Mandarin Airlines (MAL).
In here, we viewed the alternative represented the airline that passengers originally
took as an independent altemaive. So the first level of Sea_Type was eliminated from
experimental design. That is, the stated choice experiment contained 16 profiles that were
generated from the experimental design of 2 x 2 x 4. The respondents had to finish three
choice tasks. The first choice task and the second choice task both asked respondents to
evaluate the airline that they took originally, and one profile that selected randomly from
16 profiles, respectively. The third choice task asked respondents to evaluate the two
profiles that were presented separately in the first choice task and the second choice task.
That is, all respondents faced two alternatives on each choice of the game.
The choice game experiment was conducted in a questionnaire, and respondents were
randomly selected from the air flight route of Kaohsiung-to-Taipei. In addition to the
choice game, socio-economic status and demographic information were also gathered for
sample descriptive and further analysis.
Locally hired and trained interviewers were assigned to Kaohsiung Airport, and
randomly selected passengers who were going to Taipei, for interviewing. Passengers were
interviewed while they were waiting for the flight that they were going to take, and asked to
participate in a survey; 576 passengers fully completed the survey.
4. EMPRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we first describe the composition of samples and then analyze the
results about passenger choice behavior. We constructed a passenger choice model by the
use of binary logit model. Some discussions about the results found are also drawn here.
4.1 Sample Description
Among all the respondents, 60 percent were male, and 40 percent were female. Most
respondents were at age 21 to 30 which made up 51.4 percent of all samples; followed by
those at age 31 to 40 and 41 to 50. In addition, _,_bout 70 percent of all respondents were
college or graduate school graduates. Furthermore, almost 30 percent of all respondents
were business trip passengers, and 70 percent of all were non-business trip passengers.
Respondents were also asked what class of seat they took / were taking. The results
showed that 88 percent of all respondents took economic class seats, and 12 percent of
respondents took business class seats, meanwhile, only half of business class passengers
(that is six percent of all respondents) paid full price.
Furthermore, over 85 percent of the respondents were unsatisfied with the seating
situation currently provided on domestic flights. The major factors leading to their
dissatisfaction were nothing more than lack of stretch out space, strained arm rest room,
and the oppression caused by those lower overhead compartments. On the other hand,
nearly 90 percent of the respondents would prefer an airline with larger and more
comfortable seating configuration if their travel time became twice as the present time.
4.2 Affecting Factors on the Passengers' Choice of Airlines
After we referenced several studies related to passengers' choice of airline, we listed
10 possible affecting factors on choice of behavior. Respondents were asked to rank these
factors using the numbers 1, 2, and 3 to represent 'Very important', 'Important', and 'Less
important'. Then a score of three was assigned to 'Very important', two to 'Important', and
score of one to 'Less important'. As a result, total score of each affecting factor and rank
the importance of these factors can be calculated. Table 2 was the result of importance
ranking of affecting factors.
Table 2. Importance of affecting factors on passengers" choice decision
Importance Rankin_
Business Non-Business
Affecting Factors Total Passensers Passensers
Schedule of Time Table 1 2 1
Safety 2 1 2
TicketPrice 3 4 3
SeatComfort 4 3 6
Airlines Image 5 5 5
Punctuality 6 9 4
In-Flight Service 7 10 7
FrequentFlyer Member 8 8 8
ReservationandCheck-inService 9 7 9
Aircraft Type 10 6 10
From the results showed in Table 2, it is clear that the top two factors affecting
passengers' choice of airline are 'Schedule of Time Table' and 'Safety'. The factor of'Seat
Comfort' is ranked fourth by the total number of passengers, third for business passengers,
and sixth for non-business passengers. It means that business passengers view the effect of
seat comfort on their choice decision as more important than non-business passengers.
Also, most passengers give more consideration to the quality of seat comfort when they
select an airline. Therefore, if air carriers are willing to make more improvements in terms
seating space on their fleet, this may bring some positive benefits in terms of passengers'
choice.
Moreover, it also can be seen that the importance ranking of all affecting factors is
quite different between business passengers and non-business passengers, especially for
the factor of 'Punctuality'. It is ranked ninth for business passengers and fourth for
non-business passengers. This result is different from expectations that business
passengers would put more emphasis on the importance of 'Punctuality'. One possible
reason of that is business passengers may mostly be frequent flyers, so they are familiar
with flight schedule information, and realize that the quality of punctuality is quite good for
market practice.
4.3 Analysis of Passengers Satisfaction
The analysis of passengers' satisfaction can help us know the quality of airline
services that passengers actually received. Ten service factors were selected and
respondents were asked to separately evaluate their satisfaction of these service factors that
they received by the use of five-point scale: 'Very good', 'Good', 'Moderate', 'Bad', and
'Very bad'. Next, five different scores were assigned, from a maximum of five to a
minimum of one, to represent five-point scale sequentially. After calculating the total
scores of each service factor, the results are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Ranking of passengers satisfaction of service factors
S_wice Factors
R_cu'vation and Check-in Service
Flight Attendant Service
Safety
Punctuality
Responsible for Complmuts
Schedule of Time Table
Aircraft Type
Ticket Price
Seat Comfort
In-Flight Catering Service
Rankin$
Standard
Mean Score deviation
1 3.67 0.61
2 3.57 0.69
3 3.39 0.77
4 3.27 0.74
5 3.24 0.57
6 3.21 0.68
7 3.12 0.62
8 2.90 0.74
9 2.86 0.78
10 2.82 0.74
The ten service factors presented in Table 3 are a little bit different from the ten
affecting factors presented in Table 2. 'Frequently Flyer Member' and 'Airline Image' are
deleted from the set of affecting factors, and the service factor of 'Responsible for
Complaints' is added. The affecting factor of 'In-Flight Service' is divided into two:
'Flight Attendant Service' and 'In-Flight Catering Service'.
A study of the results of Table 3 shows that the service factor of 'Seat Comfort' is
ranked far behind the other eight service factors. Also, its mean score is 2.86, indicating
that the service quality that passengers received was under average. Compared to the
results of Table 2, it obviously implies that there is a scr'dcc g_ bet've_ pass_gers'
expectation and what is received. Again, it can be seen that the improvement of the quality
of seat comfort should be advanced to the most important place. As a result, there will be
positive effects in terms of the passengers' satisfaction.
In addition, each score of service factors segmented by airline, is summarized, to
obtain the total scores of passengers' satisfaction with the airlines. The rankings of
Taiwan's domestic four airlines are presented in Table 4. The results of Table 4 suggest that
Trans Asia Airways (TAA) is the first ranked, implying that most passengers are satisfied
with the services offered by TAA. The second ranked airline is Far Eastern Airline (FEAT).
TAA and FEAT made up almost 60 percents of total air traffics in the route of
Taipei-to-Kaohsiung in 2002.
Table 4. Ranking of passengers' satisfaction with airlines
Airlines Rankin$
Tram Asia Airways (TAA)
Far Eastern Air Transport (FEAT)
Uni Air (UA)
1
2
3
Mandarin Airlines (MA) 4
4.4 Choice Model
In order to quantify the effects of improving seat comfort on passengers' preference of
airline, a binary logit model is used to construct a passenger choice model. The variables
that were taken into account are shown in Table 5. Among them, there are the types of seat
as two dummy variables: Seat-Type 1 represented the level of 50 percent enlarged seats,
and Seat-Type 2 represented the level of 100 percent enlarged seats (the reference level is
same as market practice). Also, the brand names of airlines are set as three dummy
variables: TAA represented Trans Asia Airways, FEAT represented Far Eastern Air
Transport, and UA represented Uni Air (Reference level is Mandarin Airlines). The results
of this choice model are shown in Table 6.
Table 5. The definition of variables
Variables Definition
Price
Seat_Type 1
Seat_Type 2
FEAT
TAA
UA
Quantified variable. Ticket Price (Unit: 1,000 NT$)
Dummy variable. If the seat-size is 50 percent enlarged seats, the value of
it is 1, otherwise is 0.
Dummy variable. If the seat-size is 100 percent enlarged seats, the value
of it is 1, otherwise is 0.
Dmnmy variable. If the brand name of airline is Far Eastern Air
Transport, the value of it is 1, otherwise is 0.
Dummy variable. If the brand name of airline is Trans Asia Airways, the
value of it is 1, otherwise is 0.
Dummy variable. If the brand name of airline is Uni Air, the value of it is
1, otherwise is 0.
The results in Table 6, signal that all variables are quite significant, although the
variable of UA was less significant. However, the index of goodness-of-fit of this model is
weak. The value of likelihood ratio is only 0.05.
Table 6. Results of passengers' choice model of airlines
Variables Coefficients t-value
Constant 0.786 4.184
Price (1,000 NT$) -0.568 -2.457
Seat_Type 0 Reference Level
Seat_Type 1 0.724 3.585
Seat_Type 2 1.233 4.631
FEAT 0.381 2.159
TAA 0.620 3.287
UA 0.294 1.575
MA ReferenceLevel
Samples
Log Likelihood at Convergence
Likelihood Ratio (p 2 )
576
-379.302
0.05
The sign of price is negative implying that passengers prefer the airline of lower ticket
fare to that of higher ticket fare. The sign of dummy variables of SeatType 1 and
Seat_Type 2 are positive indicating that there are positive effects of enlarged seats on
passengers' choice of airline. This result supports inferences before: that passengers
actually view seat comfort as an important factor on their choice decision. In addition, it is
noted that the coefficient of Seat_Type 1 is smaller than that of SeatType 2. It means that
the effect of 100 percent enlarged seats on passengers' choice is greater than that of 50
percent enlarged seats. Furthermore, t-test could be used (see the following equation) to
test if the null hypothesis that these two coefficients are equal is accepted.
t = 13: -13, (1)
_]Var(_l ) + Varff32 ) - 2Cov(_31 ,_2 )
In the equation (1), 132 means the coefficient value of Seat_Type 2, and 131represents
the coefficient value of Seat_Type 1. According to this equation, the t-value is 3.216. It is
si_wsdficant compare to the critical v_ue of l_._,_oh¢,_, _- n_.__o_, ...."r_,;_ remal*_.... implies that the
effect of 100 percent enlarged seats on passengers' choice of airline is significantly
different from that of 50 percent enlarged seats.
Finally, the variables of brand names of airlines are also significant. The variable of
TAA that represents Trans Asia Airways has the greatest coefficient value. The second and
third values of coefficients are FEAT and UA. It implies that passengers who took TAA
would have stronger preferences toward TAA than passengers who took FEAT and UA.
These factors are in concord with the passengers' satisfaction of airlines that was illustrated
in the previous section.
5. CONCLUSION
In this research the effect of enlarged seats on passengers' preferences of airline was
measured, it has been shown that enlarged seats do affect the choice decision of air
passengers. These findings indicate that air passengers would like to choose the airlines
that have the most enlarged seats, and air carriers should take the issue of seats
rearrangement into consideration.
In addition,price is alsoa significantaffectingvariable.Although most studies, such
as Ghobrial (1989), Ippolito (1981), and Yoo and Ashford (1996), etc., indicate that ticket
price may not play a significant role in air passengers' choice, because there is not much
difference in ticket price between airlines. However, a stated choice experiment was used
to show the possible varieties of ticket price, and found that ten percent price range could
affect passengers' choice significantly; nevertheless, the cross effects between seat-type
and ticket price is not considered here. Generally speaking, air passengers who paid higher
price should receive higher quality of seat comfort. That is, there is a little positive
relationship between seat-type and price. In this study, it is supposed that any relationship
between seat-type and price does not exist. Therefore, there is no analysis of the cross
effect between enlarged seats and ticket price. This should be taken into consideration in a
future study.
Finally, the variables of brand names were used to measure the effect of passengers'
satisfaction with the airlines on choice decision. The findings imply that there is positive
relationship between passengers' satisfaction and choice decision. In other words, the
higher satisfaction passengers receive from a specific airline, the higher probability
passengers choose that airline again. Hence, it also can be used to measure the passengers'
loyalty to specific airline.
In spite of this, the study focuses on the passengers group in Taiwan, the findings of
this study could also be applied to the intemational air market. It has been found that there
are several international airlines that are gradually improving seat comfort in their
airplanes. The usual way of upgrading the quality of seat comfort is by enlarging the
seating room. Through this study, it may be concluded that enlarged seats could be an
efficient marketing strategy.
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Abstract
Using the conditional LOGIT model, this paper addresses the airport choice in the Sac)
Paulo Metropolitan Area. In this region, Guarulhos International Airport (GRU) and
Congonhas Airport (CGH) compete for passengers flying to several domestic destinations.
The -i_o.rt_ choice is believed to be a result of the tradeoff passengers perform considering
airport access characteristics, airline level of service characteristics and passenger
experience with the analyzed airports. It was found that access time to the airports better
explain the airport choice than access distance, whereas direct flight frequencies gives
better explanation to the airport choice than the indirect (connections and stops) and total
(direct plus indirect) flight frequencies. Out of 15 tested variables, passenger experience
with the analyzed airports was the variable that best explained the airport choice in the
region. Model specifications considering 1, 2 or 3 variables were tested. The model
specification most adjusted to the observed data considered access time, direct flight
frequencies in the travel period (morning or afternoon peak) and passenger experience with
the analyzed airports. The influence of these variables was therefore analyzed across
market segments according to departure airport and flight duration criteria. The choice of
GRU (located neighboring Sao Paulo city) is not well explained by the rationality of access
time economy and the increase of the supply of direct flight frequencies, while the choice
of CGH (located inside Sao Paulo city) is. Access time was found to be more important to
passengers flying shorter distances while direct flight frequencies in the travel period were
more significant to those flying longer distances.
Keywords: Airport choice, Multiple airport region, Conditional LOGIT model, Access
time, Flight frequencies, Passenger experience with the analyzed airports, Transportation
planning
1.Introduction
The air transportation long term rising trend increases the regions worldwide served
by more than one airport: the so-called "multiple airport regions". The study of the
tradeoffs passengers face when flying out of these regions has therefore become a relevant
subject in transportation planning.
In the multiple airport regions, the criteria used by passengers when they make their
choice of departure airport constitute an important issue to several professionals, as
follows:
1)The Air Transportation Authority: Because its mission is to study, orient, plan,
control and motivate the Public and Private Civil Aviation activities, the segmentation of
the market of passengers according to flight duration enables this organization to evaluate
the importance of access time to the airport placed by the passengers and therefore enables
scheduling of flights in the regional airports according to flight duration.
2)The Airport Managers: Searching for anticipated operational efficiency (such as a
more consolidated terminal and high levels of passenger occupancy), they are worried with
the capital destination to execute improvements rated as priorities by the air passengers, in
special those that define the passenger choice of airport.
3)The Airlines: Aiming at a maximum seat factor at their aircrafts, the airport
choice research enables the correct capital destination to schedule regular flights (aircraft
allocation), distributing the flights among the airports in the multiple airport region
according to the preferences pointed out by the passengers.
4)Urban Transportation Planners: These professionals are interested in becoming
aware of the passengers' preferences for airports from the point of view of accomplishing
public constructions that include improvement of accessibility to the airports, by means of
railways or motorways, from the centers where the air transport demand originates.
The overwhelming majority of researchers on airport choice found two kinds of
variables satisfactorily explaining the airport choice in a multiple airport region: one
variable related to the accessibility to the competing airports and another variable
accounting for the air transport level of service provided by these terminals.
This paper aims to determine which variables from a set of candidates have the best
explanatory power on the airport choice made by the passengers whose travel starts in the
Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area, as well as providing an analysis of the importance placed by
the passengers on these variables when passengers are grouped by chosen airport and flight
range.
The region of study is well served by two airports: Sao Paulo International Airport
(GRU) and Congonhas Airport (CGH). They stand out in the brazilian air transport system
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in terms of the volume of embarked and disembarked passengers and compete for the air
passengers for numerous domestic destinations.
This paper extends the research on airport choice by presenting and discussing
results achieved in the analysis of airport choice in some multiple airport regions
worldwide and bringing about results for the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area.
2.Literature
With a LOGIT model, Skinner (1976) studied the airport choice in Baltimore-
Washington. Building utility functions combining airline level of service measures and
ground accessibility measures, the signals found for the variables were those expected.
Skinner (1976) concluded that: a)The preferred level of service measure was the number of
flight frequencies whereas the access utility (a combination of cost and time) was the best
measure of ground accessibility; b)Non-business passengers are more worried about
accessibility and/or less worried about the supply of flight frequencies; c)To shift the
passengers' airport choice, an airport would have to supply an extremely higher amount of
flight frequencies in relation to the competing airport; d)A ground accessibility
improvement would be a positive policy to shift the passengers' airport choice if it were
directed to the entire urban area.
Augustinus and Demakopoulos (1978) analyzed the airport choice in New York-
New Jersey. To model the airport choice, they used a model that associates the probability
that a passenger chooses an airport to the ratio between: a)The ratio of the costs associated
to the cheavest "airport over those associated to the chosen airport; b)The sum of the ratios
of the costs of the cheapest airport over those of the alternative airports. These quotients a)
and b) are previously powered by an exponent ot that aims to capture the importance placed
by passengers regarding cost differences between airports. In this model, the cost variable
enhanced time cost and money cost. Augustinus and Demakopoulos (1978) concluded that
access and factors related to convenience are more significant to passengers in short-haul
flights, probably because they account for a higher percentage in the door-to-door travel
time.
Harvey (1987) studied the airport choice in San Francisco Bay Area, using LOG1T
model. He used as modeling variables: access time to the airport, absolute and relative
(without connections) flight frequencies. Models exhibiting different formats were built,
taking the variables either in their direct value or belonging to a parabolic function, the
latter aimed at denoting the decreasing character of the rise in importance of the variable,
whenever it was suitable. Harvey (1987) concluded that: a)From a certain supply of flight
frequencies, an increase in this supply doesn't seem to make an airport more atWactive;
b)Direct flights are better regarded than connecting ones; c)the marginal disutility of the
access time appears to decrease towards a rise in total time (inferred as total time of
access); d)The importance passengers place on access time seems to vary across flight
ranges; e)The airport choice seems to be dissociated from the access mode choice; f)For
non-business passengers, both flight frequencies and access time are less important.
Ashford e Benchemam(1987) performed the analysisof the airport choice in
CentralEngland,usingLOGIT model.The selectedvariableswere: 1) accesstime from the
origin of the travel to eachairport; 2) daily flights to the chosendestination;3) economy
fare.The marketof passengerswas segmentedin domestic,businessinternational,leisure
internationalandinclusivetours international.The variable "fare" was excludedfrom the
analysisfor businessandinclusivetours becauseits parameterwaspositive. For business
passengersand inclusive tours, the accesstime was found to be a dominant factor in
comparisonto flight frequencies,whereasthe fare was found to be a dominantfactor for
domesticandleisurepassengers.It wasconcludedthatnon-businesspassengersplacemore
importanceon theaccessandlessimportanceon theflight frequenciesin comparisonwith
businesspassengers.
InnesandDoucet(1990) studiedthe airport choice in the north of New Brunswick
province, Canada,using binary LOGIT model through LOGIST procedure.Variables
associatedwith theair transportlevel of serviceandaccessdistancewere tested.However,
since the signal of the parameterof the accessdistancevariables was positive, these
variableswereexcludedfrom the modeling.Among the modelsconsideringonly level of
servicevariables,thevariable"aircraft type" wasmore importantto residents,who traveled
significantdistancesin searchof a jet service.Other relevantvariableswere "difference
between flight durations" and whether direct flights were offered to the passenger's
destinationor not. Thepassengersrejectedcommuterservice,choosingairportswith direct
flights evenwhenlocatedfarther,to anextentthat this servicewasdiscontinuedafter this
study.
Windle and Dresner(1995) studied the airport choice in Baltimore-Washington
D.C., using multinomial LOGIT model, inferring that: 1)The accesstime was more
importantto businesspassengers;2)The weekly flight frequenciesarebetter regardedby
the non-residentsin the region; 3)The weekly flight frequenciesare more important to
businesspassengers;4)Theinclusionof avariable accountingfor theexperiencewith DCA
(National) and IAD (Dulles) airports decreasesthe probability of choosing BWI
(Baltimore-WashingtonIntl' airport) andthe importanceof the accesstime; 5)Duplicating
the previousresult,but only for passengersthat accessedthe airport with motor vehicles,it
was notedmore importanceplacedon accesstime; 6)Passengersoriginating from zones
with fairly equivalentaccesstime placemore importanceon weekly flight frequenciesand
less importanceon accesstime, not dependingon the market segment;7)Thepassengers'
experiencewith anairportis generallyanimportantdeterminantof theairport choice.
Pels,Nijkamp andRietveld (1998)studiedthe conjoint choiceof airport andairline
in the SanFranciscoBay Area, using nestedLOGIT model, building two situations of
sequentialchoice:1)Firstairport choiceandthen airline choice; and2)First airline choice,
followed by airport choice. Pels, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1998) didn't find expressive
differencein the estimationsof the utility function betweenbusinessand non-business
passengers.These parametersseemedto vary more across time than acrossmarket
segments.Anyway, they concluded that the estimatedparameterswere rather robust.
Moreover,theyconcludedthatthe airport choicehappensfirst, andthen the airline choice,
notbeingsimultaneouschoices.
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Researchestreating the same region in different years showed distinct passengers'
appraisal on accessibility and level of service measures, in terms of market segments
m'ouped by travel purpose. As a result, the evolution of passenger behavior across time
indicates the demand for seasonal researches on airport choice m the same multipie airport
region.
3.Model
The LOGIT model has been the most widely used model to cope with multiple
choice situations in transportation engineering especially in the majority of the papers
analyzed in the previous section. To build the LOGIT model, some considerations related
to the passengers' choice process are imperative.
Each passenger presents a consistent structure of preferences, based on the utility
each alternative choice can provide, in a way that the passenger chooses the option (airport)
whose utility is the maximum among the available choices. This choice behavior can be
expressed mathematically by the following inequation:
Umi > U,_ for all n, 1 <n_<z (1)
Where: U=; is the utility that passenger i obtains by choosing airport m, U_a is the
utility that passenger i obtains by choosing airport n, z is the number of airports
(alternatives) available for choice.
Since the !_rception of the attributes that each alternative offers may vary widely
from passenger to passenger, and even the characteristics usually measured being constant
for two different passengers, the utility of each alternative airport is not regarded from the
same standpoint, therefore it is wise to include a random element to the travel choice, that is
added to the deterministic one, forming the theoretical basis for the stochastic choice. The
stochastic formulation of the utility function is expressed as:
U_ = D=_ + R_ for all m, 1 (2)
Where: U=a is the utility that passenger i obtains by choosing airport m, Dm_ is the
deterministic part of the utility function for alternative m chosen by passenger i, R_ is the
random part of the utility function for alternative m chosen by passenger i, z is the amount
of choices considered available for passenger i.
The LOGIT model assumes that the random components of the utihty function are
independent and identically distributed with a Gumbel function (double exponential) as
Kanafani (1983) explains. The probability function that denotes the choice of an alternative
is given by:
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eCt .Dm
Pm (D,,..-,Dm,...,Dz)= z
ea.D, (3)
z=l
Where: Pm is the choice probability of the alternative m (each alternative is an
airport in this paper), among the z alternatives (airports); Dm is the deterministic part of the
utility function of alternative m (airport); ct is the parameter associated with the
deterministic part of the utility function.
While at an individual level the formulation predicts the probability that a passenger
chooses the airport in question, at an aggregate level it predicts the share of the considered
airport.
To accomplish the estimation of parameter ct, NLOGIT program version 3.0 was
used, available in the LIMDEP program version 8.0 produced by the company Software
Econometric, Inc. The reference guide of this software classifies the multinomial LOGIT
models:
1)Models whose variable values are input the same across all alternatives for the
same observation (passenger), as they are individual characteristics; .
2)Models whose variable values are attributes of the alternatives (perceived by
passengers), and variables whose value remain constant across alternatives (for the same
passenger) are also allowed.
The latter is the model that this paper employed, also known as conditional LOGIT
model, which estimates variable parameters using the Maximum Likelihood Method. For
the iterations, Newton Method was used because it produced quick convergence for all
calibrated models.
The goodness-of-fit measure generated by the Conditional LOGIT model of this
software is called R 2 (0 _< R 2 < 1). However, the percentage of passengers whose actual
choice is similar to the one the model predicts is given by the fraction of concordant pairs
(and not by the value of R 2, as the users of linear regression may think).
4.Case Study
Although the Sao Paulo Metropolitan groups several towns, 7 of them (Sao Paulo,
Guarulhos, Santo Andre, Sao Bemardo do Campo, Sao Caetano do Sul, Diadema e Osasco)
have been chosen to represent the trip origin in this region, because of two reasons:
a)They represent 79% of the electric power consumption in the region;
b)The calculationof the accesstime from the other townswasn't likely to leadto
soundvalues.
The alternativeairportswhosechoicewasanalyzedwereCongonhasAirport (CGH,
located in Sao Paulo city) and GuarulhosAirport (GRU, located in Guarulhoscity,
neighboringSat)Paulo). The criteria for destination selection was that there must have been
departures to these destinations from both airports and that the annual volume of passengers
must have surpassed 100,000 passengers. This volume, as Windle and Dresner (1995) tell,
avoids small sample bias, that usually represent less popular destinations. These two
requisites were evaluated through the last statistical report of the DAC (Department of Civil
Aviation) available to the date of data collection, the report of the year 2000.
Therefore 21 airport destinations (19 cities) were studied in this paper: 1)BPS (Porto
Seguro); 2)BSB (Brasilia); 3)CGR (Campo Grande); 4)CNF (Belo Horizonte); 5)CWB
(Curitiba); 6)FLN (Florianopolis); 7)FOR (Fortaleza); 8)GIG (Rio de Janeiro); 9)GYN
(Goiania); 10)IGU (Foz do Iguacu); 11)JOI (Joinville); 12)LDB (Londrina); 13)NVT
(Navegantes); 14)PLU (Belo Horizonte); 15)POA (Porto Alegre); 16)RAO (Ribeirao
Preto); 17)REC (Recife); 18)SDU (Rio de Janeiro); 19)SSA (Salvador); 20)UDI
(Uberlandia); 21)VIX (Vitoria);
The passenger profile was obtained by revealed preference interviews at the
airports, conducted during the weekdays of two consecutive weeks (February 8th to March
1st, 2002, during the peak hours of access to airports, i.e., from 7 AM to 10 AM (morning
peak) and from 5 PM to 8 PM (afternoon peak).
These periods were chosen because the average vehicle speeds in Sao Paulo city
have been measured during these periods by CET (Traffic Engineering Company), enabling
the calculation of access time to the airports.
Aiming at a maximization of the explanatory power of the collected data and
minimization of time and cost of data collection, compilation and analysis, 1923 passengers
were interviewed, being 897 at GRU and 1026 at CGH. This mount of observed data has
been considered satisfactory taking into account the paper of Koppelman and Chu (1985)
who calculated the amount of observations required for relatively simple disaggregate
choice models.
The revised literature tends to classify the passenger market in a way that enables
inferences on the departing airport choice made by homogeneous passenger segments.
Table 1 presents the results of the interviews according to market segmentation criteria.
5.Airport choice: explanatory variables
Three types of variables were chosen to be tested: those associated with the ground
accessibility to the airports, those related to the airlines' level of service in the airports and
the last one is associated with the passenger experience with the airports in the studied
region.
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Table 1: Resultsof the interview with passen:
Sample segmentation criteria
Departing period
Departing airport
Travel purpose
Place of residence
Age
Household monthly income
Passenger experience with the airports in
the region
Access mode
Declared reasons for choosing the departing
airport
Flight range
Type of airline chosen
erS
Passenger market segments
853 departing in the morning peak and 1070
in the afternoon peak
897 departing from GRU and 1026 from
CGH
1400 business and 523 non-business
937 residents and 986 visitors
975 under 37 years old and 948 over 37
1024 under R$ 6,000.00 monthly wage and
899 over R$ 6,000.00
946 under 7 flights during the year 2001
and 977 over 7
127 accessing by bus and 1745 accessing by
taxi or car (either hitchl_king or driving)
290 didn't know that there were flights at
the competing airport to the desired
destination; 287 choice was made by a third
party; 902 choice by proximity and 460
choice by the supply of more flight
frequencies to the desired destination.
1116 in flights with flying time up to one
hour and 807 in longer flights
1883 using regular cost airlines and 40
using low cost airlines
Using the conditional LOGIT model, the utility function of an alternative was
designed as the summation of the effects of the variables pre-multiplied by a parameter
whose estimation is one of this paper's goals. The model built was abstract, e.g., the
coefficients of the variables were the same for both alternative airports, GRU and CGH.
Each passenger i, 1 < i < 1923, has been represented by two generic decision
functions, being the first always for GRU and the second for CGH, whichever the departing
airport, as follows:
CHOICEi GRU---- (2,1.ACCESSi GRId+ a2.FREQUENCYi GRU + a3.EXPERIENCEi GRU (4)
CHOICEi CGH = _I.ACCESSi CGH+ ot2.FREQUENCYi con + ct3.EXPERIENCEi CGn (5)
Below the choice probability of each airport by each passenger is shown:
Pi GRU =
exp(CHOICEi GRU)
[ exp(CHOICEi GRU) + exp(CHOICEi CGH) ]
(6)
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exp(CHOICEi CGH)
pi C6H= (7)
[ exp(CHOICF_ ORU) + exp(CHOICEi C_H) ]
Where: ACCESS is a variable associated with the access to the airports; FREQUENCY is a
variable associated with the airlines' level of service; EXPERIENCE is a variable related to
the passenger's experience with the airports in the region; 1_ _RU is the probability that
passenger i chooses GRU; Pi CGH is the probability that passenger i chooses CGH; CHOICE
is a decision function of airport choice; (Zk is the parameter (coefficient) related to the
variable _ being k=-I for ACCESS, k=2 for FREQUENCY and k=3 for EXPERIENCE.
5.1. Variables associated to the access to the airports (ACCESS)
Since 100% of the passengers faces the tradeoff between the access distances (AD)
to the alternative airports, this variable was tested, being expressed in lan.
The access time (AT) by auto mode (in this paper denoted by "general traffic") was
the variable most widely used in the analyzed literature. Because 1745 passengers (91%)
face the tradeoffbetween ace.s times to the competing airports using general traffic when
•_..... t_ _ __L;,'po_choice, this variable was tested, its value being expressed in minutes.
t.l_t,_ff LLttadt_, .
To calculate the access time to each airport, the studied region was sectioned in 101
zones (95 in Sao Paulo city and the other 6 towns constituted, one by one, other 6 zones).
The access distances _om the centmids of the zones were measured considering the access
1-,, _ eyAsting _, avenues and roads.
The average speeds along the main streets and avenues were extracted from the
CET (Traffic Engineering Company) annual reports, years 2000 and 2001. These speeds
were grouped by access mode: bus and general traffic, and they account for the period of
the day: morning peak hours (7 AM to 10 AM) and afternoon peak hours (5 PM to 8 PM).
Data from different years were used as a matter of availability and updating at the time of
their collection. This didn't pose a problem because there were no significant modifications
in the access to the airports from the first year considered until the period of interview with
the passengers.
Regarding the streets and avenues whose speed was not available, average values of
the measured ones were adopted, weighing by length of the street or avenue, and
considering the period of the day. For highways, a value of 80 km/h was adopted,
irrespective of the period of the day.
5.2. Variables associated the airlines'level of service in the airports (FREQUENCY)
Among the level of service variables, flight frequencies were the most commonly
used in the analyzed literature, and a satisfactory explanatory power was verified, therefore
12 flight frequencies-related variables have been tested.
Thesevariableswere built in terms of the following criteria: 1)The existenceof
connections or stops (direct flights, indirect flights and the sum of the two); 2)The travel
period (morning peak or afternoon peak); 3)The day of the week.
In terms of the second criterium, the passengers were interviewed at the moments
prior to their departure, at times before their proceeding to the waiting room and sometimes
after. The morning peak was considered from 7 AM to 10 AM and the afternoon peak from
5 PM to 8 PM. Albeit the data collection was after the access to the airport, it was admitted
that close to the peak periods (no matter before or after them) the highway access speeds do
not vary at a significant basis from the peak periods themselves.
The flight frequencies across periods of the day and across days of the two weeks
when the interview took place were determined through the Internet websites of the airlines
that offer regular flights and operate at the competing airports. Although the interviews had
taken place during the weekdays, weekend flight frequencies were also accounted for since
they increase the utility associated with the alternative airport where they are supplied.
For each of the built variables of frequency, its value was collected for the chosen
airport and the airport not chosen. Below these variables are presented: 1)DDPF: Direct
frequencies in the travel day and period; 2)DDF: Direct frequencies in the travel day;
3)DPF: Direct frequencies in the travel period (morning or afternoon peak) in all days of
the week when the passenger traveled; 4)DWF: Direct weekly frequencies irrespective of
day and period; 5)IDP.F: Indirect (with connections or stops) frequencies in the travel day
and period; 6)IDF: Indirect frequencies in the travel day; 7)IPF: Indirect frequencies in the
travel period (morning or afternoon peak) in all days of the week when the passenger
traveled; 8)IWF: Indirect weekly frequencies irrespective of day and period; 9)TDPF: Total
(direct plus indirect) frequencies in the travel day and period; 10)TDF: Direct frequencies
in the travel day; 11)TPF: Direct frequencies in the travel period (morning or afternoon
peak) in all days of the week when the passenger traveled; 12)TWF: Direct weekly
frequencies irrespective of day and period.
Consider a passenger that departed to a given destination in the morning peak of
February 19th, 2002. The variables of direct flight frequencies are shown in Table 2, and the
variables of indirect and total flight frequencies were built in an analogous way:
Table 2: Variables of direct fli 8
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Mon
19
it frequencies
20 21
ThuTue Wed
22 23 24 Total
Fri Sat Sun
Up to 7h
7h- 1Oh DDPF DPF
10h-17h
17h-20h
After 20h
Total DDF DWF
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Most flights to Rio deJaneirocentralairport,SantosDumont (SDU), departfrom
Sao Paulo central airport, Congonhas (CGH), whereas most flights to Rio de Janeiro
international airport, Tom Jobim (GIG), far from the city center, depart from Sao Paulo
international airport, Guarulhos (GRU), which neighbors Sao Paulo city.
In the same way, most flights to Belo Horizonte central airport, Pampulha (PLU),
depart from Sao Paulo central airport, Congonhas (CGH), whereas most flights to Belo
Horizonte international airport, Confins (CNF), far from the city center, depart from Sao
Panlo international airport, Guan_os (GRU), which neighbors Sao Paulo city.
For these reasons, a question on the reasons for airport choice in the interview with
the passengers included whether the passenger chose the airport of departure because a
considerable surplus of flight supply to the desired destination airport in case the passenger
destination was also a multiple airport region (Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte). In case
the passenger answer was positive, frequencies to the other airport in the multiple airport
region of destination were not included in the several variables of flight frequencies. For
instance, a passenger flying to Rio de Janeiro and departing from CGH, if he declared his
airport choice because he prefers to arrive at SDU, frequencies to GIG, the competing
destination airport, were not considered no matter they were supplied at GRU or CGH.
_ 3 Variable related to the passenger _ence with airports (EXPERIENCE)
Windle e Dresner (1995) used this variable, showing that incorporating a variable
that accounts for the passenger experience with an airport of departure in the studied region
(in this case the number of times that the passenger departed from each airport in the region
during the previous year), the importance placed on access time and weekly flight
frequencies decreases, irrespective of the market segment (they segmented the market by
travel purpose and place of residence).
This variable was tested in the present paper, being expressed by the number of
domestic departures in the year 2001 from each airport, CGH and GRU. Intemational
flights (available at GRU) were not considered because CGH has only been serving
domestic destinations lately. The fact that the traffic volumes considered at the studied
airports are from year 2000, in function of availability and updating, doesn't spoil in any
sense the data collection of this variable since the questions treated are from different
n_°
5.4.Overall considerations on the models
The value of the variables was input directly in the decision function, without any
mathematical modification, enabling the immediate analysis of the tradeoffs between the
variables pertaining to the same model (what happened in the models with 2 or 3 variables).
To begin with, 77 models were calibrated. Variables belonging to the same category didn't
take part of the same model.
Table 3 exemplifies the decision functions of a fictitious passenger that flew from
GRU to BSB, departing in the morning peak of February 25th, 2002, having left the zone
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called "Penha" (in Sao Paulo city) in the day of his travel. Admit that this passenger
departed twice from GRU and once from CGH during the year 2001. For one model built
with three variables such as AT, DPF and EXP, equations (8) and (9) are obtained.
Table 3 :Variables AT, DPF
GRU
CGH
and EXP for a fictitious passenger
AT (rain) DPF
29.9 21
53.2 49
EXP
2
1
exp(ctl.29.9 + ct2.21 + ot3.2 )
1 = (8)
[ exp(_q.29.9 + ot2.21 + ot3.2 ) + exp (otl.53.2 + ot2.49 + _3.1) ]
exp(oh.53.2 + ct2.49 + _3.1)
0 = (9)
[ exp(oq.29.9 + ct2.21 + ot3.2 ) + exp (oh.53.2 + ot2.49 + or3.1) ]
6.Results
6.1.Models considering only one explanatory variable
Fifteen models belonging to this category were built, using one by one the 15
variables selected in the previous section of this paper. The comparison among these
models bring out the variable with best explanatory power on the airport choice in Sao
Paulo Metropolitan Area. Table 4 presents the calibration results of these models.
The signals for the coefficients were those expected: negative for ACCESS and
positive for FREQUENCY and EXPERIENCE. Indeed the increase on access distance and
time are undesired, whereas the supply of flights and the experience a passenger has with
an airport are desired and their increase propels the airport choice.
The t-Student statistics were satisfactory, presenting modulus higher than 2,
whereas the null p-value in all the cases also indicated satisfactory participation of the
variables in the models. The calibration of the models with one variable revealed R 2 values
among 0.01041 and 0.17978. The associability extremes with the dependent variable were
the model considering EXP (best associability) and the model considering IPF (worst
associability). Since the fraction of concordant pairs in all the cases fell between 51% and
61% of the data, the adjustments were regarded as of medium quality.
IPF presented low explanatory power on the airport choice, probably because an
indirect flight (enhancing stops or connections) is extremely undesired whenever direct
flight frequencies are available to the chosen destination.
12
Table4: Models with onb
Model
I
Variable
6
AD
DWF
0.04941
)lanatory variable
Coefficient
-0.0185
-0.01402 AT O.05931
3 DDPF 0.12613 +0.1951
4 DDF 0.11768 +0.0305
5 DPF 0.13269 +0.0336
0.12468 +0.0054
TDF
t-Student
12
-11.427
I p-value
15.336
0
Fraction of
concordant pairs
0.54
0.54
-12.210 0
16.123 0 0.59
14.921 0 0.58
16.593 0 0.59
0.58
0.517 IDPF 0.01133 +0.0613 6.155 0
8 1DF 0.02146 +0.0146 7.945 0 0.52
9 IPF 0.01041 +0.0099 5.959 0 0.51
10 IWF 0.01878 +0.0024 7.525 0 0.52
11 TDPF 0.07890 +0.0883 13.809 0 0.55
0.08634 +0.0154 14.055 0 0.56
14.048 00.0823513 0.56+0.0154TPF
14 TWF 0.09081 +0.0028
15 EXP 0.17978 +0.1023
14.311 0 0.56
14.780 0 0.61
Yet EXP was the variable exhibiting the best explanatory power on the airport
choice in Sao Paulo Metropohtan Area, probably because the more a passenger travels, the
more used he gets to the tradeoffs pertaining to an airport choice, as well as he becomes
aware of these tradeoffs, creating a consistent structure of terminal choice and
accumulating more experience of departure from one of the airpo_s.
Among the variables of fxequency, direct flight frequencies in the period of
departure (DPF) showed best explanatory power on the airport choice in Sao Paulo
Metropolitan Area. The ranking of the variables of frequency was notorious: the best
adjustments fell among the direct frequencies, followed by the total frequencies and lastly
were observed the indirect frequencies.
From the point of view of a connection or a stop on the way to the destination, the
supply of direct flights was better explained the airport choice. It is evident that delays
produced by a connection or a stop are undesired due to the loss of time, since the rapidity
is the main advantage of choosing the air mode. Therefore, as the total frequencies enhance
the direct ones, total frequencies occupied the second place in the ranking, better explaining
the airport choice than the purely indirect flight frequencies.
Among the direct flight frequencies, ranging from the one which best explains the
airport choice to the one that has the lowest explanatory power, it was found: DPF, DDPF,
DWF and DDF. The difference among the quality of the adjustment found was not
significant, albeit perceivable. It was found that passengers are more prone to shift their
departure date than their departure period of the day. Moreover, the departure period of the
day (represented by DPF) was more significant than the day and period of departure itself
(represented by DDPF).
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A possibleexplanationfor thebetteradjustmentof DPF in comparisonto DDF is
that passengersmayshowavailability alongtheweekto maketheir trips, but appointments
with which they fulfill their schedulealong the day may be regardedas a priority. For
instance,on the one handconsidera businessmanthat must depart in the early morning
from SaoPauloto participateat ameetingat 10AM in Belo Horizonte.On the otherhand
thereareplural optionsof daysalongtheweekwhenthismeetingcouldbe held. As another
exampleconsidera worker living in SaoPaulo that decidesto spendone week in the
seasideof Rio deJaneirobeaches.Vary the periodof departurealong the day may mean
poor schedulingof his trip, whereastherewouldn't differ muchif his trip were scheduledin
the first or in thesecondweekof hisonemonthvacation.
Among the indirect frequencies,ranging from the one which best explains the
airport choiceto the one that hasthe lowestexplanatorypower, it was found: IDF, IWF,
IDPF and IPF. Also in this groupthe differencewasnot that big. On the otherhand the
frequenciesalongthedayweremoresignificantprobablybecausewhenthe passengerfaces
scarcityof direct flight frequenciesduring the airport choiceprocess,he becomescareless
about shifting his flight schedulealong the day since he will undoubtedly affront the
vicissitudesof adelaycausedby aconnectionor stoponhisway to the destination.
Among thetotal frequencies,rangingfrom the onewhich best explainsthe airport
choiceto theonethat hasthe lowest explanatorypower,it was found: TWF, TDF, TPF e
TDPF. Also in this groupthe differencewasnot that big. Maybe the weekly frequencies
assumedthe leadershipin the airport choiceprocessbecauseof the importanceof the
multitude of optionswhentotal frequenciesareanalyzed,i.e.,when the passengerdoesn't
haveanyguaranteethathewill fly with or without aconnectionor stop.
Regardingthe variablesof ground accessibility,accesstime was most significant
one,possiblybecausethepassengersnot only prefer the closestairportto the trip origin but
also this proximity must be expressedmuch more in terms of time economy than in
distanceeconomy.
6.2.Models with two explanatory variables
From this category, 38 models were built, considering all combinations of two
variables among those selected in the previous section of this paper, paying attention not to
input variables of the same type in one model. The analysis of these models enables the
evaluation of the tradeoffs passengers face between the best choice variables at their airport
selection. Table 5 shows the calibration results of the models with higher R 2.
In most models with two variables, the signals of the coefficients were those
expected: negative for ACCESS and positive for FREQUENCY and EXPERIENCE.
However, the signals of IDPF and IPF were negative in the models calibrated with AD and
EXP. Since the modulus of the t-Student statistics was lower than 2 and the p-value of the
variables of indirect flight frequencies was high in many cases, the inclusion of indirect
frequencies showed itself undesirable to represent the airport choice in certain
specifications of the decision function.
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Fable5: Bestmodels considerin
Model Variable Variable
0.15449
1 2
AT DPF
AT EXP
DPF EXP
2 0.19490
3 0.23410
2 variables (higher R 2)
R 2 Coefficient
1
(t-Student)
-0.0092
(-7.459)
-0.0079
(-6.249)
+0.0240
(11.226)
Coefficient
2
(t-Student)
+0.0301
(14.350)
+0.0932
(13.454)
+0.0820
(11.932)
Fraction of
concordant
pairs
0.60
0.62
0.65
The calibrations of the models considering two variables revealed R 2 values
between 0.04942 and 0.23410. The associability extremes with the dependent variable were
the model considering EXP and DPF (best associability) and the model considering AD and
IWF (worst associability). Since the fiaction of concordant pairs in all the cases fell
between 54% and 65% of the data, the adjustments were regarded as medium quality.
As expected, a model considering one variable of indirect flight frequencies was the
least adjusted to the data, since the passengers obviously prefer direct and total flight
frequencies, as exposed before. Yet the access distance is less preferred than the access
fim_, since the time economy in intrinsic to the air transportation as a travel mode, then the
time economy during the access to the terminal is also more searched than a shorter
distance.
The experience once again appeared in the best model. A possible explanation is
that the experience with aiLport results from a detailed trip choice process, then the airport
choice for the trip that took place during the day of the interviews should be connected to
the passenger experience with that terminal in previous occasions. Besides experience, DPF
reflected that passengers probably exercise their right to consult each airport's flight
schedules well in advance of the ticket emission, thus preferring direct flights that bring
about higher utility than the delays of indirect flights
The models with two variables have been classified in three groups: a)those
considering variables of access and frequency; b)those with variables of access and
experience and c)those with variables of frequency and experience. Among these three
configurations, the last one provided the most adjusted model to the database (R 2 =
0.23410), involving the variables DPF and EXP. Thus once again experience was found to
contribute to the formation of a consistent airport choice structure. Moreover, it was noticed
again that passengers prefer the direct flight frequencies.
As well as observed in the models with one variable, the models with two variables
considering one variable of indirect flight frequencies presented the lowest R 2 value. Once
again was shown the fact that connections and stops on the way to the destination are
undesired in comparison with total and direct flight frequencies.
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6.3.Models of three explanatory variables
Among the models with three variables, 24 models have been tested, using all
combinations of three variables among the 15 variables selected in the previous section,
paying attention not to include in the same model variables of the same type. Therefore, for
instance, TWF and DWF were not tested in the same model specification because both of
them are variables of flight frequencies.
In the same way as the models with two variables, the models considering three
variables enable the evaluation of the tradeoffs passengers face between the best choice
variables at their airport selection. The best model considered access time to the airport,
direct flight frequencies in the period of departure and passenger experience with analyzed
airports. This model was selected for further analysis of passenger market segments. The
result of its calibration is shown in table 6.
Tabela 6: Model with three explanatory variables
Model Variables R 2
1 2 3
1 AT DPF EXP 0.24011 -0.0052
(-3.975)
that presented the highest R 2
Coefficients Fraction of
(t-Student) concordant
2 3 pairs
+0.0226 +0.0775 0.65
(10.346) (11.248)
It was also verified that in the models with three variables the signals of the
coefficients were usually those expected: negative for access and positive for frequencies
and experience. In the cases which this didn't occur, the modulus of the t-Student statistics
was low, around 2, and the p-value of their variables differed from zero, indicating that the
inclusion of the variables related to these coefficients are undesirable to represent the
airport choice in the considered specifications of the decision function.
Because the fraction of concordant pairs in all the cases fell between 62% and 65%
of the data, the adjustments were considered of medium quality.
The models with three variables can be classified by two basic criteria: a)by the
variable of access and b)by the variable of flight frequencies. The variable of experience
pertained to all the three-variable-models.
Grouping the models with three variables by the variable of access, two groups are
formed: those which consider AT and those which consider AD. The quality measure
indexes of the adjustment of the models with AD were lower than those which considered
AT, probably because time economy during the access to the terminal is also more searched
than a shorter distance.
Considering the frequency criteria, the models with three variables were divided
into three groups: a) those which considered direct flight frequencies; b) those which
considered indirect flight frequencies and c) those which considered total (direct plus
indirect) flight frequencies. Once again the measures of goodness of fit were lower
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whenever indirect flight frequencies were taken into account, whereas the measures of
goodness of fit were higher in the case with direct flight frequencies.
The calibrations of the models with three variables revealed R 2 values among
0.18634 and 0.24011. In two extremes of associability with the dependent variable, the
variable EXP has taken place, and EXP has already proved to play a significant role in the
airport choice. What has differentiated these models was the presence of AT and DPF
constituting the highest associability and AD and IDF constituting the lowest associability.
Once again an indirect flight frequency (with connection or stop) has little influenced the
airport choice in comparison to those direct and total. Moreover, the variable AD is less
preferred than AT, as said previously, the time economy is intrinsic to the air transport
mode choice, thus the time economy plays a more important role on the airport choice than
economy in terms of distance.
To analyze the tradeoff between the variables of the best model, it is verified that
the coefficient of DPF is 4.35 times higher in modulus than that of AT. Therefore through
this model it is inferred that passengers put up with taking about further 4 minutes to one
airport in exchange of each direct flight frequency in the period of departure this airport
offers to the desired destination. For distant zones from one airport, where the ace.s time
exceeds one hour in certain periods of the day, 4 minutes further in the access wouldn't
matter much, and also an increase of one direct flight frequency would be extremely
beneficial in the ease of a destination poorly supplied by direct flights. On the other hand
for dose zones to one airport, further 4 minutes in the access do bring a slight
inconvenience, and also an increase of one direct flight frequency wouldn't mean a
significant improvement in the case of the most popular destinations.
Moreover, the coefficient of EXP is 14.90 times greater in modulus than AT.
Therefore through this model it is inferred that passengers put up with taking further 15
minutes to one airport for each experience of departure he had for domestic flights using
this airport in the year before the interview took place.
Last but not least, the coefficient of EXP is 3.43 times higher in modulus that that of
DPF. Therefore through this model it is inferred that for each experience with domestic
flights a passenger had in the previous year with one airport, he puts up with the absence of
supply of three flight frequencies to the desired destination in that airport.
A practical and interesting illustration of what this model reveals is the calculation
of the percentage distribution between airports, of the passengers without any experience in
the year 2001 with GRU and CGH airports. In this case, even considering a model of three
variables, the airport choice is based on the tradeoff between only AT and DPF. Suppose
for exemplifying reasons that these passengers leave zone 55 (Mooca in Sao Paulo),
traveling in the morning peak of February 19th, 2002 to (destination BSB). Table 7 shows
the variables related to their choice.
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Table7: VariablesAT, DPFeEXP for ficticiouspassergers.
Airport
GRU
AT
1 32.4
2 CGH 31.9
DPF EXP
21 0
42 0
exp(U1)= exp(-0.0052*32.4+ 0.0226"21+ 0.0775*0)= exp(0.3061)= 1.3581
exp(U2)= exp(-0.0052"31.9+ 0.0226*42+ 0.0775*0)= exp(0.7833)= 2.1887
Eexp(Ui)=3.5468
Pl = exp(U1)/Y-exp(Ui)= 1.3581/ 3.5468 = 38%
P2 = exp(U2)PZexp(Ui) = 2.1887 / 3.5468 = 62%
6.4.Analysis of the variables of the chosen model in terms of passenger market segments
Having found the model with higher R 2, which considered the variables access time,
direct flight frequencies in the period of departure and experience, the interviewed
passengers were segmented by airport of departure and flight range, as Table 8 shows.
Table 8: Calibrations of the model with greater R 2 across some market segments
Market segments
Passengers departing from GRU
Passengers departing from CGH
Passengers in shorter-haul flights
Passengers in longer-haul flights
AT DPF EXP
0.0242 - 0.0064 0.0248
- 0.0752 0.0587 0.1324
- 0.0184 0.0075- 0.1042
- 0.0035 0.0444 0.0665
The signals of the coefficients of AT and DPF are not counterintuitive in the case of
GRU (the expected passenger behavior is to select the closest airport to the trip origin and
the airport with a superior supply of direct flight frequencies to the desired destination, as
far as possible), while at CGH the signals were not only the expected ones but also their
values were higher than those encountered for sample prior to segmentation.
Regarding the access, the positive signal of AT at GRU indicates that the passengers
that have chosen GRU for their trips didn't show priority for the variable of access time,
since GRU is the farthest of the two analyzed airports from the center that generates air
transport demand in the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area. This is verified by the random
sample collected: among the zones enhancing 50 or more interviewees, only one zone is
closer to GRU in terms of access time, whereas the 13 other zones with more than 50
interviewees are closer to CGH.
Meanwhile a possible explanation for the correct negative signal and high value of
the coefficient of AT in CGH is that the center where air transport demand is generated lies
closer to CGH than to GRU.
Regarding airlines' level of service at the competing airports, the high value of DPF
in CGH in comparison to the sample as a whole is justified by the observation of only
domestic flights departing from CGH, whereas GRU's runway is shared by domestic and in
large scale international flights. In the case of some destinations like Rio de Janeiro and
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Belo Horizonte,the choiceof CGH asanairportof departure is by far related to the desire
to land respectively at SDU and PLU, whereas the departures to their respective competing
airports GIG and CNF, whose demands are comparatively smaller, are somewhat
concentrated at GRU.
Finally the experience is a more important factor in CGH than in GRU. Very many
CGH passengers have already structured their airport choice process, and repeat this option
as far as possible (whenever there is flight supply to the desired destination).
The c,oeitieieat of the variable of access time was presented a higher modulus for
passengers in short-haul flights. More importance on access time is expected for this market
segment, which searches the closest airport, since access time means a larger part of the
door-to-door time of the trip for those flying shorter distances.
Yet, the coefficient of DPF was higher for passengers in long-haul flights. It is
expected that these passengers place more importance on airline level of service, since they
are going to remain a longer time inside the aircraft. Besides, it is more common for long-
haul flights to include a connection or stop (and thus they are more time-consuming) than
for short-haul ones. Therefore long-haul flight passengers search more enthusiastically an
airport that offers direct flight fi_lUencies.
7.Conclusions and recommendations
Aiming at analyzing the airport choice made by the passengers in the Sao Paulo
Metropolitan Area, conditional LOGIT model was used as a modeling tool.
Decision functions for each passenger were built, one for the chosen airport and
another for the airport not chosen.
Several specifications for the decision function were tested. These specifications
enhanced independent variables pertaining to 3 groups: a)variables related to the airport
access; b)variables related to the airlines' level of service in the airports; c)one variable
accounting for the passenger's experience with the airports in the region.
The decision functions were built considering one, two or three of the variables
described above, taking care not to mix variables of the same group in one model. The
specification that produced the model most adjusted to the data (evaluated in terms of
higher R 2) enhanced the following variables: access time, direct flight frequencies in the
period of departure and passenger's experience with the airports in the studied region.
Using the variables obtained from the best model, the airport choice was analyzed in
terms of a passenger market segment by airport of departure and flight range.
From the analysis of the results achieved with the data collected for this work and
for the region treated in this paper, it is possible to affirm that, generally:
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1. The experience a passenger has with an airport of departure is the factor that can
better explain the airport choice;
2. The access time to an airport better explains the airport choice than the access
distance;
3. The direct flight frequencies exhibit better explanatory power on the airport choice
than those total and the latter on those indirect;
o The choice of GRU is not well explained by access time economy savings and by an
increase in the supply of direct flight frequencies in the period of departure to the
desired destination, contrarily to the choice of CGH, which is;
. The access time is more important to those passengers in short-haul flights, whereas
the supply of direct flight frequencies in the period of departure is more important to
those passengers flying longer distances;
The recommendations are addressed to each group connected directly or indirectly
with the air transport activity. These recommendations were made up from this work, being
restricted to its characteristics, such as seasonality of the interviews along the year, the
existing politic and economic scenario, delimitation of the trip origin region, studied
destinations, model specifications, variables employed in the modeling, and so on. It is
recognized that to put into practice any of these recommendations, it is necessary caution
and validation of the conclusions of this work through periodic evaluations (studies) of the
airport choice in Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area.
In order to satisfy the level of importance placed by air passengers on the access
time, when the market is segmented by flight duration, this work advises the Air
Transportation Authority to schedule short-haul flights at CGH, close to the center of origin
of the air transport demand in Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area. In this way, long-haul flights
should therefore be scheduled at GRU.
Meanwhile, to establish a perimeter rule in the air transport regional system in Sao
Paulo Metropolitan Area, besides this passenger market analysis, it is also necessary to
conduct a technical evaluation of the landside and airside capacities of the airports where
the departures and connections would be scheduled (the latter may involve airports outside
the region), as well as an economic evaluation from the standpoint of the yield management
in case a perimeter rule is to be adopted.
For the airport managers, it is recommended to reserve areas at their terminals for
business, social and cultural events, which should be advertised countrywide, attracting
residents and visitors (non-residents). While the residents are potential passengers, the
visitors enhance their experience with the airport where the event is held, factor revealed in
this work to be best explaining the airport choice in Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area.
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Since an expressive mount of passengers either declared having chosen their
airport of departure not being aware of the supply of flights to their desired destination
fi:om a competing airport located in the same metropolitan area or even someone else
(possibly somebody from their workplace or a travel agent) made thor airport choice for
the., therefore the events made available in a competing airport is a potential policy to
broaden the participants minds in terms of considering this airport as an alternative of
departure for their following flights.
This work showed that the choice of GRU is not base on the rationale of access time
savings and increase in the supply of direct flight frequencies in the period of departure to
the desired destination, The rationale of choosing GRU is based on the passenger
experience with the airports in Sao Paulo Metropolitan. Thus, it is recommended that the
airlines offer non-aeronautical advantages to make a passenger choose GRU as an airport of
departure for the analyzed domestic destinations. For instance, these advantages may be
related to the provision of either ground transportation to access GRU or a parking lot in the
vicinity of GRU.
Since the experience was found to be the factor best explaining the airport choice in
Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area, this work points out that the airlines can increase their
aircraft occupancy by concentrating marketing efforts on those passengers who place more
importance on thor experience with the two airports: those who depart from CGH and
those who fly shorter distances.
Because it was found that the choice of CGH is motivated by the proximity in terms
of the variable of access time, while the choice of GRU is not, this work points out for the
urban transportation planners that an improvement on the access such as connecting GRU
to the subway system existing in the city of Sac) Paulo, is likely to enhance the choice of
CGH in case a station is included in the city of Guarulhos, rather than enhance the choice of
GRU by the passengers living in the city of Sao Paulo (for the competing domestic flights).
8.Future work
Three alternatives are proposed to extend the research on airport choice in Sao
Paulo Metropolitan Area:
a)Captm'ing poss_le changes in passenger choice behavior in Sao Paulo
Metropolitan Area in different months of the year;
b)Applying the very same principles employed in this paper to other brazilian
multiple airport regions;
c) Applying the very same principles employed in this paper to other air transport
related choices in Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area, such as airline choice for domestic and
international flights and the choice of interurban transportation mode, in which the air mode
competes against the ground mode for several destinations.
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ABSTRACT
The occurrence of flight delays in Brazil, mostly verified at the ground (airfield), is responsible for serious
disruptions at the airport level but also for the unchaining of problems in all the airport system, affecting also the
airspace.
The present study develops an analysis of delay and travel times at Sio Paulo International Airport / Guarulhos
(AISP/GRU) airfield based on simulation model.
the computational tool developed to represent aircraft operation in the airspace and airside of airports, was used to
perform these analysis.
The study was mainly focused on aircraft operations on ground, at the airport runway, taxi-lanes and aprons. The
visualization of the operations with increasing demand facilitated the analyses.
The results generated m this work certify the viabiiity of the methodology, they -also iadi _c.aw,d the solutions capable
to solve the delay problem by travel thne analysis, thus dimimshing the costs for users mainly airport authority. It
also indicated alternatives for airport operations, assisting the decision-making process and in the appropriate timing
of the proposed changes in the existing infrastructtae.
Key Words: Airports, Capacity, Simulation, Demand, and Delays
1. INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of users of air transportation in the whole world can be observed along the
years (ICAO, 1999). Although the attacks in New York (United States) on September llth, 2001
have generated conservation (in some cases fall) in these numbers, the whole aviation sector
expects the retaking of the growth of indexes in a short term.
In spite of the apparent pause in the growth, traffic jams in the airspace and airports continues to
happen and causes frequent delays, harming all participants of the airport system. The search for
solutions mobilizes from airlines to air traffic control organizations.
To have an idea of the losses, in November 2000, the airport operations in Brazil generated losses
in a Brazilian airline that reached the value of US$ 1 million (Targa, 2001). These losses,
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generated in concentrated way due to delays in the flights, most of the time they were verified in
the ground (airports), unchaining problems in every system, reaching even the airspace.
Due to the observation of the problem, analyses were made in possible operational scenarios in
the International Airport of $5o Paulo / Guantlhos (AISP/GRU), main airport of South America
in passengers' movement, based on a simulation model attesting its viability as a methodology in
airport planning systems, varying the growth of the demand expressed for the aircraft's
movement.
For this purpose it was used, the computational tool SIMMOD. A tool developed by the Federal
Aviation Administration - FAA, civil aviation authority in the United States, capable to show
through simulation the operation in the airspace and airside of airports, producing results that
allow the analysis of such systems.
This methodology is consecrated in the field "airports operation analysis", with several works
already implemented in the world (TRANSSOLUTIONS, 2000; Delcaire, B., Feron, E., 1997;
Trani, A. A., Wing-Ho, F., 1997), including Brazil (Pereira et al., 2000; Barros, 1994).
The models in SIMMOD are discrete, dynamic and stochastic. SIMMOD represents airports and
airspace system as a series of nodes connected by links. A node is defined as the position in a
system of coordinates where the simulation evaluates the location of an aircraft with regard to
other aircrafts from the system. All events happen according to the existent characteristics in the
construction of such links.
The operation of the models developed in the tool is described in the Figure 1, being part of their
events, attributes and entities considered as input data. In the tool there is also a great mount of
information related to the operational performance of the aircrafts that can be classified as entities
in the system besides an algorithm well built as for the airport operations.
2. JUSTIFICATION
The S_o Paulo Terminal Area, where AISP/GRU is inserted, is being reason for concerns from
planners, administrators and operators of the airports, due to the "bottlenecks" existent in air
operational procedures generating a traffic jam situation and problems as for its viability on the
ground or in the airspace.
Due to the complexity of the problem, the users of the system are recurring to computer science
more frequently, which subsidizes the development of new capacity analysis methodologies,
where the simulation has its outstanding status. As main justification for the use of such a
methodology, it is verified that the modeling using simulation techniques became quite efficient
in the resolution of complex problems, possessing a very low cost if compared to the
accomplishment of an experience with the real system. In the context of the air transportation,
SIMMOD has been showing quite satisfactory results.
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However the modeling of the object in study, its identification and the search for the best
guidelines in the present researches were not tasks easy to be accomplished, once the main
analyses were resulting of several technical visits to the control tower of the airport, exhausting
dialogues with the respons_le for the traffic in the ground (airside of the airport), full learning of
the tool SIMMOD and, above all, the understanding and conswaction of operational scenarios for
the new terminal of passengers (TPS - 3) and of the new track of landings and takeoffs. Their
swategy of operation is still not known.
For the coixs-lxuetion of the scenarios it ,,_as considered the increases in the demand, forming an
alliance of this criterion with the changes of the physical layout (improvement of the
infrastructure), a new runway for landings and takeoffs, and implantation of a new terminal of
passengers (TPS - 3). The sensibility analysis were made confronting the demand increase in the
flights against the value of delays and displacement times accomplished in the operations of
landings and takeoffs called as travel times, measuring all the influence of the improvement of
the aia'port infrastruc_e in the simulated alternatives.
The results will be able to assist the decisio_making process and in the appropriate timing of
the proposed changes in the existing infrastng_e.
3. A_m_PORff SYSTEM C!LPACITY_
The airport capacity is defined as _he maximum number of operations of aircratLs, established
for a certain aerodrome, for specific periods, supported by the ailport inflastructure" (Siewerdt,
2001). Starting from this concept the decisions taken in relation to the development of the
infrasmLemre are decisive for the visualization of the complete increase of system capacity.
However, the capacity is also limited by the w_st facto_ of the system where it is iaserted,
since the airspace capacity, or a new runway of landings and takeoffs, or apron area, or terminal
ofpnssengers, or simply the accessibility of the passengers to the terminal.
According this information it can be noticed how big is the problem of the increase in the
capacity of airport systems. As consequence, it is observed a necessity of searching solutions, for
the complete system - airspace until the access to the terminal - or simply for each factor that
involves it.
4. SAO PAULO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (AISP/GRU)
The biggest airport complex in Brazil, AISP/GRU was conceived originally to assist the
metropolitan area of S_o Paulo to the demand of domestic flights that used the Congonhas
airport, except for the shuttle service between Rio de Janeiro - Sio Paulo, as well as the
international flights related with the integral countries of the South Cone, also serving as an
alternative for the Campinas airport.
Although it has been planned to serve a certain scenario and objective, the administration
authority of the Ah_n couldn't maintain the initial idea, making necessary the implantation of
new strategies capable to absorb the unprecficted demand.
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The AISP/GRU, the Brazil's biggest "gate of entrance", is responsible for more than 70% of the
international passengers (origin/destiny) processed. It concentrates, in Brazil, the largest traffic of
regular passengers, the f'u'st relative placement to the total volume of freight and postal transport,
besides the great movement of aircrafts of total regular traffic (INFRAERO, 2000).
4.1. New facilities
Looking forward to solve these problems that are happening, mainly in the part of infrastructure
of AISP/GRU, Brazilian Airports Infrastructure Company - INFRAERO - is proposing as
alternatives, the construction of a new terminal of passengers (TPS - 3), and another runway of
landings and takeoffs, absorbing simultaneous operations of the aircrafts, identified as the
bounding factor for the increase of system capacity.
5. METHODOLOGY - THE MODELS CONCEPTION
Starting from the definition of the problem to be studied, the first step of the methodology
consists of listing the data and necessary information for the conception of the models and the
means to obtain them.
For that, basically, the model demands that are detailed the inherent aspects to the demand,
operation of the aircrafts (Brazilian Ministry of Aeronautics, 1987) and geometric configuration
of the airport infrastructure and of the terminal airspace (Brazilian Ministry of Aeronautics, 1993)
existent today. The construction of the model is a computational work in which all this
information is inserted in SIMMOD (Pereira et al., 2001).
The last phase for conclusion of the basic model consists of the validation and verification of it.
Some metrics are generated and selected by the simulation for comparison with real data of the
airport operation, verifying if the obtained deviations are within the maximum limits of tolerance
stipulated.
The conception of the models followed the plans of enlargement of the infrastructure of
AISP/GRU, which have been proposed by INFRAERO.
In the study now presented were conceived 6 models, relative to two new configurations, besides
the simulation of the current situation. Each one of the configurations was simulated with the
present demand (registered on March of 2000) and with increments that vary from 2% to 30% on
the current demand, totaling 15 increment values. The results for each one of them were
converted in delays (cost), and confronted against the growth of the demand. The comparative
analysis was generated from these results.
The demand on March 2000 had in its peak day 555 operations; while in February 2002 the
number of operations in the peak day was 534 operations (INFRAERO, 2002). In other words, on
these 2 years, the change was not significant; there was conservation in the numbers. These times
were originated by facts as the attacks in New York on September 11, 2001, besides the exit of
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the airline Transbrasil that paralyzed a great range of the market with domestic and international
flights.
The 6 models built and simulated with the tool SIMMOD were:
• M1: Current situation;
- M2: Hypothesis with the addition of the third runway of landings and takeoffs;
- M3: Hypothesis with the addition of the third runway and third terminal - first operational
strategy;
M4: Hypothesis _ the ad_tion of the htkirdr-m..way and third temaina! - second operational
strategy;
• M5: Hypothesis with the addition of the third terminal - first operational strategy;
• M6: Hypothesis with the addition of the third terminal - second operational strategy
Due to the inexistence of information about the behavior and the operation of the new terminal of
passengews, in development, in this work two options of operational strategies were adopted.
5.L Current Situation Model
The model built to show the current situation of AISP/GRU, followed the data from AIP
(Brazilian Aeronautical Command, 2000). It has two parallel runways of landings and takeoffs,
being one with 3000m of lengtj (09R/27L) and the other with 3700m f09L/27R}. The separation
between the axes of the runways is 375m. In the direction 09, the thresholds are 500m staggered,
runway 09R is used primarily for the operations of landings (85%) (IAC, 1999), and runway 09L
is used most of the time for takeoff options.
The staggered runway configuration results an effective separation among runways of 485m
taacauon of 30m for each 150m of staggering), u .......• '_: i,u_, _er, the _'_._., separation sugges'.ed by
ICAO is of 760m to segregated dependents operations of landings and takeoffs m parallel
runways, in visual flight rules (Barros apud Nagid, 1994). Though, runways with separation
larger than 300m can operate in the system dual lane, in other words, authorized takeoffs when
the aircraft touch the ground. Such is the procedure adopted by AISP/GRU to optimize the use of
the exi.Ctent infrastructure.
The airport has 2 terminal building (finger concept), with eleven paxking positions each one.
Only three positions at the finger extremity can rec_ve aircraft larger than Boeing 767• This fact
is due the initial proposal in which the airport would assist only South America flights. However,
INFRAERO are already modifying the _ of the aircraits parking positions in the terminals
and should conclude this stage until the end of 2003.
The 2 terminals buildings have a planned capacity to receive, each one, up to 7.5 million
PAX/year.
5.2. Third Runway Model
The development of this model was directly linked to the new project that INFRAERO is
developing.
Santana, E. S. M. 6
M_ller, C.
The master plan of the airport established a third runway with 2025m of extension. However to
implement that, it was adopted its construction inside existent patrimonial area, under the
responsibility of INFRAERO as basic premise. According this, the solution was to locate the
runway to 1462m from the runway 09L/27R axis, reducing the original length for 1800m.
The most appropriate position for the implantation of the third runway inside of the patrimonial
limits, it was then to 1462m of the axis of the current runway 09L/27R, resulting in the
dimensions of 1800m X 45m, could be enlarged for the 2025m, predicted in the master plan, by
incorporation of new areas to the airport.
IAC (Civil Aviation Institute) in the report of viability of operation of the third runway of
landings and takeoffs (IAC, 1999) has verified that a runway of 1800m would allow the landing
and takeoff, in most of the cases with 100% of the acceptable maximum weights. Besides, as for
the positioning of the runway of parallel taxi-lanes, the criterion of FAA was adopted (Federal
Aviation Administration), that it establishes a removal of 120m of the axis of the new runway,
compatible with aircrafts with wingspans minor or equal to the one of the Group IV (up to 52m
of wingspan), that reaches Fokker 100, Boeing 737, 767, and others. The report attests that about
80% of the programmed operations to the airport can be accomplished in the future third runway,
excluding only the aircrafts that accomplish international flights.
A factor that harms the operation of the third runway lives in the accessibility of the aircrafts for
the accomplishment of the landing operations and takeoffs. Starting from that consideration the
need was verified of doing an analysis among the values of delay and travel times.
With the entrance of the operation of the third runway, IAC (IAC, 1999) in the same study it was
presented the configuration of the new mix of aircrafts to the airport together with the percentile
of use of the runways as for the operation (Table 1) that was used in the conception of the model•
$.3. New Terminal of Passengers (TPS-3) Model
As well as the development of the previous model, the implantation of a new terminal of
passengers in the model considered the premises of the project bid by INFRAERO,
approximating to the reality the future operations.
Starting from the knowledge of demand studies accomplished by IAC (Brazilian Ministry of
Aeronautics, 1999), where it was pointed for the year 2017 a movement of passengers in the
order of 39 million PAX/year, INFRAERO bid in 1996 the project for the construction of the
third terminal. Their main characteristics were (INFRAERO, 2000):
• Capacity for 12 million PAX/year;
• Architectural concept should accommodate the largest possible number of aircrafts parking on
nose in, with two positions dedicated to NLA's (new large aircraft) and the minimum of seven
positions for aircrafts type Boeing 747-400;
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• Expansion Capability, making possible the implantation of the fourth terminal with identical
dimensions;
- The access circulation to the bridges was divided in two levels to separate passengers' departure
and arrival flows;
• Mix of stands for aircrafts of great and medium loads;
• Semi-automatexi System of dockages of aircrafts.
• ConsU'uction of one more remote p_ng area for the aircrafts of great, medium and small load,
access the third runway and still a small Inear terminal, that will absorb part of the domestic
U'alTIC.
5.3.1. Opetmiomd strategies in the Third Passengers Terminal (TP$-3)
As mentioned previously, the operation of the new terminal of passengers (TPS-3) of AISP/GRU
is an unknown that reaches all of the users of the system.
Once it is not the objective of the present work to point the best ways to obtain the best operation,
it was decided to come up with 2 propositions of operations and to submit them to the simulation.
The 2 propositions were based in:
Pcr",,,,_!e D/x_sion of the operations for each airline;
- Alliances among the airlines;
• Apron Capacity - size of the aircraft and their restrictions;
- Flight Plan Characteristics;
Operations balance within the 3 t_minah.
The way 2 operational scenarios were generated where -*-,herewas a propo_onality to the capacity
projected for the passengers' processing, TPS-1 and TPS-2 with 7.5 million PAX/year,
representing 27.8% each of the passengers' demand and TPS-3 with 12 million PAX/year,
representing 44.4% (Table 2). It is worth to remind that the scenarios were elaborated according
to demand of March 2000 (INFRAERO, 2000).
6. DEMAND
Looking for to evaluate the study object better, and to produce results to generate significant
analyses as for the capacity on the airport airside, it was verified that the variation of the demand
associated to the simulations in the models would consist in the very important step.
The study "Detailed Demand Analysis of Brazilian Airports" (Brazilian Ministry of Aeronautics,
1999) indicated that a 30% demand growth on the number of operations was expected in the
AISP/GRU in a 5 year-horizon. The adoption of a range of increasing demand values was
influenced by the lack of an updated forecast model after the countless problems caused in the
world and Brazilian aviation by the attacks in the USA, that caused the observed break and
decrease of flights.
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Therefore, models representing 16 demand levels, ranging from 0% to 30% demand increment,
were simulated and the for each one the level of traffic and the respective delays and travel times
were obtained.
The results allowed identifying the potential behavior of the average delay and average travel
time, evidencing, this way, the appropriate instant to intervene in the installed infrastructure.
7. RESULTS AND ANALYSES
To generate results with statistical significance, although the experience suggests 5 iterations as
enough to ensure statistically valid results (TRANSSOLUTIONS, 2000), 20 iterations of each
analyzed model were performed.
After executing the simulation, the first concern was that regarding the validation of the model,
turning it capable to accomplish the other proposed analyses. The validation stage was
accomplished starting from the comparison of the results of the simulated system with the real
system, testing logically and numerical the model.
The validation followed the criteria:
• Representative day = peak day of the data base supplied (March of 2000)
• Total Period used in the simulation = 1 day of airport operations = comp.lete cycle
• Validation Process and verification = comparison of the generated results (Figure 2)
Besides the number of operations, the process of validation of the model of the current situation
consisted of the close verification of the input data from the report of the International
Consultancy MITRE Co. (MITRE, 2001) contracted by the Civil Aviation Authority (DAC). In
this report, MITRE Co. mentions that the maximum capacity is between 46 and 49 operations,
varying that number according to the operation type, departure or arrival. The model developed
in SIMMOD obeyed exactly to these numbers, arriving in the maximum number of 50 operations
with an increase in the demand of 30% reaching its capacity limit.
In Figure 2 the adaptation of the "flotation" of the number of operations was observed, besides
with the proximity of the "peaks" and "valleys" operational between the real values and the
simulated model•
Other metric verified was that related to the number of aircrafts in the takeoff line that coincided
with the numbers of INFRAERO. In the peak hour, these values reached 9 aircrafts in the waiting
line on the ground, both in the developed model and in the real operation•
7.1. Analysis of the Results
The analysis of the simulated operational models is linked to the demand and offer of the system,
besides the installed capacity of the airport.
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Observing Figure 3 it is noticed the influence of the third runway of landings and takeoffs firstly
in the decrease of delays. It is clear the existence of the division, among the models, in 2 groups
with seemed characteristics as for the variation in the evolution of the demand. They are
differentiated amongst themselves just by the inclusion of the third runway in their scenarios.
It is also demonstrated in the same Figure 3, that the percentile growth of the delays doesnLt
depend a lot on the choice of the operational strategy for the third terminal of passengers (TPS-3).
The behavior is identical considering or not the existence of the third runway of landings and
takeoffs. However, in both cases, the- accompanied *,he tax of percentile grox_h of the delays.
As expected, the results generated starting from the simulation of the models 3 and 4 those that
presented the minor values were when applied to the increase of 30°,6 in the demand of aircrafts.
Almost 75% of delays increase in the models 3 and 4, against 495% in the model 1 (current
situation of _).
Completing the analyses of the study is necessary to confront the delays against the travel times
accomplished by the aircrafts in their courses in the ground.
The third runway of landings and takeoffs possesses a small problem as for its operation already
de_.'-r_L-edpre_.Ao-._s!y. The aL.rcr___.sto _reach the "new" nmwav threshold 09 will face a long taxi
distance increasing therefore the travel time on the ground.
The airvmit would be less subject to the delays (happened in the gates, in the taxi-lanes and
aprons), once the itineraries would not conflict with the existent procedures in the current taxi-
lanes. However, the traveled time to the runway threshold 09 "new", in the case of takeoffs,
would be high. ]he time spent for the arrival procedures would not be so accentuate_ once ',he
i,u_:,L dhOfit;uliy wuuld by to reach the runway threshold 09 "new" for takeoff.
The results were practically the same, where the differential once again was the inclusion of the
third nmway of landings and takeoffs. The demand usually varied and the travel time also in the
same way, in accordance with the same growth taxes.
On Figure 4, it is verified that the tax of growth of the travel time proceeded exactly to the tax of
growth of the demand, generating a constant graph for their average values. Once constant, the
difference can be meas-ured by the average time the aircraft spent in the models where there is the
inclusion of a new runway of landings and takeoffs and h the models in that the operations
follow all for the same runway.
This time observed in Figure 4 is of 2 minutes. In other words, in the models where the new
runway is considered, the operations were added by 2 minutes in relation to those that diclflt
considered the third runway.
According to Table 2, where the models differ for the existence of the new runway of landings
and takeoffs, and of the new terminal of passengers, it can be verified that starting from an
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increase of 14% in the demand cf the operations in the Airport, the difference among their
average delays passes 2 minutes. This value had been mentioned as the reference pattern on the
average time of trip spent by the aircrafts that use the new runway of landings and takeoffs.
On Figure 5, it is noticed that when increasing 30% in the demand of the movement of aircrafts,
the difference among the average values of delay for operation passes 5 minutes.
However, for demand values up to an increase of 14%, the delay among the models 2 and 5, and
2 and 6, turns smaller difference than 2 minutes, resulting non effective the construction of the
third runway of landings and takeoffs, once the average travel time stayed constant in 2 minutes
for any demand increase.
The installed capacity was not completely used for any of the mentioned cases. However there is
a great tendency, starting from 30% in the increase of the demand of the movement of the
aircrafts, that AISP/GRU, reach its operation limit quickly, above all in the model 1 that
represents the operation situation lived in the days today, with many points of operational
conflict.
However, one of the great problems visualized now at the airport regards the concentration of
flights in certain schedules, causing excessive delays in certain hours of the day. The existence of
idleness during other hours of the day made possible the operations in the simulations, although
with many delays.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The viability of use of the methodology as an aid to the decisior_ making in airport planning is
observed.
The study suggests that the construction of a third runway of landings and takeoffs, along with
taxi-lanes, would bring more benefits in the long run (30% demand increase) of the operation of
the airside as opposed to the solely construction of a new terminal of passengers (TPS-3).
However, the best option would be the construction of the 2 facilities, the new terminal of
passengers and the new runway of landings and takeoffs. For an increment of 30% in the
demand, the impact on delays would be very small, once the average delays would reach values
close to the ones observed in 2000.
The new terminal of passengers alone would be operationally more effective than the third
runway of landings and takeoffs up to 14% increase in the demand of the Airport.
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Figure 1. The Simulation Framework from SIMMOD Tool
Source: Delcaire &Feron, 1997
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Table 1. Aircraft's Operational Mix to AISP/GRU
Runways Using Percentile
Aircraft Third Runway 09I./27R
B737 100% a.rr 35,13% dep
FI00 100% arr
37,4% dep 62,6% dep
El20 100% arr and dep
F50 100% a.rrand dep
B767 26,56% art 100% dep 73,44% arr
MD11 - 100% dep 100% arr
B747
A300
100% dep
100% dep
09R/2 7L
64,87% dep
100% arr
100% art
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Tabk 2. Openlioeai Mix for Third Passengers Terminal at AISP/GRU
Scenario 01
I
Star Alliance and others 43.91% TPS-3
TAil • Group 28.01% TPS-2
vasp • Group 28.09% TPS-1
Scenario 02
Long Haul Flights and Brazilian aidines
Vasp • Group
Domes/ic and Int. South America
43.76%
28.15%
28.09%
TPS-3
TPS-2
TPS-1
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ABSTRACT
On October 2, 2002, JAL and JAS established a new holding company after obtaining
the necessary approval from the government bodies. Full integration is planned to
take place in April 2004.
This paper will primarily explain how JAL/JAS integration will enable JAL to
compete effectively with ANA, the giant in the domestic market, and how it will
reinforce JAL's competitiveness through further cost reduction and revenue
enhancement.
In addition, the paper will explain how the keener domestic competition brought
about by this integration could resolve the following two issues for the first time in
the Japanese aviation history. Those two issues are: (1) providing better service to
domestic customers, and (2) making Japanese airlines more competitive against
foreign airlines in the international market.
As a result, the paper will argue that such an integration, a logical outcome of the
post-war civil aviation history of Japan, will significantly benefit customers, Japanese
aviation industry and Japanese society as a whole.
Keywords: Integration, Slot Constraints, Deregulation, Competitive Market
1. JAL'S LONGSTANDING ISSUE
(1) The need for a larger domestic market share. One of the longstanding issues for JAL has
been on how to compete effectively with ANA in the domestic market. In order to do so, JAL
needed to obtain a larger domestic market share that would enable more revenue from stable
domestic market to alleviate or supplement the vulnerability of international operations.
Between 1970 and 1972, the Cabinet approved a framework for the aviation industry in Japan,
based on the three major carriers, ANA, JAS (then TDA) and JAL. The main intention of this
frameworkwas to restrict competition among the three airlines in order to foster and strengthen
the internationally weak Japanese carriers at the time.
Under the 1970/72 policy, JAL was permitted to hold a monopoly of scheduled international
routes, and to fly domestic trunk routes for the purpose of supporting financially its international
operation. ANA's mission was to fly all domestic trunk and local routes, with permission to
operate short-haul international charters. JAS was permitted to operate in the domestic market,
serving local routes, with the promise of future approval for serving domestic trunk routes.
The international aviation market is very vulnerable to volatile economic, political and other
unexpected factors such as exchange rates, terrorism, war and epidemics. JAL, being heavily
reliant on revenues from international operation, has been impacted from such vulnerabilities,
especially in recent years since the tragic event on September 11 th, 2001. Therefore, in order to
survive the cut-throat competition in the international aviation market, it is essential to establish a
substantial business base in the domestic market.
In the United States, Pan American Airways and Trans World Airlines, whose main operational
base used to be international, faded out after the introduction of the deregulation policy in 1978.
On the other hand, the present mega carriers, American, United and Delta, started as domestic
carriers. Under this deregulation policy, these mega carriers entered the international market.
They have strengthened their international competitiveness through the fierce competition in the
US domestic market, which is virtually free of airport slot restrictions. In each case their domestic
revenue accounts for 70-80% of total passenger revenue (see Fig.I).
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Figure 1.
In Japan, 60 percent of all domestic passengers (95 million in FY01) use Haneda airport and 20
percent use Itami and Kansai airports respectively (see Fig.2). However, Haneda and Itami
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airports were at full capacity.Therefore,airlineshave not had the l_eedom to increase their
competitiveness by expanding market share at these extremely congested airports. This is even
after the gradual deregulation policy that was introduced to the domestic market in 1986, and the
complete deregulation, at least in pr:mciple, that followed in 2000. These deregulation polices are
only true in principle since the break-down of domestic market shares under these policies has
been almost exactly the same as it was 30 years ago: ANA 50%, JAS 25% and JAL 25% (see
Fig.3). The ratio of domestic passenger revenue to that of international in the regulated era has
also remained virtually unchanged even after the deregulation policy was introduced, which is
completely different from that in the United States: 3:7 in case of JAL, 8:2 for ANA and 9:1 for
JAS (see Fig.l).
International Passenger
Number
46.9 rail (FY 2001)
Domestic Passenger
Number
94.6mil (FY 2001)
International cargo and domest_ cargo also concentrated at
• Narim and Haueda airport respectively
Source Ministry ofI_md, Infrast_cture and Transport
Figure 2.
Osaka=ltami+Kansai
(2) Three Measures to Address JAL's Longstanding Issue
The following three measures are expected to resolve the JAL's longstanding issue of drastically
increasing its domestic market share up to the level of ANA's:
1) To obtain JAS' consent to integrate with JAL, which would make its domestic market share
almost to the same level with ANA's instantaneously;
2) To have the airport capacity at Haneda airport expanded by the government through the
construction of a new fourth runway so that JAL can increase its market share fireely;
3) To rectify completely the substantial slot share disparity among three major airlines at Haneda
and Itami by the government through the slot allotment.
JAL had worked on JAS to form some types of partnership to compete with ANA effectively
since the latter half of 1980s', and JAS finally agreed to the integration this time and hence, the
first measurewas realised. This integration has created a well-balanced domestic and
international structure suitable for competing effectively in the international market. Domestic
passenger revenue for the newly integrated company becomes close to 50% of total passenger
revenue (see Fig.l).
FY2001
Figure 3.
Others= Skymark Airlines, AirDo, etc.
The second measure is likely to take much more time for it to be realized than the first measure.
Regarding the third measure, as reported by the Committee for Setting Standards on Distributing
New Slots at Haneda in 1997, the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) announced its intention to
rectify the disparity of the slot share at Haneda at the time of the Haneda's capacity expansion
(see foot note).
Note: the capacity at Haneda was expanded to some extent at the time of the completion of the
offshore relocation of runway C in 1997 and runway B in 2000.
However, as the government has set aside slots for new entrants since 1997 and also has adopted
the evaluation-based slot allocation method since 2000, by which the government would
distribute slots on the basis of each airline's performance, the slot disparity could not be expected
to be rectified drastically, even in the longer term.
2. THE REINFORCEMENT OF JAL'S COMPETITIVENESS
Following the Gulf War in 1991 and the worldwide economic recession thereafter, international
passenger demand has fallen against the previous year for the first time in the world aviation
history and as a result, the competition had become fiercer. Meanwhile, the growth rate of the
domestic demand has also become sluggish, causing over-capacity in the market. The average
yield of the international passenger fell by about 40% and that of the domestic passenger by about
30% in the last 12 years.
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Under these circumstances, JAL has drastically cut costs by more than 30% per ASK (available
seat-kilometres) in 12 years. In terms of the unit labour cost, the reduction is about 50% without
layoffs (see Fig.4). In Japan, layoff should be avoided as much as possible and must be
considered only as the last reso_. Such a practice is a prevalent in Japanese society.
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Although JAL finally recovered in 1998 and succeeded in recording profit, the terrorist attacks in
the U.S.A in September 2001 forced JAL back to a serious financial loss.
In this unprccxxtented severe environment; where the need for a fundamental change in the cost
and revenue stmct_e was called for more than ever before, JAL has been forced to search for
new ways to further cut costs and increase revenue. One of the main solutions to this challenge
was the JAL/JAS integration.
(1) Further Cost Reduction
The shared use of equipment such as aircraft, ground service equipment, facilities and personnel
contributes to the cost efficiency and reduction. JAL/JAS (hereafter JAL Group) originally
planned to save ¥ 61 billion (=US$510 million) annually by the end of March 2006.
Estimated amounts of cost reduaJon of each segment are as follows: ¥ 19 billion (=US$160
million) reduction from reduced rental fees; ¥28 billion (=US$230 million) saving from labour
efficiency improvement; ¥ 11 billion (=US$90 million) saving from fleet efficiency
improvement and ¥3 billion (=US$25 million) saving from others (see Fig.5). The number of
aircraft types is 16 at present and it is planned to decrease to 1 ! by FY06.
Because revenue is falling drastically due to the impact l_om the war in Iraq and SARS, which
were not considered at the time of planning the integration, JAL Group is making utmost efforts
to accelerate the pace of the cost reduction plan, aiming to complete well in advance of the
original target date.
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Figure 5.
(2) Further Revenue Enhancement
As explained earlier, JAL's domestic network is composed primarily of tnmk routes and that of
JAS local routes. This means both are in a mutually complimentary relationship. With the
integration, the JAL Group has roughly an equal share of slots to ANA group at Haneda and
Itami, resulting in a broader, nationwide network. The former "one strong + two weak airlines"
structure is changed into the new one where two airline groups, JAL and ANA become real, equal,
competitors. JAL Group can now offer a more competitive and, more customer oriented flight
schedule, network, fares and services as a market leader. After 8 months have passed since the
integration came into effect, it is quite clear that the JAL Group's competitive position against
ANA group has become much stronger. The examples of strengthening of the network and
schedule competitiveness are as follows:
1) Starting flights on high-demand routes monopolised by ANA (Toyama, Yamaguchi-Ube etc.);
2) Scheduling more flights on high-demand profitable routes where ANA had a larger number of
flights (Matsuyama, Hiroshima);
3) Eliminating over-concentration of flights at the peculiar peak hours on trunk and other routes
to set user-friendlier timetables (system-wide).
We expect an annual ¥21.5 billion (=$180 million) increase in revenue in FY06 because of
increased competitiveness but, at the same time we expect an annual ¥ 11 billion (=$90 million)
decrease in revenue because of active sales promotion. Therefore, the net expected increase in
revenue is ¥ 10.5 billion (=$90 million).
At the bottom line, we expect the net integration gain of annual _ 56 billion (=$470 million) in
FY05 and thereafter (see Fig.6).
Figure 6.
F'Y2002 FY2003
(Yen in billions)
W2005
0 12.0 21.5
• 5.5 • 11.0 • 11.0
1.0 18.5 61.0
• 4.5 19.5 71.5
• 6.0 • 6.0 • 15.5
• 10.5 13.5 56.0
($ in millions)
$1=120
(--SsOOm)
(=$470m)
(3) Current Progress and Short-Term Goal
With this integration, JAL Group has a weU-balanced revenue structure with revenue share of
international passenger 41%, domestic passenger 38%, international cargo 10%, domestic cargo
2% and others 9%. The international passenger segment also has a well-balanced r_venue
smacture with revenue share of Pacific routes 29%, E-_-opean routes 20%, long range Asian
mutes 21%, short range Asian routes 2(P/_, and others 10% (see Fig.7).
It surely seems that JAL's decision to integrate with JAS was very timely considering the
unexpected outbreak of war in Iraq and SARS turmoil.
[ Composition of IP revenues by[Composition of revenues in Air
Transportation Segn_nt] Routes]
IX: Others Guam/Saipan
.............................. Oceania 4%
IC
10_
6%
Figure 7.
The progress of integration, including computer reservation systems, is under way and controlled
very well so far without any serious problems. After full integration in April 2004, JAL Group
will consist of Japan Airline Domestic and Japan Airlines International (which includes cargo
business at the beginning). Cargo business would become independent in the future,
circumstances permitting (see Fig.8).
Within FY2003 Speeding up the reorganization of emnagement structure in preparation for Phase 2
April, 2004 Transition to the following business structure to maximize Integration effects
,i
i
Airlines
Figure 8.
With SAILS and the aftermath of war in Iraq, we are forced to expect financial losses in FY03.
However, as the effects of both events are likely to fade away by the end of this fiscal year,
combined with the revenue structure change brought about by JAL/JAS integration that can
partially offset the ill effect on the international business, we still expect profit in FY04 and FY05
(see Fig.9).
(Yen in billions)
FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003
(Results) (Results) (Results) (Estimate)
2,122.2 2,029.5 2,083.4 2,032.0
96.3 •1.0 10.5 •22.0
4.5% 0.0% 0.5% • 1.1%
43.2 •35.8 11.6 •43.0
FY2005
(Target)New Japan Airinqes Group
2,245.5
122,,4
5.5%
34.9
$=\120
(=$18.7 bill.)
(=$1018 mill.)
(=$290 mill.)
15% •14% 5% 12.4%
9 years 15 years 12 years 15 years 7.7 years
Figure 9.
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Notwithstanding above, as almost all airlines in the world including U.S. mega-carriers are
cutting cost drastically under the severe financial situation, and are desperate to regain the
international competitiveness, JAL Group is required to make further cost reduction and revenue
enhancement than originally planned in the integration project.
It is noteworthy that although China is badly affected by SARS for now, in the long run, it will
grow to become a giant aviation market in the world. JAL Group must be prepared to reap the
benefit from this lucrative growing market with the determination to lower cost to the level of
Asian airlines.
3. TWO LONGSTANDLNG ISSUES L-N AVIATION LNDUSTRY IN JAPAN
The aviation industry in Japan has had the following two longstanding issues, indirectly
explained so far. Both issues are expected to be resolved simultaneously by this JAL/JAS
integration;
1) The need for improving customer services that had been seriously hampered by the
imperfectly competitive domestic air travel market in which one airline, ANA, dominated half of
the market share, while the other two, JAL and JAS, with less than one-quarter of the market
share each, had to compete with this "Giant Share holder" (see Fig.3).
2) The need for reinforcing the competitiveness of Japanese airlines as a whole ___odnst
foreign airlines in order to expand the international network of the Japanese airlines and to
increase Japanese airlines' share of the international passenger market in Japan, which is now
only around 40*,6 (see Fig.10).
FY2001
JAs
Gxoup
Figure 10.
As explained above, the integration of JAL and JAS has changed the existing structure of "one
strong + two weak airlines" to a new structure where two airlines are real competitors. It is thus
quite natural that the competition is stimulated more strongly than before.
The more competitionJapaneseairlines are exposed to in the domestic market, the more
competitive they will become, especially in the area of cost reductions, which will in turn make
them more competitive against foreign airlines. As has been said, the American mega-carriers
boosted their competitiveness by competing fiercely in the domestic market first.
Although ANA's international passenger revenue is smaller than that of JAL group, this
difference is expected to shrink rapidly if ANA makes full use of the restriction flee slot situation
at Narita and Kansai in the same way ANA has expanded international routes so far.
In terms of international passenger market share of Japanese airlines in Japan, it has stayed at
around 40% even after ANA entered the international passenger market in March 1986, followed
by JAS in July 1988. Unlike the domestic market, the slot restriction at Narita was loosened by
the opening of its second provisional runway in April 2002, and strong growth is expected in the
medium to long term.
Therefore, the task for Japanese airlines is to become more competitive internationally and to
increase its market share through expanding the international networks. This will open ways for
Japan's increased participation in the international arena in the area of economics and politics,
and hence will contribute significantly to improving the lives of the people.
4. CONCLUSION: 50 YEARS OF CIVIL AVIATION HISTORY IN JAPAN A NEW
FRAMEWORK IS NEEDED
Civil aviation in Japan, following Japan's defeat in 1945, resumed in October 1951 when the first
Japan Air Lines took to the sky. Between 1952 and 1953, eight other domestic airlines were born.
Of these eight, four were eventually folded into ANA by 1967. The remaining four eventually
merged to become Toa Domestic Airlines (TDA), renamed Japan Air Systems in 1988. Therefore,
mergers like JAL/JAS integration are nothing new in Japanese aviation industry.
Protective Aviation Policy Until 1985
During the 1960's, the demand for air travel grew strongly as the Japanese economy surged and
annual GNP growth soared. Although Japanese airlines struggled to increase capacity to meet the
demand, they were hindered by a shortage of pilots and delays in developing airports.
Circumstances demanded a clear aviation policy.
Between 1970 and 1972 the Cabinet approved a new business field demarcation of the three
major carriers established, then ANA, JAS (then TDA) and JAL.
The main intention of the 1970/72 policy was to protect and nurture the airlines by avoiding the
excessive competition among themselves.
JAL, the senior company, was permitted to hold a monopoly of scheduled international routes
and to fly domestic trunk routes for the purpose of supporting financially its international
operation. ANA's mission was to fly all domestic trunk and local routes, with permission to
operate short-haul international charters. JAS was permitted the domestic market, serving local
routes, with the promise of future approval for serving domestic trunk routes
Gradual Deregulation Policy After 1986
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However, in the early 1980's,as both the domestic economy and the airline business were
growing strongly and being influenced to some extent by a new US-Japan aviation agreement in
1985 that permitted multi-designation of Japanese carriers to transpacific service, the government
adopted a new, pro-competition policy in 1986.
Under this policy ANA and JAS gained rights to operate the international scheduled service. In
retrain JAL got more access to the domestic market through more local routes.
At the time, there was already capacity shortage at the main domestic airports, Haneda and Itami.
Regarding the capacity of the main international airport, Narita, it was opened in 1978. Its
capacity was satm_--_ted in 1991 and loosened again in April 2002 by the opening of its second
provisional runway.
Total Deregulation Poficy in 2000, but incomplete
The next major policy change came in February 2000, when "total deregulation" was launched in
the domestic market. The domestic restrictions on air fares were completely lifted and airlines
were permitted to fly wherever they liked.
However the problem was that the persisting lack of capacity at the key airports, Itami and
Haneda, prevented airlines from starting new routes on monopolised routes and increasing flight
frequencies on other double or triple trucking mutes where in most cases ANA enjoyed largest
number of l_equencies. Thus the breakdown of the domestic market shares under the new "totally
deregulated" policy was almost exactly the same as it had been 30 years ago: ANA 50%, JAS
25% and JAL 25%.
Base on the strongest competitiveness of the network promised by the given "Giant Share" in the
domestic market, ANA had held firmly the marketing initiative. This is because why it has been
said that the competition in the domestic market is less fierce than that in the international. It
could be said that the free and fair competition which is clearly stipulated by the Japanese
antitrust law was appeared flawed to some extem under the reality, of imperfect market conditions,
aggravated by airport capacity shortages.
The JAL/JAS Integration, The Logical Outcome Of The Japanese Aviation History
The integration was the only one last choice left for the minor airlines in the domestic market
unless the government took the necessary actions to dissolve the basic contradiction of the
deregulation policy with the chronically crucial slot shortage at the main domestic airports. By
this integration, the competition in the domestic market is substantially promoted and it becomes
poss_le to solve the longstanding issues of the Japanese aviation, that are;
a) Improve customer services
b) Reinforce the competitiveness of Japanese airlines as a whole against foreign airlines
11
The Study of Airline Merger and Acquisition in the Greater China Area
Zheng_ Short
Department of Business Administration,
Wetgao Usruline College of Languages
900 Minzu 1st Road,
Kaohsiang, 807, Taiwan.
Tel: 886-7-3426031 ext. 305, Fax: 886-7-3474869
j oelshon@m_.hinet.net
Abstract
The Asian financial crisis in the late 20 th century has some long lasting effect on the
air trav_portation industry in Asia, especially in the Great China Area. Starting from 1998,
airlines in both China and Taiwan suffered some serious financial losses due to the
diminishing travel demand caused by the economic recession. Airlines were forced to cut
price to attract passengers and hence crashed the market discipline. A number of airline
mergers and acquisitions were then c_iven by the ---"_" --'_ "_"........ *_ AA_-
_lLtOA_l$.t_t,_ Oktlt.t t._t_., _V V _L/LtaLt,t_J_tt._. _ _,_A
China and Taiwan have both entered the World Trade Organization, some mega-merging
cases were finalized in late 2002 for better fitting the world's aviation competitions.
This paper reviews the nine merging and acquiring cases in the Great China Area in
the past 5 years. Almost all the airlines in the area were involved. The new groups of
airlines and the survival airlines are introduced. Market response to the airline mergers
will also be examined. A general look over the performance of the new airlines will be
discussed. And the future of the market will also be analyzed. Finally, the practices and
the impacts of current inter-state mergers in the Great China Area will be examined. The
study has expected a highly concentrated domestic market in both China and Taiwan.
Each of the market will be dominated by three major airline groups of their own.
Cross-holding equity within these 6 leading aviation groups would also be possible aiter
further deregulations.
1. Introduction: The History of the Airline Industry in the Greater China Area
The airline industry in China can be traced back to the late 19 th century. However,
there is not any single carrier that can survive for over a hundred years. The current
aviation industrial structure was established during the 1930s to 1940s when both Cathay
Pacific and China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) were established. These two
carriers are still some most important airline groups in the Greater China Area today.
Cathay Pacific was set up in 1946 in Shanghai as a private business, while CNAC was
setup in 1930 in Nanjing as a state enterprise. The role of CNAC is quite embarrassing
after the ROC regime was turned to PRC in 1949. Some pilots threw their lot in the
communists and flew their aircraft to Beijing. These pilots and aircraft were then become
the basis of the following monopoly air carrier in China, the Civil Aviation
Administration of China. CAAC is the administrative bureau of civil aviation. Following
the Soviet bureaucratic structure, it was also providing the monopolistic air transportation
service. The carrier of bureau has operated for over 30 years until the first deregulation
act made in 1985. The deregulation policy, which should be considered as a revolution to
decompose the aviation industry, was mainly for the purpose of separating business sector
from administrative bureau. By then, some new state enterprises were created, and some
regional or provincial carriers were also introduced. The entire aviation industry of China
has been expended to 26 carriers within a few years. A brand new era for the aviation
industry was come, not only because of the number of carriers was increased, but also the
efficiency and service quality was improved.
On the other hand, by losing all the aircraft during the civil war, the ROC regime
which retreated to Taiwan in 1949 was not able to run aviation business anymore. The
state owned aircraft grounded in Hong Kong was then sold to General Claire Lee
Chennault, the leader of Flying Tigers in China, in a very affordable price before the
property fights of these aircraft could be transferred to PRC. General Chennault used
these aircraft established Civil Air Transport (CAT) in Taiwan, while other members of
Flying Tigers established Flying Tiger Line in US. CAT went bankrupt a few years' after
the Vietnam War. The China Airline then took over their business in Taiwan. Established
in 1959, China Airlines was the last one of the first three airlines set up in the 1950s. All
the three carriers are still operating today, regardless of their heavy losses. After China
Airlines was set up, an entry barrier of air transportation industry was successfully built
to keep competitors away from the market for over 30 years. In the early 1990s, Eva
Airways broke the barrier by modifying the aviation law through Legislators supporting
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them, probably also supported by them. A deregulation policy was then made to welcome
new players in the market. Within a few years, the number of airlines in Taiwan has
expended from 3 to 9. Private sectors were investing huge amount of money because the
aviation industry under proton was a real profit one.
Meanwhile, new carriers in both Hong Kong and Macau were also introduced
during the mid of 1980s and 1990s. Dragon air, the second airline of Hong Kong, was
established in 1985 focusing mainly on the air transportation market of China. 10 years
after the Dragon air, Macau has also launched a new airport with a new airline, the Air
Macau. Air Macau is also an airline of Greater China market. Although these two airlines
have big similarities in product positioning, yet the huge demand across the Taiwan Strait
has still made these two carriers profitable during the past years.
2. Post-deregulation Effect: Merger and Acquisition
It seemed like most nations having deregulation policy towards aviation industry
have experienced some similar transformation of the market structure after deregulation.
In the first phase of deregulation, numerous competitors are appearing soon after the
entry barrier is brokem Nonetheless, airlines have big sunk cost. Deregulation policy has
made airliners easy to get in, but hard to get ouL This is just one worst market structure
can be found in some basic marketing theories. Deregulation policy was based on the
,.o,_o¢_.,..,,.,,, ,"-'"t"_,_,_ ,,mechanism, but the mech-_ism -,_'-- ,_^'-^u_amL_"_-c_..,. ., .,.me_w_,uumi_ _uect-'_--of
deregulation. As most marketers' prediction, airline business soon turned non-profitable
after deregulation. Any change from the operating environment will cause serious
damage of the entire industry. In the past 20 years, lots of mega-carriers went bankrupt in
US and Europe, and a number of airline mergers and acquisitions occurred each and
every year. Any single political or economic factor, including terror attacks, war, even
economic recession or business competition, could have huge impacts on airlines'
operations. Not surprisingly, airlines in the Greater China Area have to face the same
problem.
The Asian financial crisis in the end of 20 th century was one last, probably the most
important factor to encourage airline mergers in the great China area. Although none of
the carriers went bankruptcy, most carriers were losing big money. The idea of airline
mergers was than proposed by some economists in China. Long before Asian financial
Crisis, scholars in Taiwan have also encouraged airline merger to reduce the negative
effects of deregulation. Together with some acquisitions, we have concluded 7 M&A
cases after 1990s. These cases are:
1. Air China Group:
Air China Group was a combination of 3 different airlines: Air China, China National
Aviation Corporation, and China Southeast airline. Air China was the flag carrier, it is
still the one and only flag carrier after mergers. One interesting fact in this group is the
role of CNAC, the China National Aviation Corporation. It was and still is the stock
holding company of both Dragon Air, Air China, and one small regional carrier
Zhejiang airline. That is to say, Air China Group nowadays controls 5 airlines
altogether. The total asset of Air China Group is 57.3 billion REM, approximately 7
billion US dollars. They have 119 aircraft and 307 links in total. The number of
employees is now 22960.
2. China Eastern Airline Group:
China Eastern Airline Group is based in Shanghai, one attractive and energetic city
with fastest growing economy in China. In addition to the original China Eastern
Airline, the group also integrated Yunnan Airline and China Northwest Airline. The
new China Eastern Airline Group is now an airline with 47.3 RMB billion assets, 142
aircraft, 386 links, and 25000 employees.
3. China Southern Airline Group:
China Southern Airline was the first Chinese airline that went public in Hong Kong
and New York. Based in Guangzhou, China Southern Airline has enjoyed the
successful economic reform during the 1980s and 1990s. Although the focus of China
economy has moved up to Shanghai and nearby areas, Southern China has still been
beneficiated, and so has the China Southern Airline. It was the most efficient airline in
the past 20 decades. The group integrated China Southern Airline, China Northern
Airline, and Xinjiang Airline. The New China Southern airlines is having 50.1 billion
RMB assets, 180 aircraft, 666 operating links, and 342686 employees.
4. China Airlines Group:
Across the Taiwan Strait, there are also some merging cases of airlines. The China
airlines, which holds 100% of mandarin airlines, is one biggest aviation group in
Taiwan. In the aviation market, there is no merging record of this carrier, because
China Airlines has only acquiring some domestic carriers instead of merging. Currently
China Airlines is still holding someminor shares of Far Eastern Air Transport, one
most important carrier in the domestic market. China Airlines have also had over 90%
shares of Formosa Airline, one disappeared carrier in the market.
5. Mandarin Airline and Formosa Airline
Both these two airlines are belonging to China Airlines. China Airlines is holding
100% of Mandarin and majority shares of Formosa. The functions of Mandarin and
Formosa were divide_l into international brand and domestic one. The reason to set up
Mandarin was became of the too-sensitive role of flag carrier in some specific regions;
and the reason to hold Formosa was because of the allocation of time slots in the very
congested Taipei airport during the 1990s. However, the Formosa Airline was bad at
the air safety records. Fatal accidents happened year after year. Finally China Airlines
decided to terminate the operation of Formosa, but still want to hold the traffic rights in
some domestic links. The group asked Mandarin to merge Formosa in 2000 as a result.
6. Eva Air Group:
Eva Air is the airline of Evergreen Group, one of the major marine liner groups in the
world. In the late 1980s, Evergreen decided to expand their business from marine liner
to one fully integrated logistic empire, so they decided to break the entry barrier of air
transportation law in Taiwan, also initiated some ground transportation services. The
Eva Air was successfully established in the early 1990s. They also acquire one small
Making .......... '....cm-rier in Taiwan to serve the domestic mmr,m.'--""_-:ttas- amine-:-':--was mtm_, wmcn
turned into Uni Airways afterwards.
7. Uni Airways Mergers
Uni Airways was the former Makung airline acquired by Eva Air. Evergreen decided to
transfer the property of the carrier to one of its sub-company, the Uni Liner. So the
name of Makung was then changed in the mid 1990s to Uni Airways. To enhance the
competition power in the domestic market, Eva decided to acquire 2 other small
carriers in Taiwan: The Taiwan Airways and Great China Airways. Soon flier Asian
financial crisis, Evergreen Group has decided to cut cost and condensed the business
scale. All 3 domestic carriers were merged. The existing airlines has chosen to be the
Uni Airways.
8. Hainan Airlines
The most interesting case of acqtfiting the airlines in the Great China Area should be
the Hainan Airlines. Hainan Airline is the first airlines trading both A shares and B
shares in the China Stock Market. The critical ratio of equity was acquired by private
sectors during the Asian financial crisis. Some other airlines were also acquired in
2002 while major state-owned airlines group were restructuring. Nowadays Hainan
airlines group has been the biggest private owned career in China. Deer Jet Company
Ltd., Chang'an Airlines Company Ltd., Shanxi Airlines, China Xinhua Airlines
Company Ltd., and Yangtze River Express Company are all under control of Hainan
Ailines. The entire group is now holding 80 aircraft in total.
3. Cross Border Acquisitions
In addition to the local merger and acquisition cases discussed above, cross border
acquisitions are also easy to find in recent years. Although the political relationship
within the Greater China Area is complex, cross border equity holding in this area is still
popular. All the four states and regions have involved such sensitive business activities,
but all maintain very low profile. Four major cross border acquisitions are:
(1). China on Hong Kong:
CNAC is now the biggest share holder of Dragon Air. Nonetheless, the history of
taking these shares of Dragon Air from Cathay Pacific was an unpleasant experience.
In 1995, Eva Air in Taiwan has again broken the market entry barrier and
successfully penetrated the monopolistic market between Taiwan and Hong Kong. In
order to balance the pressure from two large carriers from Taiwan, China has express
their willingness to join the market, and asked Hong Kong adding one more carrier
to serve the Hong Kong-Taiwan market. The only choice was Dragon Air Who was
controlled by Cathay Pacific at the time. China then forced Cathay Pacific to give up
certain shares of Dragon Air to keep Cathay's capacity in the world's busiest air link.
CNAC finally took over Dragon Air, and the economic power of China has started to
play a role in Hong Kong's air transportation soon after this successful acquisition.
(2). China on Macau:
CNAC is also the biggest share holder of Air Macau since establishment in 1995.
This is about the same time when CNAC took over Dragon Air. But since Macau is
less sensitive in both political and economic affairs, also because CNAC has
involved since very beginning, the process of holding Air Macau by CNAC is much
easierthan holding DragonAir in Hung Kong. Lacking direct services between
Taiwan and China have given Hung Kong and Macau one great niche mm-ket to
survive, both Air Macau and Dragon are doing quite well in the Greater China
Market, thus make CNAC profitable in the past decade.
(3). Taiwan on Mac, am
The relationship betwo_n Hong Kong and China or Macau and China has already
been confirmed in the late 1990s. Both Hong Kong and Macau are now the Special
Admimstr_ve Region (SAR) of China, but it's not yet clear whether Taiwan will
accept this arrangement or not. Obviously, any merger or acquisition between Taiwan
and the rest of China can be very sensitive. Nonetheless, Eva Air has done a great job
in acquiring certain shares of Air Macau. Eva acquired 10% shares of Air Macau
from the former colony Portugal government and business in Macau. As Portuguese
may withdraw from Macau entirely, Eva Air could probably acquire more shares in
the future, hence made them the second biggest power in Air Macau.
(4). Taiwan on China:
The most difficult acquisition should be acquiring firms across the Taiwan Strait.
Even so we can still find one _ story of China Airlines and China Eastern
Airline Group. China Airlines has successful acquired 25% of China Cargo Airlines,
one of the two cargo airlines in this region hi _.v_,,_""_.The sha_e was _ansferred l_om
China Eastern Airline Group, one of the only two share holder of China Cargo
Airline. This acquisition has been suspended for over 12 months to get the approval
from the administrations of both sides. This case is even more sensitive than Eva Air
acquired Air Macau since the relationship between Taiwan and China are still
unstable.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship of the current airlines within the Greater China
Area. Both local and cross border airline mergers and acquisitions are included. They are,
however, only existing M&A cases listed in this chart. Potential M&A cases are not yet
introduced. Future integration in 2 domestic carriers in Taiwan is likely to happen, while
some individual local carriers in China are initiating strategic alliances to increase their
competition power. These possible horizontal integrations are concluded in Table 1.
ChinaAirlines_,MandarinAirlines
Fomorsa Airlines
China Southern Airlines
[ Cathay Pacific k
_" _ Chixinn_N::h_::lines
-- i
__ F/ /
China S°u_west Airlines i y _ Air Macau
_°aN_tio_ r _ "
Aviation Corporation
_" I __ .
] Hainan Airlines
CNAC Zhejiang
Airlines
China Eastern Aidines
China Northwest Airlines
Yunnan Airlines
Eva Airways
Uni Airways
Taiwan Airlines
I Dahua Airlines
China Xinhua Airlines
Yantz River Express [
Chan'an Airlines [
Shanxi Airlines [
FIGURE 1 Relationship of Airlines in the Greater China Area
Table1Possible Airline Integration in the Future
Involving Carriers
Far Eastern Air Transport
TransAsia Airways
Deseription t
Major share holders are seeking the possibility
to integrate these two carriers in Taiwan
China Postal Airlines, Shanghai Airlines, ICarriers in China out of 3 major airline groups I
Shandong Airlines, Wuhan Airlines]and Hainan Airline group sought strategic]
Sichuan Airlines, Shenzhen Airlines lalhanee [
4. Problems of Airline Mergers
Since the merging and acquiring activities occurred at a very high frequency, some
problems can easily been observed during these transitions periods. Operational,
organizational, managerial, and financial problems are the most serious ones which
mc!udes:
o Performance after mergers and acquisitions
One most important issue of M&A is evaluating the performance of merging and
acquiring company after M&A. A number of researches are focusing on this issue, but
never on the airline industry. Some indexes of both production and finance are
developed to measure the performance between pre-M&A and post-M&A. Stock
price, passenger-mile, ton-mile, labor and capital productivity are all commonly used
in evaluating airlines' performance. Nevertheless, the airline M&A in the Greater
China Area is still too new to have these comparative analysis Within one year or two,
these numerical tests are valuable topics in both academic researches and practical
studies.
° Managerial and culture conflicts
Any kind of mergers will lead to some organizational conflicts between merged and
merging company. This is also easy to see in the airline industry. The most common
managerial conlticts are usually happening during organization restructuring. Job
rotation is a must and hence force airline employees moving to some distant
work#aces. Moreover, the merged airline would easily form a sub-organization
against the merging airline. The parties within an organization, or Paixi in Chinese
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translation,has thenbecomeoneinevitablebi-productof airline merging. Conflicts
from different organizationculture could alsobe very serious especially within the
merger case of regional niche market carriers. Each of the carder is a local monopoly
in their market, and is adopted to their local environment. Merged to some other
carriers is definitely crushing the value system and the market niche of their own.
. Integration synergies of merger and acquisitions
Whether or not M&A can create better performance on some production and financial
indexes are still unknown, but the synergy of airline merging can be examined at the
very early stage. Apparently, synergy does exist in some of these airline mergers and
acquisitions, especially those cross state cases. For instance, China Airlines of Taiwan
acquiring shares of China Cargo Airlines does help China Airlines in expanding their
cargo service network to some place they currently cannot reach. Eva Air acquiring
Air Macau may possibly create open jaw service routes in across Taiwan Strait, or
also extend their service to China through code sharing and 5 th freedom. These are all
increasing their competition power in the market. On the other hand, less synergy can
be found in the local airline M&A in both China and Taiwan.
. Anti-trust and fair trade issues
The antitrust issue of airline merger and acquisition is always highly concerned by
related government bureaus throughout the world. Some famous cases in both Europe
and US have indicated one general rule of airline M&A: overlapping markets
between merged and merging carriers is harmful to social welfare. This index is
always examined with detail. However, airline mergers were encouraged in Taiwan,
and the cases were even directed by the government in China. Related bureaus in both
places are not able to evaluate these cases but only approve them. Some complaints
have already been found during the transition period. Still, this is one important issue
left behind these M&A activities.
5. Conclusion: Forming the Greater China Alliance
The airline mergers and acquisitions in the Greater China Area in the past few
years has lead to one much more concentrate market in this area. Six major airline groups,
including Air China Group, China Eastern Airlines Group, China Southern Airlines
Group, Hainan Airlines Group, China Airlines Group, Evergreen Group are established.
10
Potentially there are two other airline group can be organized, but the total number of
airline groups would probably stayed in 6 to 7. If cross border mergers can be more
accepted by the modification of aviation regulations in both sides, further integration can
still be expected. The interstate transportation demands have successfully made the
market between Taiwan and Hong Kong the biggest one in the world. Since Chinese is
now controlling the market, cross holding equity in beth Hong Kong and Macau by either
Taiwan or China could be a possible and acceptable norm. Future M&A across the
Taiwan Strait would probably be initiated through the integration of Hong Kong and
Macau a_iafion mark_
Whether these mergers and acquisitions are helpful or not to the airlines'
operations is still unknown, but the decreasing number of competitors is at least a good
news to those survival airlines, especially large scale carriers. In the past few years, Asian
financial crisis, post September 11 recession, and recent SARS disease outbreaks have all
created considerable operation deficit of some carriers in this area. Less competition may
enhance the existing airlines' market power, hence make airline a profitable business in
the future. Small carriers can now serve in a niche market only. New route allocation
regulations in China have even asked small carriers to withdraw from the hub airports.
Taiwan is also giving the fights of trunk line operations to the major carriers only. These
changes may also encourage new airline M&A in the future because airliners will seek
better stakes in the market. All these happening changes is worth watching. Future studies
may focus on these interesting and important facts to find out both the short term and
long term effects of M&A. Numerical analysis using some financial or production
indexes should also be applied in the future if statistical data finally available.
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Abstract
Airline alliances are dominating the current air transport industry with the largest
carriers of the world belonging to one of the four alliance groupings - "Wings", Star
Alliance, oneworld, SkyTeam - which represent 56% of world Revenue Passenger
Y_Jometers..Adthough much m_oea._h _ h,._ ,'_,'_,'d out ,,-, ,.,;_,h,_,. thp _act of
alliance membership on performance of airlines, it would be of interest to ascertain
the degree of impact perceived by participating airlines in alliances. It is the purpose
of this paper to gather the opinion of all the airlines, belonging to the four global
alliance groupings on the impact alliances have had on their n-allic and on their
performance in general To achieve this, a comprehensive survey of the alliance
management departments of airlines participating in the four global strategic alliances
was carried out. With this fiamework the survey has examined which type of
cooperation among carriers (FFP, Code Share, Strategic Alliance without antitrust
immunity, Strategic Alliance with antitrust immunity) has produced the most positive
impact on traffic and which type of route (short haul, long haul, hub-hub, hub-non
hub, non hub-non hub) has been mostly affected. In addition, the respondent airlines
quantified the effect alliances have had on specific areas of their operation, such as
load factors, tmftic, costs, revenue and fares. Their responses have been analysed
under each global alliances grouping, under airline and under geographic region to
establish which group, type of carrier and geographic region has benefited most. The
results show that each of the four global alliances groupings has experienced different
results according to the type of coUaboration agreed amongst their member airlines.
Keywords: Airline Alliances, Passenger traffic
1.0 Introduction
Alliances are generally a strategy that companies use when the acquisition of another
company or internal development as means of growing is not an option. Sometimes
even if internal development is possible, alliances are preferable as it provides quicker
access to new markets. Alliances vary in degree of commitment from simple
marketing cooperation to just short of complete mergers or acquisitions. Globally,
mergers and acquisition deals exceeded $2,000 billions in 1999-2000 indicating,
companies increasingly embark on partnerships to achieve their expansion goals and
develop a world-class capability. According to Harbison and Pekar (1999) survey, in
1997-1999 alone more than 20,000 alliances have been formed worldwide and,
interestingly, more than half of them are between competitors.
In this respect, airline industry is not an exception. There has clearly been a surge in
formation of alliances amongst airlines in recent years. A large number of airlines
have established or joined one of the four global airline alliances: " Wings" (1989) 1,
Star Alliance (1997), onewodd (1998), SkyTeam (2000) - and they now control as
allied partners 56% of world Revenue Passenger Kilometers (Airline Business,
September 2002). See appendix A for the description of each alliances groupings and
their memberships.
IATA (2001) defines an "airline alliance" as follows: three or more airlines
participating in commercial relationship or joint venture, where (i) a joint and
commonly identifiable product is marketed under a single commercial name or brand;
and (ii) this commercial name or brand is promoted to the public through the airlines
participating in the alliance and its agents; and (iii) the commercial name or brand is
used to identify the alliance services at airports and other service delivery points in
situations where bilateral agreements exist, e.g. code share agreement.
According to another definition "A strategic airline alliance is a long term partnership
of two or more firms who attempt to enhance advantages collectively vis-h-vis their
competitors by sharing scarce resources including brand assets and market access
capability, enhancing service quality, and thereby improving profitability...a strategic
alliance is one involving strategic commitment by top management to link up a
substantial part of their respective route networks as well as collaborating on some
key areas of airline business."
The majority of airlines are interested to extend their network beyond the markets
they currently serve. However, due to regulatory restrictions on market access,
ownership and control, they have been pushed towards the formation of strategic
1Date of alliance formation
2
alliance groupings. Legislation aimed at protecting national interests has meant that it
is virtually impossible to acquire a controlling interest in airlines in countries or
trading block,g outside those m which an airline is owned and operated. For example, a
non-US airline can only have up to a maximum of 25% of voting share in any US
carrier. A non-EU carrier can purchase up to a maximum of 49% of an EU carder.
To grow naturally a carrier is also subject to restrictions such as the limitations
imposed on its growing in home markets, or the lack of regulatory approval to access
foreign markets, or the lack of slots at airports at which the airline wants to operate. In
addition to expanding their network, through alliances airlines aim at improve
revenues, reduce costs and in_-ease customer benefits.
As a result, as discussed above, in the last decade a number of aUiance groupings have
emerged. Given such a dynamics in the airline industry and the current crisis due to
slow down in the economy and 11th September attack, it was of interest to assess the
followings:
• How do airlines perceive the impact of alliances on their operation in general
and on passenger traffic in particular?.
• How different types of partnership agreements have affected the results?
• Have airlines of different size, operating fi,om different region and belonging
to different alliance grouping been affected differently?
2.0 Ass_sing the perceprlcm ¢,f alrfines about their a!Uances impact
To address the above questions, a comprehensive survey of the aUiance management
departments of airlines participating in the four global strategic alliances was carried
out in 2002.
The heads of the alliance departments of all airlines - that is 28 careers at the time
this survey - belonging to the alliance groupings of"Wings", Star Alliance, oneworld
and SkyTeam were contacted to participate in a questionnaire survey. The
questionnaire focused on the impact of the alliances on airlines' operation as this
impact is perceived by the heads of the alliance department. All 28 carriers
participated in the research giving the survey a 100% response rate.
Special emphasis was given to the impact of alliances on passenger traffic, which is
one of the most important factors airlines themselves and airline specialists use to
determine airline and alliance performance. In assessing the impact of alliances on
passenger tra_c the following criteria were taken into account:
• The type of cooperation amongst the carriers themselves (FFP, Code Share,
Strategic Alliance with or without antitrust immunity),
• The type of route (hub-hub, hub-non hub, non hub-non hub)
• The global alliance groupings (Wings", Star Alliance, onewofld and SkyTeam)
• The size of carriers measured by their annual output (Available Seat Kilometres-
ASK)
• The region where the carriers come from (North America, Europe, Asia, Central
and South America).
This was done to establish which type of cooperation, route, alliances groupings,
carrier size and geographical region has benefited most, in terms of passenger traffic,
as a result of the formation of alliances.
As the questionnaire survey presented a unique opportunity to collect inside
information about the impact of airline alliances, the scope of the questions was
extended to cover some other specific areas of airline operations that alliances may
affect, such as load factors, traffic, revenue, costs and fares. These parameters were
chosen since they constitute the measures airlines use to evaluate their performance
and thus any carrier entering into an alliance expects to improve such measures.
Furthermore, some questions were included to examine whether there has been
satisfaction from the participation in the alliance, the degree of satisfaction arising
from this participation in the alliances and how fast the impact of alliance on their
operation has become evident.
3.0 The general impact of alliances on airlines operation
The findings of survey revealed that one of the key reasons for airlines decision to
participate in an alliance has been a defensive move as they expressed the opinion that
if an airline remained unaligned, it would be worse off losing traffic to other airlines
in alliance groupings. They are also of the opinion that the alliance relationship is
very complex and still developing.
In general the accession and participation in the alliances is considered successful.
While one third of participants rate their alliance cooperation as "excellent", the rest
believe that the course and operation of the alliances has been so far "good". A
European regional carrier expressed some reservations and preferred to take a neutral
stance.
Almost all participants believe that joining the alliance grouping has led to an increase
in traffic, load factor and revenue. While two thirds of participants expressed the
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opinion that fares have not been influenced, the rest declared that fares on routes
operated jointly by partners have increasecL A large proportion of participating
airlines affirms that costs have registered some reduction.
Figure 1
Impact of airline alliances
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To establish the degree of the impact of alliances on airlines" operation, the
respondents were asked to rate the impact fi'om 1 to 5, with 1 referring to "no impact"
and 5 to "significant impact". It can be seen from fimme 2 that the most pronounced
effects have _ experA'enced in the a,-_-- of p_s_g_ ,*xa_c. Ne_ m _g are
revenue and loaf factor. The least pronounced impacts have been observed in the
areas of costs and fares. As far as costs are concerned, not only airlines have not
reaped much benefit from their alliance participation but have entail certain
substantial initial expenses such as 1T system harmonization, marketing and
advertising expenses which could put a serious swain, at least short term, on the
airlinecosts.Any significantlong-term cost reductions/syncrgiesrequire the
alignment of some product specifications,a common approach, a common fleet
planningand requirenot only some time and a high degreeof integrationbut alsoa
major commitment on tlmpartof theallies
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The responses relative to fare increases indicate that the reduction in competition due
to airline alliances has not led to acute monopolistic situations - as regulators would
have acted to prevent such a development. However, what remains rather alarming is
the fact that the carriers that take the contrary opinion and claim that there has been an
increase in fares mounting to even 10% are amongst the major players in the existing
alliances on both sides of the Atlantic. Such fare increases may be related more to the
policy an airline follows to deal with decreased profitability than to monopolistic
situation. Each airline however, follows the policy that it sees fit even if it contradicts
the policy followed by its partners. Lufthansa's strategy after September 2001 was to
cut capacity and maintain fare discipline whereas United Airlines' strategy was to cut
fares. The dispute between the partners ended up with the German government
complaining to the US government. United's choice of policy proved to be rather
questionable given that they filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 (Airline
Business, January 2003).
4.0 Impact of airline alliances on passenger traffic
As mentioned in the above section airlines have most benefited from participation in
airline alliances in the form of increase in traffic. Almost 90% of respondents claimed
that they experienced an increase in traffic between one and two years from the
inception of their partnerships with other airlines. Unlike the common belief that
airlines attempt to provide a seamless travel have caused the increase in passenger
traffic, the respondents believe that the provision of the joint frequent flyer
programme has played an important role in an upsurge in traffic. The respondents
believe that the rate of increase in traffic tends to stabilise a few years after the launch
of the alliance.
4.1 The impact of alliance on traffic by route type
The greatest increase in passenger traffic was observed primarily on hub-hub routes,
and secondarily on hub-non-hub mutes. More specifically, the increase in passenger
tratfic on the hub-hub mutes was assessed as "significant", with 45% of respondents
experiencing an increase of more than 16%, while the corresponding percentage
increase for hub-non hub routes ranges from 6 to 15% as per 52% of the respondents;
as for non hub-non hub mutes, all respondents have assessed the traffic increase as
moderate, with the percentages equally divided between the 0-5% and the 6-15%
brackets. These results seem absolutely reasonable considering that all global carriers,
especially the major ones, operate on the hub and spoke system 2 and the whole
alliance organisation aims at increasing the hub-hub lraffic, especially the high-
yielding and efficient wansaflantic routes.
International major carders, including all the American airlines, many of the
European and South American carriers claimed that alliances have had a significant
impact on their hub-hub. In case of the American and European camps this is due to
the fact that they were the first otmrators to implmnent the hub and spoke system.
However, Asian carriers claimed a moderate increase in their tza_c on their hub-hub
routes. This could be due to the possibility, that these carriers have not exploited their
hubs operation to the same extent as their counterparts in the US and Europe. It must
also be born in mind that the US and European partners in most cases have benefited
from antitrust immunity 3 which allows them to harmonise their operation more
effectively.
2 An operational system for deploying aircraft that enables a cartier to increase service options at all
airportsencompassed by the system. It retails the use of a strategically located airport(thehub)served
by more than one airline as a passengerexchange point for flights to and from outlying towns and cities
(the spokes or non-hub). With this system flights fromnumerc_ points (the spokes) arrive at and then
depart from a common point (the hub) within a short time from so that traffic arriving from any given
point can connect to flights departing to numm-ousother points. At the hub airport inbound and
outbound schedules, that is the connecting traffic, are coordinated with the aim of producing the most
convenient and/or transshipment for passengers.
3 Antitrust immunity firom US antitrust laws enables partner airlines to make joint decisions on pricing,
scheduling capacity provision and service quality. Without such immunity airline alliances would be
very restricted in terms of what aspects of their business they could jointly undertake
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Alliance impact on the traffic by route type
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4.2 The impact of alliance on traffic by type of cooperation
It was revealing that among the chosen types of cooperation, that is FFP, Code Share,
Strategic Alliance with antitrust immunity and Strategic Alliance without antitrust
immunity, it is Code Sharing and Strategic airline Alliances with antitrust immunity
that seem to be regarded as the most efficient form of cooperation by the airlines
themselves without certainly disregarding the significance and contribution of the
other two. Several respondents also stressed that the impact of antitrust immunity is
just beginning to unfold but they consider it as a very important element as it provides
airlines with ability and flexibility and possibility to coordinate their activities in
scheduling and pricing. A very small number of Asian carriers believe that strategic
alliances have no impact on traffic. This can be attributed to the fact that Strategic
Alliances are evolving in a risky and uncertain environment in which airlines are
demanded to make a commitment without being certain of the future evolution of the
alliance.
Figure 4
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The provision of joint FFP is considered very effective in boosting traffic. The joint
scheme should enable members to collect and redeem points or miles on any one of
the partner airlines. It would also allow the recognition of elite status by a greater
number of member airlines, as opposed to just the one airline to which the qualified
passenger belongs. Most of the times FFP and Code Sharing co-exist and constitute a
much more common form of cooperation than Strategic Alliances whether with
anU_st immunity orwithoutantitrustimmuni_,.
4_3 The impact of alliance on traffic by alliance groupings
The SkyTeam members seemed to be the most satisfied from the alliance performance
followed by the Star Alliance members. No member of the oneworld alliance has
rated their alliance cooperation as "excellent" and it has the only cartier that has taken
a neutral attitude towards alliances. This is probably due to the lack of deeper
cooperation among the members. This by alliance comparative review points out that
antitrust immunity is a major parameter for the success of an alliance as far as traffic
is concerned.
Almost all members in the SkyTeam and "Wings" believe that the most increase in
traffic has taken place on their hub-hub mutes where as the corresponding percentage
for onewodd and Star Alliance is 50% and 80% respectively. "Wings" has
experienced the highest increase on its hub-non hub mutes. It must be born in mind
that "Wings" is made up of only two carriers, therefore it is difficult to compare it
with the other alliances whose membership ranges from 6 to 13 members.
Figure5
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"Wings" appears to have experienced the most positive impact in all aspects of their
operations. SkyTeam has benefited greatly from increase in traffic and revenue; the
increase in revenue may be attributed to the deeper cooperation existing among the
partners of this alliance.
Table 1
Impact of alliances on airlines operations by alliance groupings
SkyTeam "Wings" oneworid Star Alliance
Traffic 3.8
Load factor 3.3
Revenue 3.8
Fare increases 2.0
Cost reductions 2.0
5.0 3.5 3.3
4.5 3.0 3.1
4.5 2.7 3.0
3.5 1.8 2.1
3.0 2.8 2.3
Scale of l to 5, 1 = no impact and 5=significant impact
4.4 The impact of alliance on traffic by airline size
Large airlines, in general, seem to be satisfied with their alliance cooperation,
however with some reservations. While two thirds stated that their partnership with
other airlines is "good" only one third viewed it as "excellent". The majority
experienced the increase in traffic in the first year of launching their partnership.
Almost half of the large carriers have experienced up to 5% increase in traffic. The
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increasein traffichaslargely taken place for these carriers on hub to hub routes. They
believe Code Sharing and Strategic Alliance with antilrust immunity have a
significant impact on Iraffic, scoring them as 4.3 and 4.5 respectively on a scale of 1
to5.
While medium size airlines are generally satisfied with their alliance cooperation,
small carriers have some reservation about their relationship with their parmers. This
could be due to their influence on the decision making within the alliance groupings.
The medium and small carriers have also benefited from an increase in traffic due to
formation of alliances but it has taken them longer- up to two years - to experience
the rise in tm_c. A large proportion has experienced up to 15% increase in traffic.
This could be due to the fact that their base traffic is smaller than that of the larger
carriers. It is interesting to note that medium and small carriers believe frequent flyer
programme cooperation and Code Sharing have had a significant impact on their
traffic. Clearly small and medium sized carriers benefit more by joining the large
airline frequent flyer programmes.
Figure 6
The impact of the different alliance cooperation types on traffic by airline size
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4.5 The impact of alliance on traffic by region
The analysis of the responses indicates that Central and South America have
experienced the greatest increases in tm_c, load factors and revenues as a result of
alliances. It should be noted though that three out of the four carders of this region
entered alliances very recently and may be experiencing the initial positive alliance
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effects.This is thereasonalsowhyhalf of thecarriersfromthisregion- thehighest
percentage among all regions - characterize alliances as "excellent". The greatest
increase in fares has been registered in Asia, whereas as far as costs are concerned it
is European carries that report the most significant decrease, since the carriers of this
region are among those that feel more pressingly the need to reduce costs. As it was
expected, it is the North American airlines followed by the European ones that have
experienced the most significant positive impact from antitrust immunity since it is
they that have the majority of these exemptions.
Figure 7
Alliance impact on traffic according to geographical region
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The above figure depicts how the carriers of the different geographical regions. The
above figure depicts how the carriers of the different geographical regions estimate
the impact of the alliances they participate to on their traffic. It is the Central and
South American carriers that seem to have experienced the greatest increase in traffic,
which can be explained both by the fact that it is the area that is undergoing the
greatest increase in traffic and by the fact that these carriers had a rather limited
network before the establishment of the alliances. No airline of this region has
recorded an increase lower than 6%. Asia and Oceania is the region that has stated the
second greatest increase in traffic, with the majority of carriers stating an increase in
traffic ranging from 6 to 15%. This geographic region includes many developing
countries and has organized in these last years many important athletic events.
European carriers have declared the lowest increase since the carriers from this region
had before the formation of the alliances an extensive network and numerous
connections with all the other geographical regions of the world.
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Exception to this general trend were the North American and European carriers, such
as the members of "Wings" (Northwest Airlines and KLM) which have been
cooperating within this framework for many years and for these carriers Strategic
Alliance with antitrust immtmity is very important. On the contrary, Asian carriers
consider FFP as the most important factor given that their Code Sharing agreements
and Strategic Alliances are much more difficult to operate because of regulatory
restrictions.
Conclusion
The overall substantial conclusion is that alliances, despite the form of cooperation
chosen and established among the partners, entail numerous benefits for the airlines
and certainly do come up to the initial expeelations. Alliances bring about an increase
in passenger tra_c with a parallel increase in load factors and some reduction in
costs. Thus, a clear improvement of revenue is observed, a fact resulting from the
combination of the increase in tra_e and the decrease in costs. Fares, on the contrary,
do not move along the same course since in certain cases there is an increase and in
others there is no increase.
The questionnaire analysis indicates that both passenger traffic and load factors of all
airlines show clear increase. This m return has positively impacted on revenue, while
the impact on costs, even though positive, remains comparatively limited at least on a
shod-term basis. The impact on pas_er tra_m_--cis relatively ._u'n_anfiai and ha__been
experienced from one to two years since the inception of alliance cooperation_ The
increase in traffic has mostly been experienced on hub-hub routes. As regards the
impact on fares, the situation remains rather hazy, since the majority of airlines have
given ambiguous answers when asked to slate whether there has been increase or
decrease of fares.
The greatest benefits from alliances result from the more advanced and integrated
forms of cooperation, just as the one that links the carries of the ''Wings" alliance,
which is ehametefis_ by the existence of antitrust immunity and the establishment of
a joint venture. Most alliances however, remain "strate_c" only m name, at least at
their present stage, basing their cooperation on Code Share and FFP coordination and
have not proceeded to deeper integration
13
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Appendix A
Description of airline alliances
"Wings"
"Wings" is the non-official name for the alliance of KLM, Northwest Airlines and
Continental Airlines. KLM and Northwest have had a far reaching alliance agreement
since 1989, with common branding, purchasing, management, marketing and FFP,
although an equity stake that KLM had in Northwest was sold after disagreement of
control of Northwest. In 1999 Northwest Airlines bought a stake in Continental
Airlines, and announced cooperation including code sharing and frequent flyer
participation. In 1998, KLM and Alitalia concluded an alliance agreement, setting up
passenger and cargo joint ventures to manage the airlines operations and marketing
but the agreement was dismantled in August 2000. KLM and Northwest received
antitnJst immunity from the US DOT in November 1993.
Star Alliance
Star Alliance was hunched m May 1997, by Air Canada, Lufthansa, SAS, Thai and
United airlines to create a global airline network. Varig joined the alliance in October
1997, with Ansett Australia and Air New Zealand in March 1999. Ausett
subsequently left as it ceased operations in March 2002. All Nippon Airways joined
the Star Alliance in October 1999, Austrian Airlines Group including I.amda Air and
Tyrolean Airways joined in March 2000 and Singapore Airlines in April 2000. British
Midland and Mexieana joined in July 2000. Star Alliance has a total of almost 2000
aircmtL serves around 800 destinations in 130 countries worldwide and transports
more than a quarter of a billion passengers annually, through extensive code share
agreements, with 'round the world' fares for global travellers. The alliance allows
access to over 500 Star Alliance lounges around the world, reciprocal FFPs, through
check-in, streamlined airport otmmtions , cargo co-operation, joint purchasing,
advertising and promotions. US Airways will join the alliance as United Airlines has
come up serious financial problems, l.azflhausa/UA alliance has received antim]st
immunity from the US DOT.
oneworld
A global marketing alliance announced in September 1998. American Airlines,
British Airways, Canadian, Cathay Pacific, Finnair, Iberia and Qantas offer closer
linking of FFPs, reciprocal access to airport lounges, smoother transfers between
carriers and a range of global products including 'oneworld Explorer' fares. After the
takeover by Air Canada, Canadian Airlines left oneworld on June 1, 2000, while Lan
Chile and Aer Lingus joined on the same date.
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SkyTeam
It is the most recent global alliance. Formed in 1999 by Air France and Delta Air
Lines, it has extended its reach with Aeromexico and Korean Air as well as Czech
carrier CSA in October 2000 while Alitalia joined in July 2001. With a marketing
focus on passenger service, that is, code sharing, joint marketing and reciprocal
frequent flyer programs, its strategy is based on market synergies and the growth
potential of Paris-CDG as a connection platform. Cargo cooperation is also part of the
alliance. SkyTeam is expanding and currently offers nearly 7,100 flights to more than
470 destinations. It also has 289 reception lounges.
The global alliance groupings - traffic/revenue totals and world market share
Passenger traffic (RPK) Passenger numbers Group revenues
Billion share million share $ billion share
"Wings" 176 6, 0% 70,1 4,3 % 16 4,5 %
Star Alliance 637 21,7% 279,2 17,2% 70 20,0%
oneworld 471 16,1% 198 12,2% 46 13,2%
SkyTeam 352 12,0% 207,4 12,8% 37 10,5%
Total Alliances 1636 55,8% 754,7 46,5% 169 48,2%
Source: Airline Business (September 2002)
Alliances and their members
"Wings"
Date joined Region
KLM Jun-89 Europe
Northwest Airlines Jun-89 North America
Star Alliance
Date joined Region
Air Canada May-97
Air New Zealand Mar-99
ANA Oct-99
Asiana Mar-03
Austrian Mar-00
bmi british midland Jul-O0
Luflhansa May-97
Mexicana Jttl-99
SAS May-97
Singapore Apr-00
Spanair Mar-03
North America
Oceania/Asia
Oceania/Asia
Oceania/Asia
Europe
Europe
Europe
Central and South America
Europe
Oceania/Asia
Europe
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Thai Airways
United Airlines
Varig
May-97
May-97
Oct-97
Oceania/Asia
North America
Central and South America
oneworld
DatejMed _l_On
Aer Lingus
American Airlines
British Airways
Cathay Pacific
Finnair
Iberia
LanChile
Qantas Airways
Jun-00
Sep-98
Sep-98
Sep-98
Sep-99
Sep-99
Jun-00
Sep-g8
Europe
North America
Euml_
Oceania/Asia
Europe
Europe
Central and South America
Oceania/Asia
SkyTeam
Date joimd n,_ion
Acromcxico
Air France
Alitalia
CSA Czech Air!in_
Delta Air Lines
Korean Air
Sep-99
Sep-99
Jul-O1
Mar-0!
Sep-99
Jul-00
Central and South America
Europe
Europe
E_-_e
North America
Oceani_/Asia
Source: Airline Business (September 2002)
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many airports are facing capacity problems. In the U.S., 25 airports are classified as "severely
_._._u-f,_P _ 1_,, _k,_ 1;',_Ao.-,,1 A .4_-- A .I--=--'_ "^
•_,,_,_..... _ ........... ,,,uuu ,-,_W-,mun (Daniel, 2001), while also in Europe many
airports face congestion problems (e.g. London Heathrow, Frankfurt and Amsterdam
Schiphol).
In the U.S., the (runway) capacity of (larger) airports is usually allocated based on a
fast-come first-served principle. When capacity is limited, arriving aircraft cause delays (and
thus costs) for other arriving aircraft_ Only four US airports (Washington Ronald Reagan,
New York LaGuardia, New York Kennedy and Chicago O'Hare) are slot-constrained; slot
trading between airlines is allowed at these airports (seee.g Starkie, 1992). European airports
are usually slot-constrained; slots are allocated by a slot coordinator. The slot-allocation
mechanism at most airports is economically inefficient. The users of capacity (airlines) may
pay less than the marginal social cost (congestion costs are not paid, entry is deterred), and are
not necessarily the (potential) users that attach the highest economic value to the capacity.
Airport congestion pricing also to allocate scarce capacity to those parties that attach
the highest economic value to it. Most studies of (second-best) congestion pricing in transport
networks concern road traffic and consider link-based tolls. For other modes, however, it may
often be nodes, rather than the links between them, that form the bottlenecks in a network. A
question that naturally arises is whether insights from studies on link-based pricing are
directly transferable to node-based pricing, especially under second-best circumstances where
multiple market distortions exist simultaneously. It may be expected that the nature of other
market distortions, additional to congestion externalities, will often be different at nodes than
along links. Given the substantial and growing congestion at major airports and other
transport hubs and nodes throughout the world, it seems highly relevant to investigate the
implications for airport congestion pricing.
The economic nature of airports and their primary user(s) may indeed imply important
deviations from the economic conditions governing a congested road network. In particular,
individual road users would typically not have any market power, and can thus be assumed to
take travel times and tolls (if any) as given (in practice, this would normally also hold for
transport firms that may have multiple trucks using the same congested network
simultaneously). Airports, in contrast, and especially the more congested hubs, will typically
have spatial monopolistic power, while the primary user(s), airports, will often compete under
oligopolistic conditions. Moreover, when positive network externalities (or economies of
density) induce these airlines to use hub-and-spoke type networks, with different airlines
using different hubs, these oligopolies may be asymmetric. A substantial share of congestion
costs may then in fact not be external effects, but internal instead, in the sense that the travel
delays imposed by one service upon other services would often concern services of that same
operator, who can be assumed to take these firm internal congestion effects already into
account when designing a profit-maximizing price and frequency schedule for the hub
(Brueckner, 2002).
A further implication of oligopolistic competition would be that another distortion,
besides congestion, is likely to be present, namely that of strategic interaction between
competitors with the result of non-competitive pricing. Absent congestion, consumer prices
may then exceed marginal costs, implying that an economic argument for subsidization rather
than taxation would exist. As pointed out by Buchanan (1969) and Baumol and Oates (1988)
in the context of a polluting monopolistic ftrm, the implication for Pigouvian externality
pricing is that the second-best optimal tax would be below the marginal external costs and
may even become negative. This would provide a second argument, in addition to the point
raised by Brueckner (2002), of why optimal congestion charges at a hub would be below
!marginal external congestion costs if straightforwardly defined as the value of a single
service's marginal delay costs for all other services.
This paper aims to investigate such issues in a network environment, by developing a
model that is cast in terms of aviation and considers second-best congestion pricing for
incoming and outgoing flights at airports. The model extends an earlier model of second-best
pricing in congested road networks (Verhoe_ 2002). The second-best circun_tances under
which congestion tolls have to be set are those just mentioned. We comider a simple network
with multiple nodes, where both airlines and passengers suffer from congestion at airports.
Three types of interacting players are present in our model: a regulatory authority, airlines,
and passengers; each having their own objective. Congestion tolls can be determined by a
single regulator for all airports in the network, but also by "local" regulators of specific
airports. "Competition" between local regulators then becomes an issue. The insights
developed may of course often carry over directly to congestion pricing at nodes for different
modes than aviation, and possibly even different types of networks, provided market
conditions are similar to those considered here.
Airportcongestionpricinghas alreadyreceivedsome attentionintheliterature.Carfin
and Park(1970)estimatedtheexternalcostof apeak-periodlandingatLaGuardiawas $2000
(in 1969 $);abouttwenty timesthe actuallandingfee,althoughthisnumber shouldnot be
interpretedas an equih'briumcongestiontoll.Oum and Zhang (1990)examine the relation
between congestion toils and capacity costs, and find that when capacity investment is lumpy-,
the cost recovery theorem (which states that congestion toll revenues just cover amortized
capacity (expansion) costs under constant returns to scale) no longer holds. Daniel (1995,
2001) combines stochastic queuing theory with a Vickrey-type bottleneck model, and
simulation results show that congestion pricing causes a redistribution of flights over the day,
where smaller aircraft may divert to other airports because they value their use less than the
social cost of using the congested airport. Bmeckner (2002) analyzes airport congestion
pricing when airlines are nonatomistic, and concludes that there may be only a limited or even
no role for congestion pricing when the number of airlines using the node decreases, as the
share of internalized congestion costs increases.Brueckner (2003) analyzes airport congestion
pricing in a network setting, and finds that the airline specific toilequals (one minus an
airline's flight share) multiplied by the congestion damage caused by the airline.
The slructure of the paper is as follows. First, the notation and assumptions will be
presented in Section 2. Section 3 contains the (profit) maximization model for the network
operators(airlines).Section4 contains the regulator's optimization
presents a simple numerical solution, and Section 6 concludes.
problem. Section 5
2 NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
In the model, we distinguish three different parties. Passengers wish to travel between an
origin and destination (a formulation with freight transport with atomistic demanders would
be comparable to the one given here). In order to do so, services of an airline are necessary.
Airlines, in turn, need the services of two (origin and destination) or more (in case of indirect
services) airports. Prices for the use of the airport may be set by a profit maximizmgairport
operator or a welfare maximizing regulator, authority. Because we are concerned with
(second-best) optimal airport prices, we will be considering a regulatory authority alone. An
extension of the model to four types of players (regulators, airport operators, airlines and
passengers) is considered as an interesting option for future work.
For the general specification of the model, a number of assumptions are made that will
now be presented.
Assumption 1. A given passenger's trip in an origin- destinationj pair will involve one
airline only. The inverse demand function in each market is linear in form:
Dj q,j =ctj - flj_ q,j (1)
i=1
where aj and/_ >0; aj represents the maximum gross valuation by consumers in market j; qij
is the number of passengers transported by airline i in market j, and /_- is the demand
sensitivity parameter. A linear form is con_eenient in the numerical version of the model; for
the analytical exposition it saves somewhat on the notation as the slope/_ is constant.
Assumption 2. Frequency on a link is
1 J
fi.k =--_i__18i.j.kqij ..(2)
where _j,k is a dummy equal to 1 if link k is used in market j by operator i and 2, is the
product oft he load factor and the seat capacity. Congestion occurs at nodes only f.e., not on
links; "capacity in the air" or the capacity of the air traffic control system is abundant). The
average congestion costs per passenger or per flight (measured in additional travel time) at
node h are assumed to increase linearly with the total frequency at the node:
K 1 K ! 1 J
k_l iffil k=l iffil f.ij_l_
where r/s is the constant slope of the congestion function and _ indicates the nodes used on
links h. Note that arriving and departing movements need not contribute equally to, and suffer
equally from congc_'tion. However, as we only consider return markets, we do not have to
make this distinction. The congestion term (in time units) to be included in the passengg_rs"
genemlize_l cost function for alternative i in marketj then is
K H
k=l h=t
where _,k denotes the links used in market j and _ the congestion (measured in time)
suffered at these nodes. Multiplying this term by the passengers" value of time yields the
monetizcd congestion delay cost to passengers. Likewise, the term to be included in the
airline cost function (over all flights, using linkk, to passengers) is:
J H
j=l hffil
Assumption 3. The different alternatives i in market j are characterized by a generalized user
cost function gij(Pij, votpx_) where votpxf_j represents the monetized average congestion
costs per passenger (votp is the passenger's value of time) andpij is the fare. The gencqalizcd
user cost function is linearly additive in form:
g,j= p_/+ votpx _/ (6)
Assumptioa 4. The operator's cost per passenger cq_,kand per transport movement c_ are
constant on each link. th is the congestion toll at node h. Total operating costs for operator i
are then:
c + J_hth +vot l X_,.k +C tS_.,q_/-Fi, k (7)
h=l =
which may be rewritten as:
xFZfc (7')
where vottxg_,k represents the monetized average congestion costs per flight (vott is the
airline's value of time). Fi,k is airline i's fLxed cost per link.
Assumption 5. Competing airlines on a specific market act as Cournot opligopolists (i.e. they
choose an optimal output (and frequency) taking the others' outputs as given). Airlines do not
believe that by their actions, they can affect the regulator's tolls g.e. regulators and airlines
are playing a Stackelberg type game, the regulators being the leader). Passengers are pure
price takers.
Although these assumptions may seem restrictive, many of these assumptions are quite
common in the aviation economics literature. The fimctional form of the cost function used in
this paper is similar to the one used byBrueckner and Spiller (1991) 1. Combined with a linear
demand curve, the "Brueckner-Spiller" model has been used regularly in the literature to
analyze aviation networks. Despite the conceptual simplicity (but, in case of large networks,
computational complexity), recent trends in the aviation markets can easily be explained using
this model; see e.g. Brueckner (2001) for an analysis of airline alliances, and Pels et al. (2001)
for an analysis of optimal airline networks 2. It is not the objective of this paper to calculate
exact tolls for existing airports, for which these assumptions would clearly be too restrictive.
This paper aims to develop theoretical insights into the consequences of airport congestion
pricing, for which these assumptions suffice.
3 THE SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIUM
With these assumptions, we can now turn to the derivation of optimal tolls. There are three
types of players in the model (passengers, airlines and regulatory authorities), each with their
own maximization problem. The model is solved in three steps. First, a passenger demand
function for network operator i in marketj is determined. Then, using this demand function,
the airline problem is specified, and the associated profit maximizing optimality conditions
Bruecknerand Spiller (1991) do not include congestion in their cost function.
2See Brueckner (2001) for additional references.
arederived.Finally,the regulator's problem is solved, again using the passenger demand
function, and also using the operator optimality conditions as restrictions.
To determine the equilibrium, we focus on a simple network with two airports and two
airlines offering services in one market only (see Figure 1). For convenience, we assume that
both airlines use aircraft of similar capacity and that marginal costs per passenger (flight) are
the same for both airlines. Although this assumption is not necessary to determine the
equilibrium, it greatly reduces the notation. These assumptions are relaxed in a numerical
exercise.
D
Figure 1 Network configuration
In this network, congestion tolls are the same for both airports (due to symmetry).
Moreover, The congestion toll cannot be distinguished from the subsidy necessary to
encounter the market-power effect. Hence, only a tollt appears in the airline cost functions.
The passenger optimization problem
The maximum willingness to pay for the marginal passenger in marketj for alternative i,
inclua;..mg monetized time costs, is given by equation (!) while each passenger's genera!_li ed
user cost for the use of operator i are given by go(') as defined in equation (6). Intra-marginal
passengers' net benefits are determined according to the familiar Marshallian surplus.
According to Wardrop's equih'brium conditions, marginal benefits are equal to the average
genemUzed costs in equih'brium (or marginal net benefits are zero) for all used alternatives
(operators in this case), so that Dj(..)=go(..) V i in equilibrium, while the average generalized
costs of unused alternatives cannot be lower thanDj(..) and will typically be higher. Because
operators incur costs for a service also when qij=0 (see (7)), unused alternatives in our model
will not actually be offered. By assumption, demand and generalized cost functions are linear,
so that the equilibrium condition for both airlines in the simple network implies:
x ql + q:
p_ = a - P_ql + q2 )- 2rh VOtp 2
_f \ ql + q2
p2 = a -- P_ql + q2 )-- 2_hvot, 2
(8)
where at is the constant in the inverse demand function and fl is the slope of the inverse
demand function. This operator specific inverse demand curve incorporates passengers'
optimizing behavior, and is used in the next step to maximize operator profits. Note that the
arguments of this inverse demand function include the quantities sold by competing airline.
The transport network operator maximization problem
As stated in assumption 5, we assume Coumot behavior in modeling airline competition. This
is motivated by earlier (empirical) research 3 In a Cournot oligopoly, excess profits can be
made when the number of suppliers is finite. For the alternative of Bertrand-competition,
equilibrium prices would equal marginal costs without collusion, when marginal costs are
constant (as they are in this model). The current financial problems of many airlines does not
mean that Coumot oligopoly modeling would not be appropriate for this sector. High fixed
costs may contribute to financial problems, also underCournot-competition.
Thus, the operators in this model maximize profits with respect to qij, taking the
competitors quantities as given (note that the assumption of a fLxed passenger load implies
that maximization with respect to frequencies independent of passenger numbers is neither
possible nor necessary). In general, the maximization problem for operator/is:
c f dr.2t + 2vottrl, q_ + q2 ]max_i=Iaqi --fl(q'+q2)--2VOtprlh ql'_q2"lqi--qi 2 2. _-cqj-F (9)
The first-order necessary conditions for i=(1,2) are:
3For instance,in an empirical analysis of Chicago-based airline routes involving American Airlines and United
Airlines, Oum et al. (1993) conclude that "the overall results indicate that theduopolists' conduct may be
describedas somewherebetween BertrandandCoumot behavior, but much closer to Coumot, in the majorityof
the sampleobservations".Branderand Zhang (1990), using similar data,find " strong evidence ... against the
highly competitive Bertrandhypothesis". Brander and Zhang (1990) find Cournot behavior plausible for the
marketsunder consideration (Chicago-based routes where American Airlines and United Airlines togetherhave
a marketshareexceeding 75%). Based on these observations,we assumeCoumot competition.
a--fl(ql+q:)--2votptlhql+q22 qi ( 2v°tprlh)fl+ 2
C + 2t + 2votlrl h ql + q: ] 2votztl*2 2 + Cq J-- qi A-"---f----= 0
(10)
Each additional passenger tram_rted by airline i causes a congestion cost
2_kvot I /2 2 for both airl;-e i and airline -i. _ ikevdse, a congestion cost of 2.r/hvot p /_ is
imposed on the passengers transported by both airline i and airline -i. From the first-order
condition for profit maximization, it is apparent that airline i only internalizes the congestion
incurred by itself or its passengers (the last LHS-term and the fourth LHS-term respectively).
Because the airlines have the same outputs in the symmetric equilibrium, it follows that the
airlines internalize half of the congestion they are responsible for (the same result is obtained
by Brtmckner, 2003). Solving the first-order conditions yields the following optimal outputs:
1 ;t[tzg-2t-cl-gcq ]
ql= q2 = 3/IA_+ 2rlO_vot,+ rot,) (II)
which are positive when
2t + c _ + 2c q
a> (12)
The latter condition simply states that outputs are positive when the passengers' gross
valuation of an airline service exceeds the average cost of the service.
From the first-order condition and the generalized cost function, we can derive the
fare:
2.o,, h1.2 Vi = 1,2 (13)
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ThefirstRHS-term(in squarebrackets)is the airline's operatingcostperpassenger.The
second RHS-term consists of a mark-up over the marginal costs of i)
qi(2qh/; Xvot, + vot,/, )reflecting internalization of congestion costs and ii)qifl reflecting
"residual" market power. Because airlines have market power, they are able to internalize
congestion. But there is a "residual" market power effect which causes fare to exceed the
welfare maximizing fare.
By construction, pl =p2, so that the fare is (after substituting the optimal values for the
qs):
flA2(a +c q + cq )+ [fl(c_ + ct: + 4t b + 2rlh {Ct+ (Cq + Cq )]votp2 + 3avot k +votp (4t + c( + c_ )}
P = ,622 + 22votp + 2vot t
(14)
It follows from (14) that the equilibrium value for q;j is a function of the toll th if
Jk,h=l. The optimal toll is determined by the regulator.
The regulator's maximization problem
From the analysis in the preceding subsection, it is clear that there is large congestion effect
that is not internalized by the carriers. In this section, we formulate strategies for a regulator
to "fix" problem.
In terms of objectives, we consider welfare-maximizing regulation. Since there is a
market-power effect, which, considered in isolation, requires a subsidy, the resulting optimal
toll may be negative. Because both airlines have the same operating characteristics, and
demand is shared evenly between the carriers, a regulator will set only one toil; this toll is
paid by both airlines for both the usage of both airports. In the asymmetric equilibrium,
differentiated tolls th,i are necessary. Moreover, in networks with more than two nodes, it has
to be acknowledged that congestion occurs at the airport level, while market power occurs at
the market-level.
The global regulator maximizes surplus for the entire network: the regulator considers
consumer surplus in all markets and profits of all operators. It sets a common toll t for all
nodes h in the system. The authority thus maximizes the following objective function:
11
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th
i
2_q,.j ' _ K V -]J ,=i 1 J
j=l 0 i=i j=l i=l j=l kffi! L
(15)
The first fight hand side (rhs) term represents total benefits (as integral of the Marshallian
inverse demand function). The second rhs term represents total generalized costs (excluding
the airline fares, which cancel out against the airline revenues). The thirdrhs term represents
airline operating costs (excluding the expenditures on tolls, which cancel out against toll
revenues). The three terms together thus give social surplus. The regulator sets the toll th,
given the airline (profit maximizing) optimality conditions. A change inth affects the optimal
output, and thus total welfare. Substituting the airlines' optimal outputs (which are functions
of th) in the welfare function and maximizing over tk yields the equilibrium in quantifies and
tolls. For the network in Figure 1, the maximization problem is:
+q2)(ql +q2)v°t,rl_
0 2
(16)
2q IIc: votj +c q][,,+
Compa_ring the first-order conditions for welfare maximizmion and profit
maximization yields:
am G D_ G
&li _i
2t
(17)
where the first RHS-term is the congestion that is not internalized by carrier/and the second
RHS-term is the market power effect. Ideally, the toll would be set to fix both the congestion
and market power problems. Following Bmeekner (2003), the regulator may set a toll that
charges the airline for the congestion that is not internalized:
tC=q(vot,+v°_l tlh(}tvOtp+vOt'laFt--C'-ACq]
= 3 ,822 + 2rl(Avot, + votj)
(18)
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which is necessarily positive when q>0 (i.e. when (12) holds). Likewise, the subsidy
necessary to encounter the market power effect is:
p,_2 (_,___cq___C f )
s = 3 ,822 + 2rl(Avot p + vot,) (19)
The subsidy would be given on a market level, while the toll would be levied at the
airport level (and both are carrier-specific). In the symmetric equilibrium for a network with
only market, one can not distinguish between airport and market specific tolls, because both
depend on the passenger flow in a single market.
A welfare maximizing regulator will thus set a toll
l (2rlh (2votp + votk )- f1221a2-c' - 2c qJ
t = t c + s = 3 ,822 + 2rl(2votp + votz ) (20)
Condition (12) for positive qs implies that a > (c' + Ac_ )/2, so that the second term
in the numerator is positive. The toll is negative when 2r/h (2votp + vot l )- f122 < 0; i.e. when
the "residual" market power effect qifl in the fare-equation (13) is larger than the congestion
effect qi(Erh/2Xvotp + vot,/2). Since subsidization may not be feasible in practice, so that
the regulator may set a congestion toll only, as in (18). Note that this toll will not maximize
welfare. In fact, to maximize welfare, output should be increased (because the market power
effect dominates), while output is decreased by the toll (it can be shown that
O[consumerbenefits]/at evaluated at t as given in (18) is always negative). The toll in (18)
does not take into account any losses in consumer benefits
Finally, using (ll), we find that the toll equals (1-flight share)×damage, as in
Brueckner (2003), when we would set airline specific tolls, although this rule has little
meaning in the symmetric case. The asymmetric case, with airport specific congestion tolls
and market specific subsidies, will be analyzed in the next section.
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Variations on file regulator's mmiimization problem
The tolls in the previous subsection are "Tlrst-best" in the sense that total welfare is
maximized without any restrictions. In practice, it may be, however, that the airlines play a
Stackelberg-type of game, in which the authorities first set a welfare-maximizing congestion
toll, to which the airlines then respond. In effect, welfare is them maximized with respect to
the toll, aRer the optimal qs are substituted in the welfare function:
vt 2( .Fl: 2q' 7
 XOo: o,T_,qLzL ,
The first-order necessary condition for welfare maximization is
(a-2/?q')2-_-SVOtpq-_ Oqot 2-_-[l[cf +vot,2q--_]+c']-4-_f-:vot,-_-=O (22)
The interpretation of the first-order condition is as follows. A change in t causes a
change in q, and thus also the consumer benefits; this is indicated by the first LHS-term.
Furthermore, because the total number of passengers changes, total congestion costs change.
This is indicated by the second LHS-term. _A,_L'rl_i.-.-.-ne¢, ,,_, _t;,.r_._._b.... a congestion) costs _so
change, as indicated by the third and fourth RHS-term. Solving the first-order condition yields
the following toll rule:
t = (23)
4 pA2 +4rih(vot, A+vot,)
Comparing (23) and (20), we see that the second-best (Stackelberg) toll exceeds the
welfare maximizing toll. This stands to reason. When the airlines and the regulator play a
Stackelberg-game (rather than the game in which the regulator sets a first-best welfare
maximizing toll), airline profits will most likely be higher because airlines maximize their
profits. A lower output means lesser congestion damage, so that the congestion part of the toll
is lower than the congestion toll in (18). The market power subsidy will be necessarily higher
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(in absolute value) compared to the subsidy in (19), but because the congestion effect
dominates, the overall toll is lower (in absolute value).
4 NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, numerical solutions for the network in Figure 1 are presented. These solutions
serve two purposes. Firstly, they allow us to check the welfare effects of a pure congestion
toll in a market where (symmetric) airlines have market power. Secondly, we can analyze the
asymmetric equilibrium, for which the analytical solutions are more difficult to interpret.
The necessary demand characteristics are given in Table 2; airline characteristics in
Table 3, and airport characteristics in Table 4. It is not the purpose of this paper to accurately
describe a real-life aviation network. The parameters therefore may also not correspond to
real life values. In the simulation, we will calculate the price elasticity of demand and
compare this estimates from the literature to validate our results.
a 30000 _ 200 c f 100000 c q 100
4 Table 2. Transport network operatorTable 1. Demand characteristics
characteristics
vott 50 rlA 0.5
vo_ 5
Table 3. Node characteristics
Table 4 contains the no-toll equilibrium. The calculated price elasticity in equilibrium of
-1.17 roughly corresponds to the value of-1.146 reported by Brons et al. (2002). The latter
number is the overall mean of 204 estimates encountered in the literature. The model thus
yields an elasticity in equilibrium that corresponds to real life values; we operate on a relevant
segment of the demand curve.
generalized costs welfare effects (x 107)
q fare congestion c_ local welfare consumer benefits profits
airline 1 1862 10447 931 1.17 3.45894 3.85275 1.72499
airline2 1862 10447 931 1.17 3.45894 3.85275 1.72499
Table 4. Equilibrium outputs and welfare," no toll, elasticity in absolute value
Table 5 contains the equilibrium for the (first-best) welfare maximizing toll (given in
equation (20)). The toll is negative, and quite large in absolute value (compared to, for
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instance, the marginal cost per flight). This indicates that the market power effect in the no-
toll equilibrium exceeds the congestion effect. Because the airlines receive substantial
subsidies, the optimal outputs and profits are larger than in the no-toll equilibrium. Because
the optimal outputs are higher, congestion costs are also higher. In the no-toll equilibrium, the
airlines set their optimal outputs too low, and as a result, the congestion costs are too low in
the optimum. The welfare maximizing toll fixes this problem.
generalizedcosts welfare effects (xl0 _)
q fare con,,_'sfi_,_,aaF_ local welfare consumerbenefits profits
airline 1 2390 4904 1195 0.46 3.77069 8.62801 2.90621
airline 2 2390 4904 1195 0.46 3.77069 8.62801 2.90621
Table 5. Equilibrium ou_zuts and welfare:first-best welfare maximizing toll = -833349;
elasticity in absolute value
The equili_um in Table 5 may only be of academic interest, because subsidi_ng
airlines may be politically rather tricky. Bmeckner (2003) suggests that the toll in such a case
should be set at the level of congestion that is not internalized by the airlines (equation (18)).
This equilibrium is given in Table 6.
generalizedcosts welfare effects (×10_)
q fare congestion e.gm localwelfare consumerbenefits profits
airline 1 1800 11097 900 1.28 3.40219 7.56073 .1.60563
airline2 1800 11097 900 1.28 3.40219 7.56073 _1.60563
Table 4. Equilibrium outputs and welfare; Brueckner-toll = 97767; elasticity in absolute
vn_h!e
The toll is positive (as expected), and this is also reflected in consumer prices (the airlines
pass the toll on to the passengers). Because the fares increase, consumer benefits decrease.
From Table 4 and fl we already concluded that in the no-toll equilibrium, the airlines set their
optimal outputs, and thus also the congestion costs, too low. The 'Brueckner-toll" causes the
outputs to be even lower. Combined with the decrease in consumer benefits, this leads to a
decrease in total weffare. The straightforward conclusion then is that in this market the
regulator should set welfare maximizing tolls. If this is not possible, the regulator should do
nothing. Pure congestion tolls do more harm than good.
When we take the first-best optimum as a reference case, it could be more for the
airLines to act as followers in a Stackelberg-like game with the airports authorities. The
airports then set a toll to which the airlines respond; in practice, this means that the optimal
outputs from the airline point of view are substituted in the regulator's objective function. The
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airlines thus obtain the maximum possible profits, conditional on the toll, while this is not the
case in the first-best optimum. Because the airlines receive a subsidy for each passenger they
move, they maximize the output up to the point where the "production" costs, including
congestion costs, of the marginal passenger exceed the revenues (including subsidy). This is
reflected in Table 6. The optimal output exceeds the optimal output in the first-best optimum.
In theory, the airlines thus have an incentive to act as followers.
generalized costs welfare effects (x 107)
q fare congestion _ local welfare consumer benefits profits
airline 1 2661 2063 1330 0.21 3.81113 8.88483 .3.62531
airline 2 2661 2063 1330 0.21 3.81113 8.88483 .3.62531
Table 6. Equilibrium outputs and welfare; second-best welfare maximizing toll = -1260480;
elasticity in absolute value
CONCLUSION
Conventional economic wisdom suggests that congestion pricing would be an appropriate
response to cope with the growing congestion levels currently experienced at many airports.
Several characteristics of aviation markets, however, may make na'fve congestion prices equal
to the value of marginal travel delays a non-optimal response. This paper has developed a
model of airport pricing that captures a number of these features. The model in particular
reflects that airlines typically have market power and are engaged in oligopolistic competition
at different sub-markets; that part of external travel delays that aircratt impose are internal to
an operator and hence should not be accounted for in congestion tolls. We presented an
analytical treatment for a simple bi-nodal symmetric network, which through the use of
'hyper-networks' would be readily applicable to dynamic problems (in discrete time) such as
peak - off-peak differences, and some numerical exercises for the same symmetric network,
which was only designed to illustrate the possible comparative static impacts of tolling, in
addition to marginal equilibrium conditions as could be derived for the general model
specification.
Some main conclusions are that second-best optimal tolls are typically lower than
what would be suggested by congestion costs alone and may even be negative, and that the
toll as derived by Brueckner (2002) may not lead to an increase in total welfare.
While Brueckner (2002) has made clear that congestion tolls on airports may be
smaller than expected when congestion costs among aircraft are internal for a firm, our
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analysis adds to this that a further downward adjustment may be in order due to market
power. The presence of market power (which causes prices to exceed marginal costs) may
cause the pure congestion toll to be suboptimal, because the resulting decrease in demand is
too high (the pure congestion tall does not take into account the decrease in consumer
surplus).
The various downward adjustments in welfare maximizing tolls may well cause the
optimal values of these to be negative. Insofar as subsidization is considered unacceptable for
whichever reason, our results warn that the most efficient among the non-negative tolls may
actually be a zero toll; the pure congestion toll may actually decrease welfare compared to the
base case.
The model in this paper contains a few simplifying assumptions that may be relaxed in
future work. Load factors and aircraft capacity are fixed in this model for simplicity. In a
more advanced version of this model, load factors and aircraft capacity can be endogenized.
This makes the derivation of the optimality conditions far more complicated, but it should be
feasible in a numerical experiment. One can also add a fourth layer to the model, describing
the airport's optimization problem. For example, the airport can maximize profits under a cost
recovery constraint. The model then deals with interactions between four types of agents. No
distinction is made between peak and off-peak traffic in this paper. This distinction is quite
common in the literature (see e.g. Brueckner (2002), Daniel (1995)) and could, as discussed,
of the numerical exercise in this paper need to be checked against an asymmemc equilibrium.
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Abstract
This article deals with an auction mechanism for airspace slots, as
a means of solving the European airspace congestion problem. A dis-
equilibrium, between Air Traffic Control (ATC) services supply and
ATC services deman_ axe at the origin of almost one fourth of de-
lays in the air transport industry in Europe. In order to tackle this
congestion problem, we suggest modifying both pricing and allocation
ofATC services,by settingup an auctionmechanism. Objects of the
then to benefit from ATC services over a period corresponding to the
n_ary time for the crossing. Allocation and payment rules have
to be defined according to the objectives of this auction. The auc-
tioneer is the public authority in charge of ATC services, whose aim
is to obtain an efficient allocation. Therefore, the social value will be
maximized. Another objective is to internalize congestion costs. To
that end, we apply the principle of Claxke-Groves mechanism auction:
each winner has to pay the externalities imposed on other bidders. The
complex context of ATC leads to a specific design for this auction.
1 Introduction
The air transport industry in Europe is faced with the recurring problem of
delays. Although delays slightly decreased in 2001, this was essentially due
to the current international context. Delay and traffic levels are strongly
connected. High rate of flight delays can again become very topical with
"EUREQua, CNRS, University. of Pafis-I and LEEA, ENAC-CENA, Toulouse, e-maih
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future growth of the air transport industry. Delays are very costly in terms
of welfare.
The reason essentially advanced by airlines to explain delays is the insuf-
ficient capacity of the Air Traffic Control (ATC). A study estimates the cost
of those specific delays, borne by passengers and airlines, between 6.6 and
10.7 billions of euros for 1999. It is very important to tackle this problem.
However, if ATC services are actually responsible for an important part
of European delays, airlines are also at the origin of this situation: under-
capacity is due to insufficient supply and too much demand.
The aim of this article is to propose a solution to the inadequacy of the
supply to cope with the demand, by considering a fixed capacity. Pricing is
the mechanism usually used to avoid such disequilibrium. We observe that
ATC fees do not satisfied this principle. Indeed, ATC charges are a function
of the weight of the aircraft in order to introduce cross subsidies between
airspace users, and of the distance flown over in order to reflect the cost of
service. The ATC fees provide incentives to operate flights on small aircraft
and to supply frequent flights, but frequencies contribute to air congestion.
Thus, ATC charges do not work to reduce delays.
Another problem is the organization of ATC services, such that the upper
airspace is divided into "sectors" with a team of two or three controllers in
charge of one sector. When the demand is greater than the supply for one
sector, ATC authorities have to "regulate" the traffic and to allocate slots.
The time an aircraft is allowed to enter in a regulated sector is specified in a
slot. For each regulated sector, a list of slots is built. Those slots satisfied the
capacity .per hour announced by the regulated sector. For instance, a four
hour long regulation associated with a rate of 30 flights per hour would result
in a slot allocation list made up of 120 slots separated from one another by
2 minutes. The principle '_irst planned, first served", which presumes that
flights should arrive over the restricted sector in the same order in which they
would have arrived without regulation, is applied throughout the process.
ATC fees and allocation rules do not produce an efficient treatment of
congestion. This article proposes a mechanism which combines allocation
and pricing. Allocation of slots will be done in an efficient way, via optimal
ATC fees.
First, we need to present the specific context of auction for airspace.
Then, we will be able to design allocation and payment rules of the mech-
anism. The public authority is faced with some constraints, as capacity
constraints, to determine the optimal allocation. Airlines' payoffs have to be
defined according to the objectives. Finally, we will provide an example to
understand how the mechanism works and to analyze the results.
2 Context of auction for airspace
In order to define an auction mechanism, we need to present objects and
objectives for the auction. The wide complexity of the ATC organization,
explained by a high level of security, is at the origin of a specific defmition
of objects. They will be presented in detail. Objectives are more simple: a
public authority in charge of ATC services sets up an auction with the aim
of reducing delays and promoting a better use of the existing capacity.
2.1 Objects of the auction
An auction for the airspace will be the selling of fights for airlines to cross
a part of the airspace, and then to benefit from ATC services over a period
corresponding to the necessary time to cross. Those rights will be called
"slots", as for the airport slots, but with a different sense of current "ATC
slots".
Obviously, there are many objects in this auction. Two elements are at
the origin of this multiplicity: space and time.
2.1.1 Components of a slot
The airspace is divided into "sectors". The work of a team of controllers is
bU _::JlJb_UAt:: _-'_U_lby bU mmm4_Llb_ I_ILU_JULI_ bm*_: _1 bJ.t_c_ adl._ _ _ILL_1_IL_ U.t. .tVJL'.._b
of air links cross many sectors. It means many different goods.
Moreover, a sector is defined by its capacity: This the highest number
of Rights that can be present in the same sector at the same moment. A
given sector can be crossed by several Rights during a given period. It means
many identical goods. Those goods are perfect complements because airlines
cannot run a risk of missing a sector to operate a link. It is absolutely
necessaryto allowpackagebidsfrom indi_idualsectors.
Another importantdimension toconstitutea slotisthe time. Each pack-
age must alsoincludeperiodsat which sectorswillbe crossed.
For securityreasons,air trafficflow must be spread over the day and
cannot be concentratedover a shortperiod.Thus, a sectorcapacitycannot
be definedby day.Ithas tobe fixedfora shortperiod.We divideda day into
34 periodsofhalfan hour:6:00-6:30,6:30-7:00,etc.The auctionisorganized
forRightsin airspacebetween 6:00inthe morning and 11:00in the evening.
The setof sub-periodsofone day is:
T= "[tl, . . . , t_ }
Thedivisioninto airspacesectorsalreadyexists.The setof thosesector
is: X = {1,..., x}. Each sector is characterized by a time capacity. Due to
the activation of some military areas, where civil flights are not allowed to
cross, this capacity varies over the periods. We consider ks;t as the capacity
of the sector s during the period t.
2.1.2 Complementary objects
A slot is not necessary only for one flight or for only one air link. For strategic
reasons, airlines can bid for a slot used for several air links. Sectors for a
same flight axe not the only perfect complements. Flight periods of several
air links need to be consistent with each other, due to aircraft turnover. The
existence of a hub explains also the strong complementarity between sectors.
Then, slots can be for an air link, or for several air links of an aircraft, or for
several air links of a group of passengers.
An airline bid specifies which sectors, at which periods, are necessary
to form a package. Generally, flights will be operated over several periods.
A slot z will be pairs of "sectors-period": z = {[(Ya, ta)]a=l,...,A}, with ya a
package of sectors, t_ the time period needed for the package Ya and A the
number of necessary periods to operate the flight.
Airlines can ask for many slots. So, this auction is for multiple packages.
2.2 Objectives of the auction
Many objectives justify an auction mechanism for airspace.
2.2.1 Internalize congestion costs
ATC services are not a public good. On one hand, fees paid by users involve
possibility of exclusion. On the other hand, periodic situation of congestion
involve rivalry. With the limited capacity of ATC services, airlines impose
externalities on others.
One aim of this auction is to lead airlines to take into account the con-
sequences of theirs flight choices. We need to know the value of each slot
for airlines. H the demand of airlines for a slot is not satisfied, they bear an
opportunity cost. This cost is equal to the profit that airlines would obtain
if the demand has been satisfied, minus fees for the slot. The airlines ability
to pay for a slot is the amount of this opportunity cost.
If this cost is revealed by the auction, it will be possible to charge winners
the externality imposed on others.
2.2.2 Reach an efficient allocation of slots
Although ATC servicesarenot a publicgood, a publicauthorityisin charge
ofthem. In the collectiveinterest,thisauthoritywould preferto reach the
highest social surplus than the highest revenue. We look for an efficient
mechanism.
The social surplus is equal to the sum of the airlines' net surplus, passen-
gem' net surplus and ATC re_enues. With "_4eld management _ strategies,
airlines capture passengers' surplus. ATC costs for airlines and ATC revenues
cancel each other out. Thus, after simplification, social surplus is equal to
the sum of bids of winners, because we saw, that airlines' net profit plus ATC
cost are equal to their bids.
One objective is the maximization of this welfare.
2.2.3 Spread the traffic over time and space
We decided to study an auction mechanism for airspace slots in order to solve
the present problem of congestion. The goal of this system is also to spread
the traffic over time and space and not to cancel flights initially forecasted
at a peak period.
The interest of an auction mechanism in this context is to incite airlines
to modify either flight route, or flight hour, or both, when the capacity is
insufficient_ by. means of prices. The optimal period to flight and the optimal
se_ors m cross _ii be determined according to abiii_" to pay_
2.2.4 Balance the ATC services budget
France, as most in countries, decided to charge direct users of airspace. An
auction mechanism is at the origin of transfers from bidders to the auctioneer.
However, it is not sure that the budget of the civil aviation administration
will be balanced.
For this reason, we suggest to separate the fees in two parts. One will
be connected to the ATC service costs and the other will be linked to the
congestion costs. This second part will be determined by the auction results.
3 Auction design
Due to multiple packages, the auction design specifies not only allocation and
payment rules but also what bids look like. Airlines will have to announce
which slots they want and how much they are able to pay for them.
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An optimizationof the total valueof the bids, underconstraints,will
give the allocationand the objectiveswill inducea specialpaymentrule.
Indeed,externalitiesandservicesmanagedby a publicauthority arein favor
of a mechanismsuchthat winnerspay the costimposedonothers. So,the
auctionmechanismfor airspaceslotswill beanadaptationof aClarke-Groves
mechanism.
3.1 Bids of the auction
There is a lot of possible "sector-period" combination. So, we propose to
leave airlines to define themselves their slots.
Bids of the auction will have two components. First, airlines will describe
precisely the slots which are relevant to them. Second, they will announce
their values for those slots.
3.1.1 Relevant slots
The auctioneer cannot propose an exhaustive list of all possible slots. Airline
i will describe the M i slots it wants. The first part of her announcement will
be the list Z _ = {Z_},n=I,...,M,.
Considering the third objective, it is not possible that at the end of the
auction, some forecasted flights at peak period are canceled and all capacity
is not used at off-peak period. The auctioneer can allow airlines to modify
a slot if their demand is not satisfied. We suggest to implement an auction
with only one turn and to leave airlines asking for several slots for the same
flight. At their "favorite" slot, they will add others slots in case of insufficient
capacity to obtain the first one. Those alternatives will be different from the
"first choice", either by the time period, earlier or later, or by sectors, a
longer but less congestioned route, or by both.
i;rThus, for an air link, airlines ask for several slots, z_ = {z m }r=l,...jv_ is
a vector including all the slots described by airline i to operate the air link
m.
For a given air link m, the smaller is r, the more the airline prefers this
slot. It means that slots with r -- 1 are "favorite" slots.
_rith the previous notation, the slot r asked by the airline i for its air
link m is: z_" i;r i;r
. = {[(ym;a, tm;a)]a=l,...,A_,}.
3.1.2 Slots values
In addition to describing slots for their air links, airlines must also announce
how much they are able to pay for them. For each airline i, bids are contained
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in the list of price: B i = {b_}_=I,...,M,.
As for the slots, b_ is a vector including bids for all the slots asked for a
given air link. Bids are classified in order of preference: b_ = {b_}_=x,...,_,
such that b_* is greater than bi&_+1 for all r in the set [1,/_ - 1].
According to information they have, airlines announce their bids. Con-
sider that _ in e i, is the exogenous private information of airline i. The set
of all bidders' private information is e = 01 x ... x e n and the vector of all
bidders' signals is 0 = (0 _, ..., On), with 0 in e.
For each airline i, abilities to pay is defined as following:
v__ : 0 i _ R*,Vr = 1,...,P_,Vm = 1,...,M _,
where v_(8 i) is the willingness to pay of the airline i with the signal 8 i for
her slot r, for its air link m. For notation: W__ --- {v_(_)/_ e O_}.
Then:
v': +
suchthat = = 1,..., m = L---, M
Airlines' bids are based on their own willingness to pay for goods:
b_: e_ --+ R +
o;_ !vg: ttrlj = 0_ t_-)
The complete airline i's bid is D _ = (Z_; B_), with:
Z i i;r ";r . .
= {{[(y_.a,t*_;a)]a=l,...,A_,}r=l,...,t_}m=l,...,M,
=
The component zrn = {[(y_, t,_;_)]a=l,...,A_, } of Z i is associated with the
component b__ of B i.
3.2 Results of the auction
With the objectives we fixed to design an auction mechanism, a Clarke-
Groves mechanism will be suitable for airspace slots auction. Such a system
can be used when either a single public good is sold or many private goods
axe sold to many people. In a Clarke-Groves mechanism, payoff of an agent
is connected to its bid only through the consequences its bid has on the final
allocation or decision. The price he pays is independent of its bid. Let's see
how this price will be computed for airspace slots, after the announcemem
of the final allocation.
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3.2.1 Allocation rule
Once airlines passed on their bids, made of slots and willingness to pay,
the auctioneer computes the maximum social surplus. Then, the auctioneer
announces to airlines which slots they obtained. The allocation list of airline
i is given by H i {hl, i i= ..., hM,}, such that hm = {h_r}r=l,...,n_ is equal to
one if it won the slot and to zero otherwise:
h_,r e {0, 1}, Vi, Vm, Yr (:)
Moreover, h_ cannot contain more than one element equal to one, because
all bids are for the same air link:
r e (0,:}, Vi,W.
r----1
(2)
Finally, capacity constraint must be satisfied by the final allocation:
ZZZZ(<
i=l m---1 r=l a=l
x lsev_,_° x lt=t_:.) <_ k,;t, Vs • X, Vt • T (3)
We obtain the allocation of slots among airspace users by maximizing the
sum of the ability to pay for slots, under constraints (1), (2) and (3). The allo-
cation is given by H (Ha,.., H i, ., Hn), with H i i;_ .= " .. = {{hm}_::,...,_}m=: .....M',
solution of the auctioneer program:
n M_
max Z Z Z b_ × h_ (4)
hm },e[a,R_a ] me[:,Mi] _eN
under the constraints:
i=1 m=l r=l a=l
h_ r • {0, 1}, Vi, Vm, Vr
y_h_ _ • {0, 1},Vi, Vm
r--1
3.2.2 Payment rule
The auctioneer informs winners of the slots cost. To compute the price paid
by agent i for slot m, he needs to know what would be the "allocation L(i; m),
if agent i did not bid for slot m. It is a vector such that:
L(i;m) = (Ll(i;m),...,Li(i,m),...,L"(i;m))
with /fi(i;m)= {l{(i;m),...,l{,_(i;m)}
and l_(i;m) = {//_(i;m)}r=a,...,_ = {O}r=l,...,/i_
We obtain this allocation by solving:
n MJ R_,
{{.{<':(i,-.,)}.,_t,..._,,,}.,.,,,_t,,..,' }j,_,, ,=1 ,',','=1 ,-=1
under constraints:
(5)
n MJ Ifm, m'
i;r •
j=l m'=l r=l a=l
l.;jm,-
,tz;m) e {0, 1},Vj ¢ i, Vm',Vr
l_(i; m) S {0, 1}, Vm'# m, Vr
_'m _,*, "_1 -- u, v,
_£'J_'"m) e {0,1},Vi, Vm'
Then, the agent i must pay for the slot m:
n M j _,
]=i m'=l r=l
/__ ra
_j=l nt =1 r=l r=l
n MJ /_,
lJ_ { "- m)E E Eb',::×.,,,,,,,
j=l ra'=l r=l
- g' x h_,r' + bi_,' x hl r,
/J =1 mira--1 m'=l r'=l
\ j:#:i m'¢m
(6)
This price is the difference between the total bids of all airlines, except
i, when airline i does not bid for the air link m and when it bids for this air
link. Then p_ reflects the amount of which airline i deprives other bidders
with its demand for m.
The price can also be written:
R_ n MJ RJ_
hj;r ";r lJ;r {_" m) )
r=l j=l m_=l r=l
In this way, another interpretation is possible. Airline i pays its bid for the
slot it won, for its air link m, and it benefits from a discount equal to the
amount it increases the final allocation value with its demand.
Prices correspond to externalities that airlines imposed on other bidders.
Proposition 1 This mechanism is a direct revealing and efficient mecha-
nism.
Proof is given in annex A.
4 Example
In order to understand what the process is of the auction, we give a simple
example with less parameters than in an actual situation.
4.1 Data of the simulation
We consider:
• 4 airlines: i = 1, 2, 3, 4;
• 6 ATC sectors: s = Sl, s2, s3, s4, Ss, s6, laid out as on the figure (1):
• 3 time periods: t = tl,t2, t3;
• a capacity for each sector at each time period equal to 2 aircraft: ks;t =
2, Vs, t.
Each airline describes the slots it wants and the substitute slots in case
it would not obtain its favorite slot. The slot r of the airline i for its air
i;r and is associated with the ability to pay vra.link m is zr, i;r Given that the
mechanism is efficient and direct revealing, we know that the airlines' bids
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Figure 1: Layout of the 6 sectors.
are equal to their ability to pay. We suppose that the
following:
Airline 1: .1 st link
. _d link:
Airline 2: .1 st link:
1st choice: { z_;1 =- I;I
V 1 =
{4, 2 =- 2 nd choice: t;2V 1
1;3- 3rd choice: z_;s
{4"=-1 st choice: 1;1V2
- 2nd choice: ,,t$
-2
- 3rd choice: _,._
t v£- =
2;1
-1st choic e: ;_;
2;2- 2nd choice: z_;2V 1
2;3
- 3rd choice: z; =
U12;3
2;4 -----
airlines' bids are the
{[(81, 82; 84), _;1], [(83, S6)'_ t2]}
70
{[(,,, _), t,], [(,_,_,,_,),t_]}
62
{[(,1,_2,,4, t2],[(,_,,_), t_]}
53
{[S2, tl], [,,, _]}
16
la
{[_, t_],[_,,_4}
IU
{[(_, _,), t_],[_,,t_l}
32
{[(_, _), td, [_,,t_]}
27
{[,_,tl], [(_,,s_), t_]}
25
{[(,_, _), t_],[,_,t_]}
21
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Airline 3:
Airline 4:
.2 nd link:
,3 rd link:
. 1st link:
* 2nd link:
* 1st link:
* 2nd link:
2;1
- 1st choice: z2 = {[(Sz, S6),tl],[s2,t2]}
v 2;1 = 26
-2ndch°ice: [ _'"_ vz_:: == 24{[s3'tl]'[(s2's6)'t2]}
{ z_;3 = {[(s3, s_l,t2l,[s2, t4}- 3rd choice: 2;3v 2 = 21
=- 4th choice: 2;4 17
V 2 _---
2;1- 1st choice: z3;,v 3 = 22
=- 2nd choice: 2;2 19V 3
3rd choice: _ z2;3 = {(s3, s4),t2}
- [ 2;3 13V 3 =
3;1
- 1st choice: zl = {[(s4, s5),tll,[(s4, ss),t2]}
v_ ;1 = 52
3;2
2nd choice: z_;2 {[(s4, s5),t2],[(s4, s5),t3]}
v[ 34
- 3rd choice: v3;3 20{(s4'ss)'t3}
Z ;1 = {[82, tl],[81,t21}- I st choice: 3;1v 2 21
3;2
- 2nd choice: z2 = {(sl,s2),t2}
v# ;2 17
{z? =- 3rd choice: v23;3 13{[s2't2], [sl, t31}
4;1
s6),tl],
- 1 st choice: Zl;1
v 1 20
2nd choice: { z4;2 -- {[S3, t2],[(S5, S6),t2]}
- V14;2 17
Zl ;3 = {[(83, S6),t2],[85,_3] }- 3rd choice: 4;3 14
V 1
_ 1st choice: { v2Z_:: _--- 18{(81' 82)'t2}
2nd choice: [ z_;2 = {[s2, t2],[st,t3]}
- 4;2[ v2 15
-3rdch°ice: [_'_;v_:: = 12{(sl's2)'t3}
(see annex B).Interpretation of those demands is appended to
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4.2 Results
From thosebidsand capacityconstraints,we can solvethe program (4).The
optimal allocationis:
H = {[(1,0,0),(0,1,0)],[(0,1,0,0),(0,0,0,1),(0,1,0)],
[(1, O,0), (1, O,0)], [(1, O,0), (0,1, 0)]}
Results are resumed in the following tabular:
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
I st link
Istchoice
2nd choice
IStchoice
Istchoice
2 nd link
2nd choice
4thchoice
IStChoice
2nd choice
3rd link
2 nd choice
The social value, computed by adding the abilities to pay for allocated
slots, is equal to 254 monetary units.
Then, we have to compute the price of each slot. _re soh, e the program
(5) several times, by removing alternatively an air link of an airline. The
tabular 1 gives all the new allocations. If the airline i does not receive any
slot for its air link m, the allocation is L(i, m). It means that components
of the slot z_ are available to make other slots. Then, new allocations are
possible.
For _ple, with ,ha Cnmpn_,t_ nf the _]nt 3:1 ax_ilahle, it becom_
optimal to allocate to the second airline its first choice instead of its second
choice for its first air link, with all other slots still allocated in the same way.
The airline 2 can benefit from the sector s4 at the period tl to operate its
flight avoiding to make a detour through the sector s5. With the allocation
L(3,1), the sum of the willingness to pay is equal to 277.
We can compute the price of each slot. It is the willingness to pay for it
minus the differencebetween the sum ofthe willingnessto pay of allocated
slots,254 monetary units,and the one ofslotthatwould be allocatedifthe
airlinedid not bid forthisairlink.Pricesof the nineslotsare given by the
set of equations (7).
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p_ = 70- (254-196) = 12
rg = 13- (254- 247) = 6
= 27- (254- 231) = 4
pc] = 17-(254-237) = 0
P_s= 19-(254-241) = 6
P_I = 52-(254-207) ---- 5
t_ = 21-(2_-242) = 9
p_ = 20- (254- 240) = 6
p_ = 15- (254- 242) = 3
C7)
Let us understand how those prices are defined. If airline 3 would not win
a slot for its first air link, the only change in the optimal allocation will be
in favor of airline 2 for its first air link. Instead of winning its second choice,
with a value equal to 27 monetary units, it would obtain its first choice, with
a value equal to 32 monetary units. Since there would be no bid from airline
3 for its first air link, the increase in the total value would be of 5 monetary
units. Then, the price of _ slot is: p_ = 5-
4.3 Analysis of the results
Some comments can be done on payoffs and on the competition consequences
on allocations.
We note that the price of the slot _ is zero. It means that airline 2 does not
deprive any bidders with its slot. Since it would not bid for this slot, any of
its components would be allocated to another airline: L(2, 2) = H. Airline
2 imposes no externality with its slot for its second air link.
With other slots, airlines deprive at least one bidder of getting a better
choice. The price they have to pay is different from zero. Nevertheless, some-
times airlines impose externality on themselves. The price paid by an airline
is computed for each slot. The authority can define the payoff differently. For
example, the price can be computed for the whole set of slots won by airlines.
Then, the new allocation we look for is the one when an airline is completely
out of the auction. In this way, results would be different from previous ones.
To observe the difference, we need to compare the two methods.
The price for the pool of slots obtained by airline I is computed by looking
for the allocation L(1) of the auction with no demand from airline 1. This
is the following allocation with a total value equal to 183:
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L(1) = {[(0,0, 0),(0,0,0)],[(1,0, 0, 0), (0,0, 1,0), (0,1,0)],
[(1,0,0), (1,0,0)1,[(1,0,0), (1,0,0)]}
, 1;2The total value of slots won by airline 1 is 83 (v_ ;1t v2 = 70 + 13). The
global price is then:
pl = 83 - (254 - 183) -- 12
pl = 12 Cp_ +p_ = 18
This price is less than the sum of the prices for the two slots computed
separately. It means that airline 1 imposes externalities not only on others
airlines but also on herself, and this latter externality is equal to 6. Indeed,
1;1
we observe from the allocation L(1, 1), with the available slot z 1 , airline 1
gets a better slot for its second air link.
Another example is for airline 2. If it did not bid in this auction, the
allocation would be:
L(2) = {[(1,0,0),(0,1,0)],[(0,0,0,0),(0,0,0,0),(0,0,0)],
[(1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0)], [(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)]}
For airlines 1,3 and 4, the allocation is the same as H. Airline 2 imposes
no externality on others bidders. We can guess that the price p2 is equal to
zero. Indeed, the total value of L(2) is 191 and the sum of slots' values of
2;2
airline 2 is v2;2 + v22;4+ v3 = 63. Then the price is:
p2 = 63 - (254 - 191) = 0
For the other airlines, the global price for slots is equal to the sum of
individual price.
4.3.2 Competition
In our example, we observe that airlines are in competition for some air
links. The same slot is relevant for airlines 1 and 3. Obviously, due to under-
capacity, the airline with the highest value gets the better possible choice.
It is different when the competition is only for a part of the slot. For
example, for a slot made of three sectors, airlines 2 and 4 have respectively
for their air link 2 and 1, two common sectors. Airline 4 with a value equal
to 20 gets the slot, although the value of airline 2 was 26. The slot is in
this case, not necessary for the airline with the highest value. This result
is due to the other components of the slot. More than sector s3 and s6 at
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period tl, airline 4 needs sector s5 at period t_. But there is few demand for
this sector. Allocating the slot to airline 4 and the sector s_ at period t2 to
another airline than airline 2, leads to a greater total value of the objective
than otherwise.
5 Concluding remarks
An auction mechanism seems welLsuited to the ATC situation. A scarce
resource, the airspace, can be efficiently allocated because willingnesses to
pav of airlines are revealed. An example shows us consequences of such a
mechanism on payoffs and on competition. A price computed by slot and not
by airline leads airlines to internalize congestion costs imposed on themselves.
From a competition point of view, it is not necessary that the airline with the
highest value gets the slots. It can be a solution for airlines to reroute their
air link from congestioned areas, keeping a large part of sectors in common
with their competitors and to bid a lesser value. Such an airline may win the
slot and its competitors not.
To do a computer simulation, we need to have a lot of data about air-
lines. For the moment, we only know their favorite slots. But we need their
alternative slots and their willingness to pay.
Nevertheless, this chosen mechanism leads to reach objectives of this auc-
tion. it is a direct .... a_d efficient mechanism. _n _ .....
for a Clarke-Groves auction, is at the origin of the incentive effects. A do-
minant strategy for airlines is to bid their actual ability to pay. But such a
mechanism is complex due to multiple packages and alternatives slots.
This auction will be repeated and in each European country a major
airline is at the origin of a majority of flights. Collusion problems may also
appear.
Moreover, with a Clarke-Groves mechanism we supposed that airlines'
values was independent. But those values may be in fact interdependent.
The airline's would be a function, not only of her own signal, but also of
other airlines' signals and to "collective judgments". A personal characteris-
tic, useful only for itself would be the cost to operate an air link. An airline's
ability to pay is connected to this cost. The competition in prices, flights
times, frequencies and on board services would be at the origin of interde-
pendency between airlines. For example, if two airlines bid for the same air
link, the announcement of one of them would be linked to the effect of its
own airline on the network of the other.
In such a case, airlines are no more able to bid their willingness to pay,
because it depends on the others. Moreover, the payment rule is no more
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suitablebecausewecannot knowwhatwouldbe the allocationif anairline
did not bid.
DasguptaandMaskin(2000)showthat anefficient,but constraintequi-
librium exists.Fromapracticalpointof view,themechanismwouldbemore
andmorecomplex.Now,researchonATC auctionhaveto takeintoaccount
this interdependencyof valuesandto removeproblemsof collusion.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Let us show that it is a dominant strategy for airline i to bid truthfully
for each relevant slot, whatever are bids for other airlines b/,_r. We need to
compare net surplus of airline i between the case it bids truthfully for slots
of its air link m and the case it lies. Note that the net surplus is equal to
the difference between the actual value of the agent and the amount it has
to pay.
•/:/is the final allocation when airline i bids truthfully for the/_ slots
for whom she announced v_ _, whatever are bids for other airlines:
n M j RJ M i Rim,rn/ _"
/_ argmaxy]_ Z Z b)'_'r' _j;r'± xh_r,'+Z ,i;r i;_
m /r;m;t j=l m'=l r'----1 mt=l r*=l r=l
j#'i m' #m
under constraints:
/=1 m=l r=l a=l
e {0,1}, Vi,Vm,W,
r=l
y_fi_ e {0,1}, Vi, Vrn.
L(i; m) is the allocation when i gets not slot for its air link m:
=
n MJ RJTr_t
lj;r [g. m)arg max Z Z _-'_ b_m_,x .m,,.,
t, m,, Jml6.[I,MJ]j j,EN
(9)
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under constraints:
,,_ • lt=_, ]]
j=l m'=l r=l a=l
t_;(i;m) e {0,1}, vj #i, Vm',W,
ra;!i;m!e {o,1},Vm'-¢=re,W,
i_-ti; m) = O, W,
j;r . • t
Elm,(t;m) e 10,1}, V,,Vm
If bidder i bids truthfully, when its net surplus is:
× h_,"- V.7,x ',,,,t',
r=--I j=l m'-----1 r=l
- E<": xh:,+ _ Zb_;'xh,,,,
rn"#lrn
(lo)
• Now.. let us see the case of a liar airline i [or _10_.... or" _.... na_-'-:-'-uu_,,,.-- H
is the final allocation when airline i announces _;_ _ v_,_ for all slots r in
1:,...,_}:
arg max
{{{'_'_..._,}._..,,},.
n M_ _,.
Z _ E b: xh_,"
i=l m=l r=l
under constraints:
tr.
E EEE (h_",,__ x_. )_<k._,v.,vt,
i-=l r_=--1 r=l a-._l
hg e {0,1}, Vi, Vm, Vr,
_h_" e{o,1},Vi,Vm.
r----1
Given that airlines' values are private and independent, airlines announce
only one bid by slot and their bids are not functions of the other airlines.
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Then,vectorL(i; m), solution of the program (9), does not change and the
airline i's net surplus is:
V'v _;" -i;" P;_" m)r. x hm - bJ_,x om,_z,
r=l \j=l m'=l r=l
_j;r p i;r _ ~ i;rl
- b_._T'x.o., + bin, xh.,
\j_ _'=,,'=, .,;_,'=,
We compare the two net surplus (10) et (11):
))^ .r_ i;r _ ^ i;r_AS = z.., ,n_7"vi;'. x h,n +^i;, bJ;mT'x h_, + b,n, x h m,
r=l _ m'=lr'=l m'=l r'=lIt12! _lt_
_j;r I - i;r'
- .vv,.. x_;.+ E _;: x..m,+ E E b_,' xhm,
r=l j=l Erll=l mt=l r'=l
i¢i rn' #rn
(12)
As/I is defined (program (8)), AS is positive.
_rhatever are the other airlines' bids, it is a dominant strategy for an air
link to bid truthfully for each slot of each air link relevant for her. Truthful
bids constitute an equilibrium in dominant strategy. This mechanism is
direct revealing.
An efficient mechanism is such that all goods are allocated to agents with
highest values. An efficient allocation is the one defined by/2/(program (8)).
We just show that airlines bid truthfully, then the final allocation is/2/. This
mechanism is also efficient.
B Interpretation of airlines' bids in the ex-
ample
The first relevant slot for airline 1 is in fact for several links. Two flights
from sectors sl and s_ go to the airline's hub in sector s4. From this point,
two flights go to sectors s3 and s6. Airline l's ability to pay for those four air
links is 70 monetary units. The airline does not try to get slots separately,
because a part of them could miss it and then effects of its hub would be
reduced. Alternative slots for those air links are delayed. Abilities to pay
decrease as flight hours are put back.
2O
Airlines1 and 2 are in competition for a part of their first air link: sector
sl, s6 and s4. If its first choice is not satisfied, airline 2 prefers to bypass the
congestioned sector, by crossing s5. Due to the over_ost with this route: the
ability to pay for this second choice is equal to 5 monetary units less than to
the first one.
Airline 3's bid is for several flights between two airports. One takes off
during the period tl for the air link s4-ss, and then it comes back. The same
slot takes into account the two air links, because if the first does not begin
at tx, the second air link is necessary delayed. The second choice for this
round-trip is postponed. For the third choice, the slot is so delayed that the
return is canceled. It is the reason why the ability to pay for this slot is so
low compared to the others: 20 monetary units instead of 52.
Airlines 1 and 3 compete for their second air link: sectors s2 at tl and sl
at t2. Airline 3's value is the highest.
Sectors s3 and s6 at tl is common for air links of airlines 2 and 4. Each
slot is made of a different complementary component for the two. For the
whole slot airline 2's value is the highest, with 20 monetary units.
Sector s4 at ti is asked four times. But sector capacit)- is equal to two
flights. This over-demand will lead to allocation of slots which are not "fa-
vorite" slot.
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ABSTRACT
Aircraft noise perception is related to several variables that are tangible and objective, such
as the number of operations, flight schedules. Other variables, instead, are more subjective,
such as preferences. However, although their elusiveness, they contribute to determine the
individuals' perception of this type of externality.
Despite the fact that the complaints related to aeronautical noise have bccn
rcgiste,e_1 since the decade of 50, it has be_n observed .:hat ".,he -_ " "perdition o_ noise seems to
_"......... ially th thi " "ua_* , _,,,,tt, _=spe.c S;u"IG¢ C or_',, I, _,_o t. ..... ,_1 ,h,_+ ,.,g,,,.,.,,.,,= ,,_ _,-,,o,=tJ*J _. 1_ JtttO J _w_._t A t_t _t,t_._.L _tl_tL _ _wt t_.t A_ z_A AA_,J t _)_,
perception has its roots on the ac_lerated expansion of air traffic. But, it is necessary to
point out the important role played on modeling preferences, by the growing environmental
conscience and the higher welfare and quality of life standards and expectations.
In that context, the main objective of this paper is to study the aeronautical noise
perception in the neighborhoods of the Aeroporto Internacional de S_o Paulo - AISP (the
biggest airport of South America). Specifically, it analyzes the relationship between aircraft
noise perception and social class, which is expected to be positive.
Since noise perception is an intangible variable, this study chose as a proxy the
value losses of residential properties, caused by aeronautical noise. The variable social class
has been measured utilizing average per capita income of the population who live nearby
the airport. The comparison of both, the lowest and the highest social class suggests that the
relationship between social class and noise perception is positive in the AISP region.
Moreover, it was observed that all social classes are very susceptible to aircraft noise
annoyance. In fact, the magnitude of the noise perception proxy for both social classes -the
residential value losses- was found to be comparable to levels encountered in developed
countries.
Additionally, this paper highlights the aviation noise problem taken into account a
scenario where the airport capacity may duplicate in the next 20 years. This scenario is
compounded by the paradigmatic change on environmental awareness that has emerged all
over the world, as a result of the changing social and economic preferences, which favors
human quality of life and a sustainable growth, in order to preserve resources endowments
and quality of life for future generations. Under these circumstances, it can be foresighted
that the social change is for the internalization of environmental problems, with the
expected increase in the air transport sector costs.
Keywords: Aircraft noise perception; externalities; air transport.
1. INTRODUCTION
The aeronautical noise has been considered one of the most serious environmental
problems of aviation, in accordance with the Report The Full Cost of lntercity
Transportation (University of Berkeley, 1996).
Noise generated by aircraft operation affects negatively the quality of life of people
living nearby airports. That notion of quality of life is a very subjective experience, as it is
the aircraft noise problem (Janic, 1999). In fact, the evaluation of noise is also a subjective
measure, because it depends on individual's noise perception, which depends on both
tangible factors, such as numbers of landing and take-off aircraft operations, flight
schedules, climatic conditions, and intangible factors, such as environmental awareness,
welfare and quality of life standards, levels of education and income (Janic, 1999; Garcia,
1993).
Despite of the fact that the complaints related to aeronautical noise have been
registered since the decade of 50, it has been observed that the perception of noise seems to
have grown, especially since the 80"s. It has been argued that this change of noise
perception has its roots on the accelerated expansion of air traffic. But, it is necessary to
point out that the perception of noise annoyance may have grown as a result of the
increasing environmental awareness brought about by the institutionalization of
environmental movements (Mol, 1999). Under these circumstances, the emergence of the
ecological conscience has been accompanied by the emergence of higher standards and
expectations about people's welfare and quality of life (Mol, 1999; Garcia, 1993).
Moreover, it should be pointed out that these changes on welfare expectations have
disseminated all over the world. The growing importance of such intangible factors might
be credited in large measure to the web infi'astructure that connected the world since the
80's and allowed access to new flows of information and knowledge created around the
world.
For all these reasons, it has been observed an increasing social demand for noise
reduction in the whole world. These changes on preferences have stimulated researches
devoted to the evaluation of the human being perception of noise discomforts. This
evaluation is complicated, because it involves personal attributes, such as sex, age and
social class (Rogerson, 1995). Despite the difficulties associated to the noise perception
evaluation, it should be emphasized the importance of obtaining an approximated measure
of the externality. Thus, it would be possible to approach more adequately the problem of
cost internalization. In fact, the idea is to understand the problem of noise perception in
order to propose solutions that could improve human welfare and quality of life.
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Additionally, this paperhighlights the aviation noise problem taken into account a
scenario where the airport capacity may duplicate in the next 20 years. This scenario is
compounded by the paradigmatic change on environmental awareness that has emerged all
over the world, as a result of the changing social and economic preferences, which favors
human quality of life and a sustainable growth, in order to preserve resources endowments
and quality of life for future generations. Under these circmnstances, it can be foresighted
that the social change is for the internalization of environmental problems, with the
expected increase in the air transport sector costs.
2. AIRCRAFT NOISE PERCEPTION
When considering the evaluation of aircraft noise impact, most methodologies leave
out the individual perception of noise annoyance, considered to be the size of the
externality. Because of the important subjective characteristics of noise perception, its
study becomes more dificulL It should be remember that there is a diference between
emitted noise and perceived noise. The emitted noise, more easily quantificable, is related
to factors like the technological stage of the aircraft that is in operation, climatic and
topographic condition, etc. On the other hand, noise perception .is recognized to be a
subjective experience, determined in large measure by subjective variables, which have
been associated to personal attributes, such as sex, age and social class (Rogerson, 1995).
It is important to point out that Garcia found out that noise perception varied with
soci_ ciass_ T-htL_, it can be expected that people that could be classified into hi_ner classes
are, in general, more refined and have higher qualit)., of life standards. Therefore, it can be
expected that they are less willing to accept aviation noise annoyance. Conversely, the
lower class people would be less susceptible to noise. This situation is confirmed in the
research developed in Finland by Heinonen-Guzejev et al. (2000), where he shows results
that support that the self-report of noise sensitivity does not have a positive correlation with
the people noise exposure.
In this context, it is interesting to study the subjective factors that determine aircraft
noise perception, in order to provide subsidies for mitigating and controlling its
environmental impacts.
3. THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF NOISE ANNOYANCE
Aviation noise affects negatively welfare of people living nearby airports. These
effects are considered to be economic externalities. According to Nicholson (1985),
externalities happen when two or more economic agents produce effects on the activities of
each other and these activities are not visible in market transactions.
When a consumer buys economic goods, he causes an increase on its price, because
this action determines a demand increase of such goods. This action is harmful for the
remaining consumers. These effects, which are captured by the price system, cannot be
characterized as externalities, became they do not reduce the market capacity of allocating
resources efficiently. The price increase of a commodity reflects the society preferences for
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it. This price increasehelpsto recoverthemarketequilibrium,by searchingfor anefficient
resourcesallocation.Nevertheless,Nicholson(1985,pp.285-287)statesthat "this is not the
casefor toxic chemicaldischarges,aircraftnoiseor trash."
In suchcases,the marketprices (of chemicalproducts,air transportationor trash
removal)may not reflect strictly the societypreferencesfor theseactivities,becausethey
arenot likely to takeinto accountthe lossescausedto third parties.
As it can seein Figure 1, once an externality doesexist, the production of an
economicgood, that generatesthat effect, will be representedby Q1.In this case,the
Marginal private Benefit will be smaller than the Marginal Social Cost, generatingan
externaldiseconomy.On theotherhand,whentheexternalcostis considered,productionis
reducedto Q2,optimizingtheresourcesallocation.
Notice that the non-internalized cost of externalities increases the quantity
produced.Therefore,theair transportuserreceivesthebenefitsfi'om the supply increase, as
long as the community living in the airport noise area, which, in general, does not use this
service, is jeopardized by the increase in output.
The correct understanding of the aviation noise externality is a fundamental
requisite for developing an efficient economic instrument, capable to internalize the
external costs.
$ Demand Marginal Social Cost
_Extemality
Marginal Private Cost
" Marginal Benefit
Q2 QI "Q
Figure 1 - Externality effect over the quantity produced
4. THE ECONOMIC REGION OF THE AISP/GRU
Aircraft noise perception is a localized experience. In fact, the socio-economic
characteristics of the region surrounding the airport, as well as the airport's dimension, are
factors that are expected to affect the perception of aviation noise discomfort. Thus, this
part of the paper is devoted to describe the main socio-economic characteristics of the
Guarulhos city and of the AISP/GRU.
4.1 - Guarulhos City characteristics
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The city of Guarulhos is located in the State of S_o Paulo, in the southeast region of
Brazil. It has 1.100.000 of inhabitants and has the 3 '_ budget of the State. Despite this
favorable position in the public finance context, a study developed by the Brazilian Institute
of Geography and Statistic CIBGE), point outs that 22% of the population of Guarulhos can
be classified under the poverty income line. Thus, they probably have no access to
employment, or sufficient conditions of housing and food. The average per capita income is
considered to be low when compared with the national average Gross Domestic Product -
GDP. In fact, Guarulhos's average income is R$ 500,00 (five hundred reais) by month or
about US$ 1701, while the Brazilian average per capita Gross Domestic Product - GDP is
about R$ 420,00 per month 0BGE, 2000).
The Guarulhos" unemployment problem is the result of structural changes suffered
by declining industrial regions. This decline was caused in large measure by the "fiscal
war" initiated by other Brazilian regions with the objective of attracting industries. In fact,
Guarulhos observed the transferring of its industries to other regions of the country, mainly
the northest, because of better fiscal conditions.
Another interesting characteristic derived fi'om the city's historical industrial
vocation is the population syndicate engagement, with popular presence in the political and
classes fight. For this reason, despite the fact that the unemployment level could lead to the
conclusion that people living in Guarulhos have low access to education and information, it
is more probable that they have conditions to understand the social and economic processes
that affect them. Thus, it is possible to expect them to organize themselves in order to fight
for higher quality of life standards.
Guamlbos city is part of Sio Paulo metropolitan region, one of the largest cities of
the world 2, which historically received enormous immigration flows. In that context,
Guarulhos is a suouroan area, wmcn has been characterized ,t,__......,_lvmg'-:....... t,nat t,_" "----tau_
immigrants, especially from the poorest parts of the country, with the consequent irregular
occupation. Also, even considering the fact that S_o Paulo's immigration flows have
decline in intensity overtime, currently Guarulhos urban density is affected by S_o Paulo's
own vegetative population growth, which pressures suburban areas.
Figure 2 expresses visually the urban demographic growing vector that comes from
S_o Paulo City to the Airport region and increases substantially the demographic density of
the airport's western borders. This situation is relevant environmentally because that region
is right below the flight tracks of the most occupied runways. For this reason, it is expected
that as both the urban demographic density and the airport expands, the aircraft noise
problem worsen.
l At the exchange rate ofR$2,95/US$1 (O Estado de Sio Paulo Newspaper, _¢w.estado.com.br, in
04/06/2003)
2 S_o Paulo metropolitan region is estimated to have around 18 million inhabitants 0BGE, m
http://www6.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/secretafias/planejamento/sp_em_numeros/O006).
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Figure 2: The urban demography of S,_o Paulo Metropolitan Area and the AISP Region
It should be pointed out that there is a regulation designed to reduce noise problems
in airport neighborhoods. Specifically, in the noise contour areas land use is not permitted
without appropriate noise insulation, or even land use is simply not recommended.
However, the combination of population vector growth with irregular land occupation turns
noise regulations irrelevant because they are not respected. To compound this situation,
there is a lack of integration between the regulation made by Brazilian civil aviation
authorities (Piano de Zoneamento de Ruldo) and the one made by the County's urban
specialists (Piano de Zoneamento Municipal), which was more affected by population
pressures than for environmental problems.
4.2 The Aeroporto Internacional de Sio Paulo (AISP/GRU)
The AISP/GRU, the biggest airport of South America, was inaugurated in January
20 th, 1985 and has two parallel runaways with its centerlines separated from each other of
375m. The airport is located in the city of Guarulhos, 25 kilometers awa_¢ from the city of
Sao Paulo. It occupies an area, of its own property, equivalent to 14 km (fourteen square
kilometers). The airport passenger's throughput (embarked plus disembarked) was
11,000,000 in round figures during the year 2002.
The airport has an average daily traffic about 500 operations, 90% of which occur in
runways 09L and 09R. The airport typical aircraft fleet is classified in the Chapter 3 of the
ICAO Annex 16 (IAC, 1998).
5. AIRCRAFT NOISE PERCEPTION AT THE AISP/GRU
This part of this paver is devoted to study aircraft noise perception in the vicinity of
the Aeroporto Internacional de S_o Paulo (AISP/GRU). Initially, it is described the research
methodology employed in this study. Afterwards, results are presented and analyzed.
5.1 Research Methodology
The idea is to study the aeronautical noise perception, focusing the relationship
between aircraft noise perception and social class, which is expected to be positive. The
problem that arises in this study is that the noise perception is intangible, difficult to
quantify,. Therefore, it is necessary, to find a variable that expresses noise perception in a
quantifiable way. Thus, this study chose the variable, developed by Eller (2000), which is
the losses of value of the residential properties, caused by aeronautical noise as a "measure"
of the perceived noise discomfort. The variable social class was measured utilizing the
average per capita income of the people who live nearby the airport.
It is interesting to comprehend the methodology utilized by Eller (2000) to asses the
impact of aircraft noise on property values, assuming that such impact is closely related to
the subjective noise perception variable. Thus, it is necessary to point out that the author's
methodology was based on the ideas exposed by Frankel Marvin in a study carried out in
1991, where he interviewed real state developers in order to get the "real" market values.
According to Marvin, the sample composition is important, and he recommends that
qualified professionals, who have relevant market information, must be chosen to be
interviewed °. Thus, Eller's research developed questionnaires, in order to interview real
state developers, who worked in the Cnmnflhos city area4.
Eller's study focused uniquely on the value losses of residential properties, because
it was considered that noise impact is perceived in a different way by owners of
commercial and residential properties. This differentiated perception can be explained by
the fact that commercial properties axe, in general, occupied during day light hours only 5.
The variable property value losses, chosen as a proxy of aircraft noise perception,
was related to a variable that expresses social class. The social class variable requires also
the choice of a "proxy" measure. Thus, this study chose the average per capita income as an
3Additionally, the use of a sample of real state professional is considered to be appropriate due to the fact that
other methods of assessing properties values -like researching official statistics or interviewing the properties
owners - could fail to estimate these values, because they can incorlxn_te other factors, not necessarily
related to the airport influence (e. g., cemeteries, schools, highways and personal impression.)
4 Eller's research developed Non Personal interviews made by means of questionnaires sheets, sent by postal
shipmenL This method is considered appropriatexi by Brcen & Blankenship (1991), who recommendcxi that
the research universe should be homogeneous and small, as well as, the subject of investigation should be
presented, in an identical and simple way, to all the interviewed people. It has to be pomted out that the
method chosen by Eller allowed to previously identify the entire interviewed public, as well as to know in
advance their postal addresses.
5Two factors that recommend the commercial properties exclusion from the sample refer, on one hand, to the
fact that this type of property have a functional noise background that minimize the perception of the
environmental noise, along with the fact that it can be easily insulated acoustically. The other factor that
supports its exclusion is the expectation of oversized market values for commercial properties, due to their
closeness to the airport area (this situation would typically affect business related to airport activities, like
warehouses).
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expression of social class. It could be argued that this variable is not the best to assess
economic and social welfare, because those are elusive factors 6. Despite these factors, this
study assumes that average per capita income of the population who live nearby the airport
is an appropriated measure of social class. There were utilized four social classes, based on
published data.
It was necessary to remember that, amog the questionaires properly answered, there
was not any of them that pointed out losses in property value from regions which average
per capita income below the average of the city. It is explained by the fact that the poor
regions of the city are located out of the aircraft noise impacted area, as it was already
shown.
5.2 Results Analysis
The results 7 obtained by Eller (2000) were separated by property's value losses
intensity, and for region. Thus, it was possible to associate each real state business region
with its property's value losses intensity s. Afterwards, it was identified average per capita
income for each real state business region. Therefore, it was possible to associate value
losses intensity with social classes, as shown in Table 1.
Ta!,le 1: Properties market losses due to aircraft noise related to the average per capita
AVERAGE PROPERTIES MARKET LOSSES
PER CAPITA BELOW BETWEEN BETWEEN HIGHER
INCOME 10% 11 AND 20% 21 AND 30% THAN 30%
0Reais)
500-1000 0 50 50 0
1000-2000 0 33 35 32
2000-3000 0 33 25 42
>3000 6 30 23 41
income
6 It could be argued that economic and social welfare could be better expressed by a measure of the income
purchasing power, however, due to the data scarcity this study chose a simple measure. Another variable that
could be used is the educational level of people living nearby the airport, because there is a close relation
between social class and human capital accumulated, but the data is not sufficiently discriminated.
In this study, the results selected, corresponding to 99% of the responses, showed market losses above 11%.
SAll the real state market regions were identified and, after that, the corresponding average per capita income
of each region was found.
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Consideringthatthe "really" poor people do not live nearby the most noise-affected
area, the lowest level of income selected was R$ 500 (five hundred Reais) per month,
which is equal to the average income of the Guarulhos City.
The sample was classified in four income classes, and the people belonging to each
social class was separated utilizing the noise perception criterion, as shown in Table 1.
There, it can be observed that all social classes had losses of value estimated to be above
11% of the market value of a similar residential property located in an area not affected by
noise. Moreover, between half and two thirds of the people, classified in each social class,
had residential value losses greater than 20% of the market value of similar houses, located
in a noise-free area. In fact, for income levels above R$1000, around 67% of the income
level sample group declares residential value losses of more than 20%. It is interesting to
note that people classified into the lowest income class registered substantial losses of value
in their residential properties. However, as expected, the highest income class had more
residential properties losses, indicating that their noise perception was greater.
Table 1, also, shows that for the lower noise perception level, there were reported
only 6% of the sample groups earning above 3000. Another interesting feature of the
sample is that people classified into the lowest income class registered intermediate levels
of noise perception, as approximated by the range of residential value losses between 11%
and 30%.
Also, it is possible to observe, in the second column of Table 1, that all social classes
earning above R$1000 registered around a third of the group sample on the intermediate
noise perception levels, reporting properties market losses between 11% and 20%. On the
other hand, for the subsequent intermediate noise perception level, it was observed that the
proportion of the sample that reports between 21% and 30% declines as income increases.
However, as expected, for the higher noise perception level, the proportion of people
affected, in each social class, increases as income increase.
Additionally, it is possible to look at Table 1 from a diagonal perspective, so as to
allow both noise perception and social level to increase. Thus, it is observed that higher
income levels reported a substantial proportion of people (around 40%) very much affected
by aircraft noise. As commented above, results for one of the intermediate levels, again, do
not follow the expected pattern. However, observing results for social classes that earn
more than R$1000 and comparing both the more susceptible group and the lower
intermediate level, it can be clearly perceived a positive relationship between noise
perception and income class.
Thus, it was observed that the lowest income class registered substantial losses of
value in their residential properties. Also, as expected, it was observed that the higher
income class had proportionally more reports of residential properties losses, indicating that
their noise perception was greater. Thus, the comparison of both, the lowest and the highest
social class suggests that the relationship between social class and noise perception is
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positive in the AISP region. However,since part of the sample, reflecting one of the
intermediate noise perception levels, did not behave as expected, it is recommended to
pursue this study, in order to better support the conclusion that social class determines
aircraft noise perception. Additionally, an important result obtained by this study is the fact
that all social classes are very susceptible to aircraft noise annoyance. In fact, the
magnitude of the noise perception proxy for both social classes -the residential value
losses- was found to be comparable to levels encountered in developed countries.
Thus, the results obtained in this study highlighted the change on the behavioral
pattern, since both, the lower and the upper, social classes perceived noise as a serious
problem. These modifications on perception could be attributed to a change on social
preferences caused by the emergence of new global vision of what is a good quality of life.
6. ENVIRONMENT AWARENESS AND AIIRPORT SUSTAINABILITY
This part of this paper is devoted to study the evolution of environmental awareness
over time, as supported by the new information and knowledge economy, and its expected
impacts on the AISP/GRU expansion plans.
6.1 Expected AISP/GRU Growth
As mentioned above, the AISP/GRU, the biggest airport of South America, was
inaugurated in January 20 th, 1985 and has two parallel runaways. According to Infraero
(Apud Lorenzo, 2003, 44), these two runways support around 14 million passengers
annually.
Table 2 shows that airport has already reached its full planned traffic capacity. Thus,
it is expected an airport expansion, as was planned by the Infi'aero Director Plan 9.
Table 2: Annual Movements of Passengers (embarqued + disembarqued) at the AISP/GRU
YEAR TOTAL
1995 10.704.421
1996 14.032.208
1997 14.407.036
Font: IAC (Apud Loren¢o, 2003, 44)
In fact, nowadays there is a project to build the 3rd runway. This runway is planned
to allow movements of 12 million passengers annually. Thus, the AISP/GRU full capacity
will reach 26 million passenger movements per year.
Lorengo (2003) estimated that the AISP would reach full capacity of the three
runways close to 2014. Thus, table 3 shows his estimates, which were based on other
Brazilian studies, focused on projecting the airport capacity demand, under alternative
scenarios. There were chosen two year bases in order to avoid any abnormal situation.
9Inf_ero is a government agency responsible for Brazilian airports management.
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Table 3: Alternative Scenarios for Annual Movements of Passengers at the AISP/GRU
SCENARY PROJECTED
DEMAND
26.034.000
YEAR
(Base: 2002)
2014
YEAR
(Base: 2000)
2012
IAC - Pessimistic 26.727.000 2015 2013
, PDDT - Pessimistic 26.315.000 2014 2013
i
Font: Loren_ (2003, 50)
The relevant aspect of this discussion is that in the next decade the AISP/GRU will
duplicate its capacity in around one decade, and that situation will have a very important
impact on the environment.
6.2 Preferences Changes And Environmental Awareness
Airports managers have to be prepared to face an increasing social demand for
reducing environmental problems, specifically the aviation noise annoyance. That change
in social demand could be the attributed to the emergence of a more susceptible
environmental awareness, in large part became of the changing preferences in a global
scale. Such changes favor human quality of life and a sustainable economic development,
in order to preserve resources endowments for future generations. Thus, these new set of
social and economic preferences configures itself in a new paradigm 1°, because it brings
new values -and perceptions about what is acceptable, about what brings welfare.
This paradigmatic change in human preferences could be attributed to the important spaces
opened in economic life of modem societies, by the ecological movements that initiated
during the 70's. According to Mol (1999), the old radical movements have transformed into
institutionalized movements, which have a saying in economic decisions that affect
environment. Mol calls this process of ecological modernization.
The ecological modernization brought about the institutionalization of
environmental regulation and control. Thus, they participate in environmental negotiations
and obviously have left behind their radical positions, accepting some environmental losses
in exchange for ecological advances, when internalization costs were too heavy.
Ecological movements have contributed to create a new ecological conscience all
around the world. In fact, the global emergence of environmental awareness was expressed
in the World Submit of Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The idea was to define an agenda in order to
avoid ecological risks and environmental deterioration. Thus, this first meeting can be seen
as the foundation of a world movement that supports the preservation and recuperation of
the environment.
It is necessary to point out that the perception of noise annoyance may have grown
as a result of the increasing environmental awareness. Thus, these considerations may shed
l°Paradigm can be defined as the set of values that defines the perception and the vision of the world (Capra,
1982).
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a light on the results obtained in this study, which showed that noise perception intensity
was not differentiated by social class. In fact, both the higher and the lower income classes
perceived aircraft noise as a negative externality.
6.3 The Knowledge Economy and Environment
The growing importance of environmental factors in determining human
preferences and welfare standards might be credited in large measure to the information
and communication technology innovations implemented during the 90's, in a worldly
scale. In fact, in this period the world became connected by a digital web, which allowed to
accessing the flows of information and knowledge created around the world.
These new communication technologies had a very important impact on the rate of
innovation generation and adoption by the productive sector of the economy. The access to
enormous flows of new knowledge contributes itself to generate new ideas, new
knowledge. In fact, this times are inaugurating a new economic paradigm, where the main
factor in the production function is new knowledge, which itself helps to generate the most
valuable type of products -knowledge-intensive goods and services.
Some of these innovations could alleviate environmental problems, such as the
developments of less noisy aircrafts turbines. These innovations might be the result of
changing world preferences toward higher standards of life. One indication of the
importance of these social pressures in molding entrepreneur's decisions could be found in
the NASA strategic planning for the next 25 years. Thus, in the strategic goals roadmaps
developed by Nasa, the third goal that guides their long run investment decisions is noise
reduction. Specifically, the goal is to reduce the perceived noise levels of future aircraft by
1/2 (10dB) from today's subsonic aircraft within 10 years, and by 3/4 (20dB) within 25
years. Consequently, efforts will be devoted to develop technology to reduce community
noise impact (www.nasa.gov).
Another side-effect of the new information and communication infra-stmcture that
links the world is the fantastic access to information and knowledge it provides. This access
creates conditions for expanding people's awareness of social, political, economic and
ecological problems. Under these circumstances, the civil sector can be mobilized by Non
Government Organizations in order to fight for their rights or their welfare.
The growing expansion of the third sector could be seen as a result of the strengthen
communication web, which reduced enormously the costs of informing and contacting
people. As an example of this potential for people mobilization created by today's
technologies, it can be pointed out the case of pacifists movements that have spurred all
around the world recently.
As pointed out above, noise perception intensity is considered to be related to
quality of life expectation, which is highly influenced by people's information/education
level. In the case of AISP/GRU, which is located in a region, where people have more
access to information because of their presence in the political and classes fight, the social
demand for quality of life is expected to be stronger, even from people with low income. In
these circumstances, results obtained in this study support the recommendation that
government and airport authorities change the idea that poor people are less sensitive to
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annoyance.Nowadays,as a result of higher access to information, the social demand for
welfare is expected to increase, with the consequent development of a new relationship
between airport and society.
6.4 The AISP/GRU Sustainable Growth
The emergence of new environment preferences supported by strengthen Non
Government Organizations could be seen as a signal that airports managers would be, more
and more, required to face pressmes to reduce environmental externalities, which would
require the adoption ofmeasm'es that would increase airports costs.
Under this scenario, the AISP/GRU growth plan would be very much attacked by
social and ecological movements, because it would worsen the already critical aircraft noise
perception problem. Moreover, as the airport expands to double its current capacity, also
the urban demographic density will increase in the regions nearby the airport. Thus, it can
be expected that the perception of noise discomfort would become so relevant that may
initiate social and political pressures that may limit AISP/GRU expansion. In fact, airport
growth has to be sustainable in the long-tam 11, so as to preserve environment. Under these
circumstances, airport managers would have to deal with the internalization of the noise
negative externality. That situation, besides increasing airport costs, would reduce its rate
of growth because the social optimum airport capacity is below the private one.
This scenario could be attenuated by the expected technological advances devoted
to aircraft noise reduetiom However, airport expansion strategic planning can not omit
environmental issues. In fact, as it can be foresighted that the social change is for the
internalization of environmental problems, managers have to be prepared to deal with the
expected increase in the air transport sector costs.
_ _.,LNL[IN_ (kJ.J[_ JLJLI.I._J_JLJL(k,(_L_U,I_A UJ J_UJG[Nb'_IJt Ik._qlJP_L._4&UiyJt.L#iJ.I.J._I._l.t.JLV_ LImJLt,,,P(k,l.k,_'_,m._tV*.II_Ik._r Ibm._#_k,6.mt
with specific environmental problems may not avoid future social demands that might
impair airport growth. Thus, it is suggested the development of a managerial program for
dealing with environmental problems at the AISP/GRU.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The last decade was characterized by the emergence of worldwide webs that linked
the world and allowed to accessing enormous flows of information and knowledge. Under
these circumstances, citizens of the world are more conscious of the serious implications of
neglecting environmental impacts on the world ecology sustainability. As a result, during
the last years, a new approach toward these problems has resulted in social pressures to
develop regulation and to implement measures designed to mitigate/control environmental
damages on social and economic welfare, caused by economics activities. This situation
demands that airport managers and aeronautical engineers take into account possible
environmental negative impacts, when they develop airport expansion projects. Moreover,
]] Sustainable growth is the kind of growth that is compatible with the preservation of the ecology and of the
resource endowments for the use of future generations. In other words, sustainable economic growth does not
compromise future generation's economic growth (Seroa da Motta, 1997). In this case, sustainable growth is
associated to the microeconomic growth decisions that are compatible with social demands for the
preservation and recuperation of the environment, in the long-run. Under these circumstances, firm's
economic growth decisions do not con_romise the long-rim expansion path of the firm.
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it is expectedthat managersdevelopa more systemicview of the relationships between
airport and society.
In this context, the main objective of this paper was to contribute to the
understanding of environmental problems in the Brazilian air transport sector. In this
context, this study analyzed aeronautical noise perception in the neighborhoods of the
Aeroporto Intemacional de S_o Paulo - AISP (the biggest airport of South America).
Specifically, it focused on the relationship between aircraft noise perception and social
class, which was expected to be positive.
This work contributed to show that Brazilian preferences support the reduction of
environmental negative impacts, caused by aircraft noise. Thus, it was observed that the
lowest income class registered substantial losses of value in their residential properties. As
expected, the higher income class had more residential properties losses, indicating that
their noise perception was greater. Thus, the comparison of both, the lowest and the highest
social class suggests that the relationship between social class and noise perception is
positive in the AISP region. However, since part of the sample, reflecting one of the
intermediate noise perception levels, did not behave as expected, it is recommended to
pursue this study, in order to better support the conclusion that social class determines
aircraft noise perception. Additionally, an important result obtained by this study is the fact
that all social classes are very susceptible to aircraft noise annoyance. In fact, the
magnitude of the noise perception proxy for both social classes -the residential value
losses- was found to be comparable to levels encountered in developed countries.
Moreover, this paper highlighted the aviation noise problem taken into account a
scenario where the airport capacity may duplicate in the next 20 years. This scenario was
analyzed taken into account also the paradigmatic change on environmental awareness that
has emerged all over the world. Thus, social and economic preferences favor human quality
of life and a sustainable growth, in order to preserve resources endowments and quality of
life for future generations. Therefore, it can be foresighted that the social change is for the
internalization of environmental problems, with the expected increase in the air transport
sector costs.
Under these circumstances, airport expansion strategic planning can not omit
environmental issues. Moreover, the recommendation is for the development of a
managerial program, capable of dealing with environment problems in a systemic way, so
as to allow a sustainable airport growth in the long run.
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Abstract
Delay in the air transport occurs when passengers, baggage or cargo do not arrive at
their destination at the time indicated in the contract of carriage. The causes of delay in
the carriage of passengers are booking en_rs or double booking, delayed departure of
aircraft, incorrect information regarding the time of departure, failure to land at the
scheduled destination and changes in flight schedule or addition of extra landing stops.
r_l_v., _-_ /he carriage of baggage or cargo may have _._%'n_ *.ca_es: no _ser,.,afion,
lack of space, failure to load the baggage on board, loading baggage on the wrong plane,
failure to off-load the baggage or cargo at the right place, or to deliver the covering
documents at the right place.
The Montreal Convention of 1999 Article 19 provides that 'The carrier is liable for
damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo.
Nevertheless, the carder shall not be liable for damage occasioned by delay if it proves
that it and its servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to
avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures'.
The Montreal Convention Article 22 provides liability limits of the carder in case of
delay for passengers and their baggage and for cargo. In the carriage of persons, the
liability of the carrier for each passenger is limited to 4,150 SDR. In the carriage of
baggage, the liability of the carrier is limited to 1,000 SDR for each passenger unless a
special declaration as to the value of the baggage has been made. In the carriage of
cargo, the liability of the carrier is limited to 17 SDR per kilogram unless a special
declaration as to the value of the cargo has been made.
The Montreal Convention Article 19 has shortcomings: it is silent on the duration of
theliability for carriage,andit does not make any distinction between persons and good.
It does not give any indication concerning the circumstances to be taken into account in
cases of delay, and about the length of delay. In conclusion, it is desirable to define the
period of carriage with accuracy, and to insert the word 'unreasonable' in Article 19.
Key Words: Air carrier, Liability for delay, Warsaw Convention, Montreal Convention,
Limit of liability, Overbooking, Conditions of carriage
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I.Introduction
Since 1929, air carriers have been carrying passengers, baggage and
cargo on the basis of an aviation liability system which originated in the
Warsaw Convention.
This system is about to change. In 1999, ICA0 organized a diplomatic
conference in Montreal, which agreed on the adoption of a new
....... +;,-,- call,=a _h,_ l_&,n_,-,_ai Cnnv_ntinn of 1999= This new convention
is designed to replace the Warsaw Convention and all the amendments
thereto so as to create a uniform aviation liability system. Its structure
and provisions are based upon those of the Warsaw- Convention, as
amend, and other international agreement.
The Montreal Convention of 1999 with 29 ratifications as at April 2003,
is expected to enter into force in 2003 upon the 30 th ratification 1.
Considering that the air carrier's customer has chosen the carriage by
air because of its speed and to save time, Article 19 of the Warsaw
Convention and the Montreal Convention declares the carrier is liable for
damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers,
baggage or cargo.
destination at the time stipulated in the contract of carriage. The causes
of delay in the carriage of passengers may be booking errors or double
bookings, delayed departure of aircraft,incorrect information given to
passengers regarding the time of departure, failure to land at the
scheduled destination, and changes in the flightschedule or addition of
extra land stops.
However, delay in the carriage of baggage or cargo may occur due to
different causes, e. g. no reservation, lack of space, failure to load the
baggage on board, loading baggage on the wrong plane, failure to off-
load the baggage or cargo at the right place, or to deliver the covering
documents at the right place 2.
1 Article 53(6) of the Montreal Convention provides that this Convention shall enter
force on the sixtieth day following the date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Deposita_, between the States
which have deposited such instrument.
2 I. H. Ph. Diederiks Verschoor, "The liability for Delay in Air Transport", A/r & Space
Law, VolumeXXVI, Number6, November 2001, Kluwer Law International, p.300.
The Warsaw Convention does not provide a special limit of the
carrier's liability for delay in the carriage of passengers, baggage or
cargo, while the Montreal Convention of 1999 fixes a special limit of the
liability for delay.
This paper intends to describe the liability regime of the carrier for
delay in the international air transport under the Warsaw Convention and
the Montreal Convention, comparing the differences between them. Also
this paper deals with the issues of the Convention and conditions of
carriage which are relevant for the liability of the air carrier for relay.
II. Causes of Flight Delays
As shown in Table 1 'the statistics of flight delays by airport of 2002"
reported by the Korea Airports Authority, 3 the causes of delays of
international flights in Korean airports are composed of weather, aircraft
connection, aircraft maintenance, passenger processing, multiple causes,
and others.
In this statistics of flight delays, standard for delay of international
flight refers to delay of more than one hour, and multiple causes refer to
the compound of aircraft connection, passenger connection, passenger
processing, and ground waiting, and others refer to passenger connection,
ground handling, runway, air traffic control, ground waiting, and aviation
security, and weather refers to fog, snow, rain and others.
Among the causes of total delays of international flights in Korean
airports, the ratio of delayed flights due to aircraft connection compared
to the total international flights is 1.29% which is the biggest specific
gravity, and the ratio of delays due to weather is 0.36%, the ratio of
delays due to aircraft maintenance is 0.33%, the ratio of delays due to
passenger processing is 0.05%, and the ratio of delays due to multiple
causes is 0.001%, and the ratio of delays due to other causes is 0.40%.
Particularly, in Incheon International Airport opened on March 29, 2001,
as hub airport in Korea, the ratio of delays due to weather is 0.31%, and
the ratio of delays due to aircraft connection is 1.29%, and the ratio of
delays due to aircraft maintenance is 0.34%, and the ratio of delays due
to passenger processing is 0.05%, and the ratio of delays due to other
3 Korea Airports Authority, Airport Traffic Report 2002: http://www.airport.co.kr
causes is 0.45%.
<Table 1> International Flight Delays by Airport in Korea
2002. 1-2002. 12
Note: Excludes unscheduled and cargo flights.
Source: Korea Airports Corporation, A/rport Traffic Report 2002:
http://w_w¢.airport.co.kr
Ill. Meaning of 'Delay in the Carriage by Air'
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Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention
states that the carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the
carriage by air. However, the Convention provides no definition of delay.
Speed is an essential part of the carriage by air. In case of delay the
carrier is liable according to the Convention, but according to case law
and jurisprudence the delay must be 'unreasonable'.
The question of what is to be considered as 'unreasonable' delay will
Aircraft Right Aircraft Passenger Multipule
Weather Other Total
Movements Connection Maintenance Processing_ Causes ,
I
97,045 309 1,257 335 54 0 442 i 2,397
, , i i
11,764 70 123 I 30 2 1 5 1231,
I
2,131 8 24 2 0 0 2 i 36
1,489 10 44 8 1 1 4 68
565 3 7 1 0 0 0 11
511 9 17 2 0 0 9 37
12 0 1 0 1 0 0 2I
I
Total 113,517 r 409 1,473 378 58 2 462 2,782
I
depend on all sorts of circumstances, e.g. the distance of carriage, the
manner in which the transportation is carried out, the weather conditions,
5
the season, the availability of other means of transport, etc. 4
It is submitted that under the common law, in the absence of any
express contract, the carrier is only bound to perform the carriage within
a reasonable time having regard to all the circumstances of the case;
accordingly, delay means failure to complete the carriage in a reasonable
time.5
This rule, found in the cases on the carriage by land and sea, was
applied to the carriage by air in Panalpina International Transport Ltd. v.
Densil Underwear Ltd. 6 In the case the court, stressing that air transport
is used because of its speed, held that a delay in the delivery of cargo to
Nigeria, from 2 December to 21 December, leading to the loss of
Christmas trade, was in the circumstances an undue and unreasonably
delay. 7
Several interpretations can be attributed to the phrase of 'delay in the
carriage by air'. It can mean: (a) that the delay must occur whilst
passengers, baggage or cargo are airborne, or (b) that 'carriage by air' in
Article 19 must be read together with Article 18(2) which defines the
period of liability for loss of, or damage to, any checked baggage or any
goods, or(c) that liability for delay exists whenever passengers or goods
do not arrive on time at the point of destination, s
The first and third interpretation have been rejected by the courts in
several jurisdictions, while a number of cases have favored the second
interpretation. 9 The courts have used the definition of 'carriage by air' in
Article 18(2) to ascertain whether the delay had occurred during that
period.
Article 18(2) defines the period of carriage by air of checked baggage
or cargo as 'the period during which the baggage or cargo is in charge of
4 I. H. Ph. Diederiks Verschoor, supra note 2, p.301.
s Shawcross & Beamont, Air Law, Fourth Edition, Volume 1, Butterworth & Co (Pub-
lishers) Ltd., 1989, para. 192-193.
6 [198111 Lloyd's Rep(QBD); Shawcross & Beamont, supra note 4, para. 192-193.
7 Ibid.
8 Georgette Miller, Liability in International Air Transport, Kluwer Law and Taxation
Publishers, 1977, p.158.
9 Bart v. British West Indian Airways, Ltd., 2311967] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 239(Guyana Ct.
App. 1966); Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 10a, 541 Supp1388(WD Pa, 1982),
17 Avi 17,723.
the carrier, whether in an airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the case
of a landing outside an airport, in any place whatever'; but the period
does not extend to any carriage by land, sea or river performed outside
an airport (Article 18(3)). This period includes time after the arrival of
goods at the airport of destination.
The application of Article 18(2) to delay solves the problem for the
carriage of baggage and cargo, but not for the carriage of passengers. It
has been advocated that the delay in passenger cases should be
ascertained by reference to Article 17, which defines the period of
liability for the carriage of passengers.1°
Article 17 does not expressly define the period of carriage by air of
passengers, but refer to an equivalent period, referring to accidents
taking place 'on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking.
It is submitted that 'delay in the carriage by air' in Article 19 means
delay during the period mentioned in Article 17 in the case of passengers,
and means delay during the period mentioned Article 18 in the case of
checked baggage or cargo, n
1. Limit of Carrier's Liability for Delay
The Warsaw Convention provides no special limit of the carrier's
liability for delay in the carriage of passengers, baggage or cargo. So the
same limit applies where the liability is based on delay as applies in
cases of death or injury, and of loss or damage. 12 However, the Montreal
Convention provides explicitly the limit of the carrier's liability for delay
in Article 22: In the carriage of persons, the liability of the carrier for
each passenger is limited to 4,150 SDR; In the carriage of baggage, the
liability of the carrier is limited to 1,000 SDR for each passenger unless
the passenger has made a special declaration of interest in delivery at
10 Georgette Miller, supra note 7, p.159.
n Shawcross & Beaumont, supra note 4, para.191.
_2 Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention provides that : in the carriage of passengers the
liability for each passenger is limited to 125,000 francs(8,300SDR); in the carriage of
checked baggage and cargo the liability is limited 250 francs(17SDR)per kilogram; in
the unchecked baggage the liability is limited to 5,000 francs(332SDR).
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destination and has paid a supplementary sum; In the carriage of cargo,
the liability of the carrier is limited to 17 SDR per kilogram unless the
consignor has made a special declaration of interest in delivery at
destination and has paid a supplementary sum.
Under Article 22(5) of the Montreal Convention, the foregoing limit of
the liability for delay in the carriage of persons and baggage does not
apply if it is proved that the damage by delay resulted from an act or
omission of the carrier, its servants or agents, done with intent to cause
damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably
result.
The carrier is liable without limitation for delay of baggage when his
employer had specifically informed the passenger that his baggage was
on board the aircraft while it had been removed therefrom and was
delivered after the passenger had returned to his home at the end of the
holiday, the misinformation having been given deliberately and
recklessly. 13
In Oddvin Lokken v. Federal Express Corporation 14 the court has held
that an air carrier's failure to timely delivery an international shipment
did not, without more, constitute willful misconduct under the terms of
the Warsaw Convention. The shipper presented no evidence beyond
speculation and conclusive assertions that would permit a jury to
reasonably conclude that the carrier's failure to deliver the package
resulted from willful misconduct. Consequently, the Convention governed
the claim and limited the carrier's liability.
2. Exoneration of Carrier's Liability
The carrier is not liable for damage occasioned by delay if it proves
that it and its servants and agents took all measures that could
reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that was impossible for it
or them to take such measures under Article 19 of the Montreal
Convention.
13 Florida Court of Appeals, 3rd District, Compania de Aviation Faucett v. Mulford, 29
July 1980:15 Avi 18,358.
14 U. S. District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 99 Cir. 0585(THK), 16
February 2000:27 Avi 17, 596.
The only way in which the carrier can be relieved of liability is to
prove that he has taken all necessary measures to avoid the delay, or
that it was impossible for him to take such measures. It is not enough for
the carrier to prove that after the cause of delay had occurred,
everything possible was done to minimize the damage. The carrier must
prove that there was no negligence in the occurrence of the delay itself.
If the delay is caused before departure or after arrival by a through
and lengthy inspection of the aircraft by the customs authorities, the
carrier can not be held responsible. As the customs authority is not a
servant or agent of the carrier, he can not take measures to avoid
damage by delay. 15
The carrier was held liable when part of the cargo arrived 17 days late
and the carrier did not prove that he had diligently tried to have the
goods carried on another aircraft or by another airline: "considering that
there exist many direct and indirect aerial links between Paris and
Teheran, he has manifestly acted negligently and with complete
disregard of his duties under the contract of carriage'J s
If the carrier proves that the damage by delay was caused or
contributed to by the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the
person cl_iming compensation, or the person from whom he derives his
rights, the carrier shall be wholly or partly exonerated from its liability to
the claimant to the extent that such negligence or wrongful act or
omission caused or contributed to the damage under Article 20 of the
Montreal Convention.
Once the existence of damage due to delay is proved, the carrier is
presumed to be liable on the basis of Article 19. The carrier can only
escape by showing that he took the necessary measures to avoid the
damage, or that it was impossible to take such measures, or that the
damage was due to the contributor3., negligence of the injured person.
3. Carrier's Liability for Delay due to Overbooking.
is Landgericht Frankfurt am Main, 14 November 1990; ZLW, 1991, p.188; Transp R,
1991, p. 146; AirLaw, Vol. XVI, 1991, p. 142; I. H. Ph. Diederiks Verschoor, supra note
2, p. 306.
is Court of Appeals, Paris, Iran Air v. Societe generale de Geophysique, 14 November
1974:1975 RFDA 60 ; Rene H. Mankiewicz, The Liability Regime of the International
Air Carrier, Kluwer Law and Taxation Pubilishers, 1981, p.193.
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Many airlines adopt the practice of overbooking flights to counter act
'no shows': passengers with bookings but who do not present themselves,
so as to maximize seat-occupancy and to minimize the loss of revenue
they would otherwise suffer. 17 Overbooking is one of the causes of delay,
and it has become a rather common occurrence in the airline business
these days.
The U.S. Courts have held that the carrier is liable for delay of an
overbooked passenger, because his refusal to issue a boarding pass was
in open violation of the carrier's own priority rules with respect to
embarkation of overbooked passengers. 18
A German court has held that the carrier is liable for any delay caused
by his refusal to permit embarkation on the flight on which the passenger
held a confirmed seat, whether the flight was overbooked or not. 19
In Carmia Fields v. Bwia International Airways Limited 2o a claim for
emotional injuries by a passenger who was denied boarding on an
international flight to attend her father's funeral was preempted by the
Warsaw Convention. The passenger asserted that the Convention was
inapplicable because her claim arose the carrier's nonperformance of a
contractual obligation. However, the carrier performed its obligations
under the contract for carriage when it transported the passenger to her
destination on later flight. Consequently, the Convention governed the
claim because it arose from delayed transportation. Since the passenger
alleged no physical injury or pecuniary loss as required for recovery
under the Convention, the claim was barred.
The compensation on account of overbooking has been regulated in the
EC and the U.S.A. In the U.S.A. the CAB laid down some rules, which
were one of the sources for the later European Community rules to be
based on. 21
17 Shawcross & Beamont, supra note 4, para. 198.1.
is United States Supreme Court, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 7 June 1796:14 Avi 17,
148; U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Karp v. North Central Air Lines, 31 August
1978:15 Avi 17, 355.
19 Tribunal, Dusseldorf, 3 February 1971: ZLW 290, 293; Rene H. Mankiewicz, supra
note 16, p.191.
2o U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, No. 99-CV-2493(JG), 7 July 2000:
27 Avi 17,933.
21 I. H. Ph. Diederiks Verschoor, supra note 2, pp. 303-304.
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The EC rules issued on 4 February 1991 provide that: 'EC passengers
are entitled to a certain sum to be paid by the air carrier in case of
overbooking, a part from an additional to any compensation for damage
caused by the ensuing delay'. In case of flights of 3,500 kilometers or
under the amount set at ECU 150, for longer flights at ECU 300. These
amounts are halved if the passenger is offered alternative transportation
enabling him to arrive with a delay of no more two hours in respect of his
original tLm..e of arri_.'va!, or four hours in case of flights of more than 3,500
kilometers. 22
Towards the end of December 2001 the European Commission put
forward a proposal for a regulation establishing common rules on
compensation and assistance to air passenger in the event of denied
boarding, cancellation and long delay of flights. 2a
Briefly, the proposal would extend rights given to passengers by the
current regulation on denied boarding (Council Regulation 295/91) by
imposing an obligation on airlines to call for volunteers in exchange for
agreed benefits and increasing compensation some five times to 1_ 750 for
short-haul flights and t_ 1,500 for long-haul flights. It would also create
similar fights and obligations in respect of cancellation of flights
,:,-_w1_e than L ....... of ....... :---_ -: ............ _-..... -_ *"-
....... Ut_t.d U _ _tf t'AL:t_'_tlUIId! ,. ;t L _:;_t_i:t..,-:.,'_. _$-,-_._,.$11u tiL_
airline's responsibility. Further, it would entitle passengers subject to
long delays (i. e. of two or more in the case of short-haul flights and four
hours or more in the case of long-haul flights) to choose between an
alternative flight and reimbursement, and to special assistance in the
case of disabled passengers, z4
4. Timely Notice of Complaints
Under Article 31 of the Montreal Convention, in the case of delay, the
complaint must be made at the latest within twenty-one days from the
date on which the baggage or cargo have been placed at his disposal.
Every complaint must be made in writing and given or dispatched within
22 Council Regulation No. 295/91; B.J.H. Crans and E.M.H. Loozen, "EC .Aviation Scene",
A/r La_,, Vol. XVI, 1991, Kluwer Law International, pp. 178-194.
_30J No. C-103/E225, 30 April 2002.
2, John Balfour, "EC Aviation Scene(Nol:2002)', Air & Space Law, Volume XXVII,
Number 4/5, September 2002, Kluwer Law International, p.250.
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the times aforesaid. If no complaint is made within the times aforesaid,
no action shall lie against the carrier, save in the case of fraud on its part.
In Oddvin Lokken v. Federal Express Corporation e5 a shipper's failure
to provide an air carrier with timely written notice of loss incurred due to
a delayed shipment warranted the dismissal of his claim under the terms
of the Warsaw Convention. The shipper's alleged timely verbal notice to
the carrier followed by a written notice delivered five months after the
shipment was made was insufficient to satisfy the Convention's
requirements. Accordingly, the shipper was barred from recovering
damages arising from the delayed delivery.
V. Effect of Conditions of Carriage Excluding Carrier's Liability for Delay
The Montreal Convention recognizes the freedom of the parties to
enter into a contract that may stipulate specific dates and times for the
carriage by air in Article 27, but provisions or general conditions of
carriage specifying conditions under which the carrier would be relieved
in whole or in part of liability for delay are null and void under Article 26
of Montreal Convention. 26
It is commonly provided in General Conditions of Carriage of the
airlines that 'the times shown in timetable or elsewhere are approximate
and not guaranteed and form no part of the contract of carriage, and
schedules are subject to change without notice and the carrier assumes
no responsibility for making connections'. 27
A clause in the carrier's tariff which limits compensation for delay to
the refund of the ticket price when the flight was cancelled for technical
reasons, is invalid and unenforceable because contrary to Article 19. 28
In Russell Jones v. Britannia Airways 29 the Judge of the County Court
ruled that the passenger rights under the provisions of the Warsaw
2s U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, No.99 Civ.0585(THK), 16
February 2000:27 Avi 17,596.
26 The Warsaw Convention Article 23 (1) and Article 33.
27 Korean Air Lines, General Conditions of Carriage for International Passenger, Article
11, Paragraph 1(1).
28 New York Civil Court, McMurray v. Capital Interational AJ'rways, 4 January 1980:15
Avi 18,087.
29 Case No. SH 714259, decision of 5 November 1998; Chester County Court, Judge
Barnett ; I. H. Ph. Diederiks Verschoor, supra note 2, p. 302.
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Convention, including Article 17 and 20, could not be limited by
exclusions in the carrier's conditions of carriage (Article 23) and that the
claimant was entitled to seek to prove his case under the provisions of
Article 19 on the carrier's liability for damage caused by delay; the
carrier would then have to prove (Article 20) that he did all he could to
prevent the damage. The General Conditions of Carriage as laid down by
the IATA expressly state that the times of departure and arrival do not
fo_--n part of the ^_--_- _* reference•.u,,ua_._ of carriage. In _,,.,_,_n,, ....... cases was
made by the carrier to its o_Tl genera] conditions of carriage for
passengers and baggage, including the 199] edition which had similar
conditions. This decision make it clear that all has to be done not only to
avoid delay but also to avoid damage. 3°
In Ets Peronny v. Ste EtMopin Airlines 31 the Paris Court of Appeal
ruled that a clause in the air waybill stipulating that no time was fixed for
the completion of the carriage, and that the carrier was authorized to
select, or deviate from the route or routes of shipment, was invalid
insofar as it related to cases where the performance of the air carriage
took a great deal longer than the normal time and was far in excess of
what the shipper could expect on the bases of his selection of that mode
! rl_
Conditions of Carriage dealing with delay is to exonerate the carrier for
cases of slight delay. In all cases where the delay is more than slight, the
exonerating provisions of the Conditions of Carriage are not allowed to
operate. The only way in which a carrier can be relieved of liability is to
prove that he has taken all necessary measures to avoid the delay, or
that it was impossible for him to take such measures, pursuant to Article
20(1) of the Warsaw Convention. 32
VI. Conclusion
The Montreal Convention Article 19 provides that the carrier is liable
for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers,
baggage or cargo. However, this provision has some shortcomings as
30 I. H. Ph. Diederiks Verschoor, supra note 2, p. 302.
31 (1975) 29 RFDA(C. A. Paris, 30 May 1975); Georgette Miller, supra note 7, p.155.
._2 Georgette Miller, supra note 7, p.155.
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follows33: it is silent on the duration on the liability for carriage, and it
does not make any distinction between persons and goods. It does not
give any indication concerning the circumstances to be taken into
account in cases of delay, and about the length of delay. Therefore, it is
desiable to define the period of carriage with accuracy, and to insert the
word 'unreasonable' in Article 19.
Although there will be no liability under Article 19 unless the delay is
such that the carrier does not perform the carriage in a reasonable time,
there may be liability under other provisions of the Convention. So if the
delay, even if not unreasonable, causes the destruction or loss of
checked baggage or cargo, there will prima facie be liability under
Article 17(2) and 18(1) of the Montreal Convention.
The Montreal Convention provides the limit of liability for delay for
passengers and their baggage and for cargo. The liability for delay of
passengers is limited to SDR 4,150 per passenger, but the carrier has the
defense of having taken all measures to avoid the delay. Baggage liability
is raised to a limit of SDR 1,000 per passenger for both checked and
unchecked baggage, while cargo liability is limited to an unbreakable
limit of SDR 17 per kilogram.
0verbooking has become a general airline practice, and delay due to
overbooking raises special problems. As overbooking is not a risk
characteristic of air transport, as delay is, it should not be dealt with
under the Convention, and the carrier can not rely on the terms of the
Convention to limit his liability.
Where the Montreal Convention applies, any provision in the
Conditions of Carriage tending to relieve the carrier of liability under the
Convention is void. If the effect of the Convention is to make the carrier
liable in cases of unreasonable delay, any contractual term seeking to
restrict or exclude that liability can not be upheld.
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Quantifying subjective aspects is a difficult task that requires a great dedication of time from
researchers and analysts. Nevertheless, one of the main objectives of it is to pave the way for a better
understanding of the focused aspects. Fleet standardization is one of these subjective aspects that is
extremely difficult to mm into numbers. Although, it is of great importance to know the benefits that
may come with a higher level of standardization for airlines, which may be economical advantages,
maintenance facilitation and others. A more standardized fleet may represent lower costs of
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This study presents the first step on developing an index, hereto called "'Fleet Standardization Index"
or FSI (or IPF in Portuguese, for "'Indice de Padroniza¢_o de Frotas"), that will allow senior airline
planners to compare different fleets and also simulate some results from maintaining or renewing
their fleets.
Although being a preliminary study, the results obtained may already be tested to compare different
fleets (different airlines) and also analyze some possible impacts of a fleet renewal before it takes
place. Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to introduce the proposed IPF index and to
demonstrate that it is inversely proportional to the number of different airplane models, engines and
other equipment, such as avionics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The need for standardization of the various items, equipment and characteristics of the aircraft
composing an airline's fleet is a very discussed issue among aviation specialists and also among
economists involved with the aviation industry. On the other hand, few studies have been done (or
publicized) on this subject, leaving the particularities of fleet standardization covered in a mist of
several complex issues that are poorly explored in the conventional literature.
In view of this, the primary objective of this paper is to start a broad analytical study and stimulate
further follow-on studies on airlines' fleet standardization (fleet commonality issues), while
considering the factors that influence this standardization and the benefits that can be granted from a
higher level of it. For this, an initial effort is made to quantify the level of standardization of a given
airline fleet, bringing both study and discussion from a subjective to an objective point of view.
Due to the somewhat pioneering characteristics found in the present study, the authors acknowledge
that errors may occur during the conception and development of the formulations and assumptions
herein made. For this, the authors welcome any contribution, suggestion and critics made on the
purpose of continuing and improving the present study, since the primary goal is to contribute
directly in the analysis and understanding of the challenging, complex and dynamic world of
strategic airline planning.
2 FLEET STANDARDIZATION - DEFINITIONS AND INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS
When mentioning "fleet standardization", the first common thought points to a fleet composed of
the same type of aircraft (i.e. from the same manufacturer and the very same model/variant) painted
in the same color scheme and aligned on the apron, just as seen in several airline ads. Through this
common view, having an Embraer ERJ-145 and an Airbus A319 in the same fleet means a great loss
of standardization, mainly due to the different manufacturer. Nevertheless, when going deeper into
the term of "fleet standardization", one should overcome the simple view of considering basic
aircrafl characteristics and incorporate engines, avionics, equipment, propellers, tooling and much
more in his or her analysis.
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This means that having several aircraft from different manufacturers or _om a single manufacturer
but of different variants may not pose a great deal, as long as these aircraft share the same engine
manufacturer, for instance. As an example, four different Boeing airplanes (i.e.: 737-700, 747-400,
767-300 and 777-200) can be equipped with powerplants from a single manufacturer, even being the
engines themselves different. Moreover, engines of the same family (using the same engine core)
can be installed in various types of aircraft, from different manufacturers. An example is the Pratt &
Whimey of Canada PT-6, used m the Cessna Caravan/Grand Caravan,. the Embraer Bandeirante and
the Bombardier (de Havilland) Twin Otter, just to mention a few.
In order to understand correctly the technical consideration of airline fleet standardization, we shall
refer to the basics parts of an ai_lane.
2.1 Aircraft parts and components
When asking a child about what an airplane is, the answer would probably be somewhere near of
"an airplane is a big vehicle that flies and has wings". Complementarily, aviation enthusiasts would
try to better distinguish the different parts of an airplane in their response on the same question,
stating that an airplane is made of wings, fuselage and engines. But for the purpose of this study we
shall refer to .L^.l_,.ia_s,,_,,u_a^'--=':--'_-- used "--lo,project and maintenance as the most appropriate, means m
describing an airplane, pointing that it is composed of a cell, an engine-propeller system (the
powerplant), avionics and other equipment.
The cell is what we could refer as being the "'hull" of the aircraft, meaning all _es, the hull
itself and assorted mechanical parts. It is important to notice that in this group, we will not include
any interior-related item such as seats, bins, galleys, etc. The cell alone does not fly, but it is
responsible for lift forces generation.
It is very common to consider the engine-propeller group and the engine alone the same item. In fact
this error occurs due to the variety of jet aircraft used nowadays, where the propeller simply does
not exist or does not make itself apparent. When mentioning the "'engine-propeller group", it will
only make sense for turboprop or other propeller-equiped airplane, where an engine (piston or jet) is
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responsible for rotating the propeller(s). The propulsion on jet aircraft is given entirely by the engine
(turbojet or turbofan). For the purpose of this study, we will refer it all as "powerplant".
The avionics group is the combination of all flight, engine and navigation instruments, together with
all the electronic equipment on board, essential for the various regimes of flight the airplane has
been certified. In this group we can mention the ADF, VOR and GPS as examples of navigation
avionics, the VHF and HF radios as communication avionics and the N1 (or EPR) indicator as an
example of engine-monitoring avionics.
Finally, the last group is the one that combines all other items and equipment of the aircraft. This
group is composed of so many different items that it can be referred as "others" without incurring in
a serious error. Listed in this group are seats, galleys, interior panels, tires, etc.
2.2 Aircraft cell standardization
We can consider as having the same cell all airplanes from a single family, such as the Boeing 737-
300/400/500, the 737-NG (-600/-700/-800/-900), the Airbus A318/319/320/321, and the Embraer
135/140/145. The differences between aircraft from a same family are usually few and usually relate
to their length, capacity and powerplant variants (mainly thrust). Their piloting procedures and the
maintenance procedures can be considered almost the same for simplification.. However, this
approach must be taken with caution: it does not mean that all Boeing 737 have the same cell, as it is
widespread known that the 737-200 is quite different from the -300/400/500 family, while both are
different from the -NG family. This classification of separating through families, takes in account
the design and the aerodynamics characteristics, indeed both quite similar (if not equal) to the entire
family. In the basic approach and in the simplification herein used, it is of fundamental importance
knowing how to classify the aircraft in families, or the findings of the present study will not be valid.
It is interesting to notice that, once all aircraft from a single family are usually operated almost on
the same way, the "family classification" shown above immediately implies a substantial benefit
when considering crew training programs. A crew trained to operate one type of aircraft within a
given family can be easily switched to operate throughout all the other aircraft of that family.
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2.3 Powerplant standardization
As mentioned before, the propeller is also a part of the engine-propeller group. On jet airplanes, we
can say "engine _ and "engine-propeller" indistinctly, became there is no propeller. As a follow-on to
this preliminary, study, a more detailed and complex analysis could consider fleets composed by all
kind of aircraft (mc__ding aircraft with piston engines). In the present case, as a simplification, this
paper will address the item "engines" as a whole, leaving the study of propellers' influence on
standardization for the above mentioned follow-on, more detailed study. In view of this, as
highlighted in the previous section, we will refer to the term "powerplant" only.
If it was possible to separate the powerplant from the cell, we could see some interesting situations.
A single cell can be equipped with more than only one type of powerplant, and a single powerplant
can be used with different cells, generating one or more of the following situations.
1. Same cell, same powea'plant;
2. same cell, different powerplant;
3. different cells, same powerplant;, and
4. different cells, different powerplant.
Low-aged fleets tend to be formed around situation #I. New enuant ah-lmes, especially low-
cost/low-fare carriers, tend to built their fleets aiming to exwact the most positive results from this
first situation. Middle-aged fleets, as the ones in a renewal process, can be commonly nested within
situation #2. On the other hand, situation #3 is not commonly seen, but would be the case of a fleet
composed by Boeings 707 and 737, that can be equipped with the same powerplant.
Complementarily, situation #4 is more common on small airlines with a relatively small fleet, m
particular all-cargo operators with few mutes or operating cargo charter flights.
But, again, for the purpose of this preliminary study, let us concenWate solely on the powerplant.
They will be classified not only in regard of its manufacturer and type, but also to the extent of what
we will herein refer as variant or "dash", something like a 'sub-type'. This three-level classification
is indeed complex, but it follows the same approach used for the two-level applied for the cell
analysis, as will be seen on section 3.
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2.4 Avionics standardization
The study of avionics standardization is much more complex than the aforementioned cases. This is
in great part due to the great variety of instruments and electronic on-board equipment. In order to
picture yourself in this complex scenario, imagine being the captain or first-officer of an airline
operating a Boeing 737-300 registered BR-BR1 on day-one, and having to fly the next day another
737-300 (registered, say, BR-BR2), with instruments from different manufacturers and, worse of all,
with these instruments mounted on different locations on the front and overhead panels. In the
extreme, this could even lead to confusing the crew on a particular switch or on/off signal during an
emergency situation, posing risks of catastrophic consequences. Moreover, maintenance personnel
could also encounter problems with this confusing, multiple layout flight deck configurations while
in the programming procedures of daily fleet maintenance.
This type of standardization can be easier to achieve as long as the carrier blocks a given batch of
airplanes coming off the production line in direct sequence. In this case, even if not clearly
demanded by the carrier, there is a tendency by the aircraft manufacturer to install avionics from a
same supplier on all aircraft in that batch. In fact, a good level of standardization can be achieved
within a same aircraft family when the avionics are at least of the same manufacturer or the same
model, which is very much possible in several isolately purchased aircraft. However, nowadays only
a few airlines are able to purchase batches of aircraft directly from the manufacturer, being the
leasing of diverse aircraft from international lease companies one of the most common forms of fleet
composition.
Being a preliminary study, this paper will not address the complex issues of the standardization
involving the avionics group and the "others" group. We encourage other follow-on studies to
address in detail these and other groups not listed in this paper.
2.5 Economical aspects of fleet standardization
It should be pointed out that using equipment from the same manufacturer may lead to significant
savings in maintenance, spare parts inventory, tooling, training and in buyer-supplier negotiations.
The target of the negotiation shall not be achieving short-term advantages, but mid- and long-term
advantages. Brazilian carriers TAM and GOL are examples of it, the first with an almost all-Airbus
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fleet (A319/320 and A330-200s, plus still a few Fokker 100s), and the second with a trim all-Boeing
737NG fleet (737-700s and -800s). Although not being a target for the present paper, for a more
detailed analysis of economical aspects of airline fleet standardization we recommend the approach
put in discussion by Holloway (1997).
3 TIIE FLEET STANDARDIZATION INDEX 0flPl_
Indexes (or indicators) are non-exa_non-precise tools to quanti_ a highly subjective .aspect with no
link to numerical data. Many indexes/indicators are commonly used in trying to allocate quantitative
values poverty, development, customer satisfaction, and others. In spite of their existing limitations
the use of indicators is continuously growing. In fact, ff in one hand they are can be labeled as non-
precise and non-exact, on the other hand they permit making direct and uncomplicated comparisons,
which can be used, understood and discussed by almost any individual. Indexes are essential, for
example, in the cost-benefit analysis, when evaluating the impact distribution of a project.
Comparing fleets is very difficult when the variety of types and models of aircraft and powerplants
is such that allows almost infinite combinations between them. Moreover, discussing about fleet
standardization is as difficult as comparing them. To assist in this difficult comparison task this
pap_i h-_trod_ces an index herein christened "Fleet Standardizahon Index", or IPF (,*or _e initials m
Portuguese of Indice de Padroniza¢_o de Frotas).
As mentioned earlier, the formulation of the IPF is herein presented in its initial form of quantifying
the level of fleet standardization. Despite this preliminary and simplistic approach, it is already
possible to have a fair good idea about the status of airlines" fleets. In view of this, and considering
its current preliminary format, the "Fleet Standardization Index" will be initially composed of two
aspects: the standardization of airplanes' cells and powerplant. The development of the IPF
formulation was made on a semi-empiric basis, starting with the following assumptions:
• The higher the number of different manufacturers of aircraPdpowerplant, the lower is the
level of standardization- consequently the IPF will be found proportional to the inverse
of the number of manufacturers;
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• The higher the number of different models (families) of airplanes/powerplants from the
same manufacturer, the lower is the level of standardization -- as seen above, the IPF is
proportional to the inverse of the number of different models for each manufacturer;
• The same analogy can be used for the dashes (variants, sub-types) of powerplants -- this
put, the IPF is proportional to the inverse of the number of powerplant variants, for each
model and manufacturer.
The two aspects shown above will lead to a pair of auxiliary indexes: the "Cell Standardization
Index" (or I.PC, in Portuguese) and the "Powerplant Standardization Index" (or IPM, in Portuguese).
In further studies, other indexes could be added in the IPF determination (i.e.: IPA for Avionics, and
IPOPI for Other Parts and Items). So, the initial formula for IPF is shown below:
IPF= lxlPC+ 2xlPM, where _+ 2 =1 (1)
The definition of ct_ and t_2 values will be the result of practical studies and surveys, when the
researcher will be able to identify and measure the influence of each type of standardization on the
IPF. As a matter of simplification and in order to obtain numerical results for this preliminary study,
we will assume a case where the values are 0.6 to oh and 0.4 to t_2. For this, expression (1) becomes:
IPF = 0.60 x IPC + 0.40 x IPM (2)
The next and most important step is to obtain the equations for IPC and IPM. Considering the
similarity between both them and again as a matter of simplification, we will address either one and
then extrapolate the result to determinate the other. Later on we will mention some IPC and IPM
formulas that were tried out by the authors, but were found to be non-effective.
3.1 Initial formulas
Initially, with the approach and considerations set on section 2, it was intended to pursue directly the
formulation of indexes IPC (cell) and IPM (powerplant). However, a major concern arose when
turning values that are proportional to the airplanes/powerplant quantities into a single expression.
The intermediate solution adopted was to create partial indexes calculated for each manufacturer.
These will be herein named "Cell Standardization Partial Index" (IPPC) and "Powerplant
Standardization Partial Index" (IPPM, from the Portuguese abbreviations).
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3.1.1 Cell Standardization Index (][PC)
The number of airplanes from each manufacturer is used as the ponderation factor of the index,
being the number of models the main quantifying factor. Due to its inverse proportionality, the IPPC
expression was obtained as:
IPPC = total number of airplanes from one manufacturer
number of families from that manufacturer xtotal fleet (3)
With the IPPC in hand, tests were run in order to establish the correct formulation for the ]PC. After
several tests, the emerged IPC equation was:
/PC = _, IPPC
number of manufacturers (4)
In such a way, it was possible to ensure that the considerations seen in previous sections would be
met, being the IPC inversely proportional to the number of manufacturers.
3.1.2 Powerplant Standardization Index
The same approach was used to develop the formulation for the IPM index. Nevertheless, as the
powerplant considerations have a further level of detailing (different "'dashes"/variants of
powerplant available), an adjustment on IPPM was found to be necessary. This has emerged in
another index, herein called "'Model Specific Powerplant Standardization Index" (IPPMM). All
expressions, for IPPMM, IPPM and IPM, are presented below.
IPPMM = number of powerplants of a model
number of dashes of same model x total number of powerplants
(5)
IPM = _ IPPM
number of manufacturers (7)
_, IPPMM
IPPM = number of models from a manufacturer (6)
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3.1.3 Practical use of the equations developed
In order to test and present a preliminary practical use of the above listed formulas, a sample airline
"Air Studies" will be considered. This airline operates a fleet of aircraft from three different
manufacturers, ALFA, BRAVO and CHARLIE, as listed on Table 1. The sample powerplants are
listed in the fight column of Table 1 and also on Table 2, on the sequence.
Table 1: Fleet operated by sample airline AIR STUDIES
Maker
ALFA
BRAVO
CHARLIE
Model Qty. Type
ALFA-100 4
3
ALFA-200 9
B-1 2
8
B-2 12
25
B-3 8
CH- 10 12 Twin Jet
Powerplant
Twin jet W- 1-2
Twin Jet W- 1-3
Twin Jet W-7-2
Twin Jet W- 1-2
Twin Jet Y-90-F
Twin Jet Y- 100-A
Twin Jet Y- 100-B
Twin Jet Y-2000-Z
Y-100-C
Table 2: Powerplant combinations used on sample airline AIR STUDIES airplanes
Manufacturer
WALKER MOTORS
YIELD AVIATION
ENGINES
Model
W-1
W-7
No. of variants/dashes
2
Total qty.
9x2 = 18
9x2 =18
Y-90 1 8 x 2 = 16
Y-100 3 37 x 2 = 74
Y-2000 1 2x2 =04
Calculating the IPC (Cell Standardization Index) for carrier Air Studies:
• Manufacturer ALFA: 2 different cell models, 16 airplanes total:
16
IPPC - = 0.096
2x83
(8)
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¢ Manufacturer BRAVO: 3 different cell models, 55 airplanes total
11
IPPC = 55 = 0.221 (9)
3x83
• Manufacturer CHARLIE: 1 cell model, 12 airplanes total
• The IPC for Air Studies is:
1PPC= 12 =0.145
Ix83 (I0)
0.096 + 0.221 + O.145
/PC = = 0.154 (11)3
The next step, using Table 2 data, is to obtain the IPM for our virtual Air Studies carrier. Together
with the calculated IPC, it will compose the IPF as shown in formula (2).
• Manufactur_ Walker: 18 W-1 engines of 2 "dashes" and 18 W-7 engines of a single "dash".
18 18 0.163
IPPMMw-I = " IPPMMw 7 = ;IPPMwazx_ = _ = 0.082 (12)
• Manufacturer YIELD: 16 Y-90 engines, of a single type, 98 Y-100 engines of 3 types and 16 Y-
2000 engines of a single type.
16 98
IPPMMr_9o = _ ; IPPMMrqoolx166 = 3×166 ;
16 0.389
=_=0.130IPPMM r__oo = 7...; IPPM FIELD
IXlO0 3
(13)
• Follows the IPM for Air Studies:
IPM=
number of manufacturers
0.212
=_=0.106
2
(14)
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• Finally, the IPF is obtained with formula (2):
12
IPF = 0.60x0.154 + 0.40x0.106 = 0.135 (15)
It is important to observe that the result, alone, is of no meaning. However, when advancing to the
next step of comparing the indexes for different airlines it would be possible to notice which carrier
has a higher or lower level of standardization. Moreover, it can be used as a strategic tool in
assisting and analyzing opportunities for fleet renewal.
3.2 Rejected formulas
In this section we will present some of the rejected formulas. Those herein listed were discarded
because the results obtained were found to be incorrect and/or inconsistent in some particular
situations. However, they were extremely valuable in the development of the initial formulas
presented in section 3.1. As a matter of simplification, the formulas below will only be presented
with its main discarding reason. Its development will not be presented.
3.2.1 First rejected formula
The following formula was the first to be rejected during the development of the indexes.
IPC = _, IPPC (16)
The reason for discarding formula (16) was the fact that the IPC (or IPM) would increase if the
number of manufacturers had also increased. When analyzing the cell (or the powerplant)
individually, having aircraft from more than one manufacturer, clearly the fleet will be less
standardized, thus directly conflicting with what would be set in formula (16).
3.2.2 Second rejected formula
The tests following the previous rejection paved the way to discarding the equation shown below.
IPM = 1 - _, IPPM (17)
This formula solved the initial problem found with formula (16), but another problem of the same
sort was then created. At that point the IPM (or IPC) increased with the increase in the number of
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models, what would be also incorrect_. The next step taken to re-analyze and run other tests came to
solve this problem, leading to the correct formulas, presented in the previous sections.
3.3 General considerations for future development
As highlighted previously, the present approach does have limitations, the primary being that it does
not yet consider the avionics and the "others" groups, both exuemely relevant for a strategic fleet
plam_g in the _ complex world of airline planning. However, these limitations can be minimiTed
with further analysis and research. The limitations identified during our study and some possible
solutions are presented and discussed below.
The first drawback of the present preliminary development phase is the low capability of the IPF
index in allowing planners not only to compare different fleets or situations but also its low
capability in presenting them the correct feeling of quantity. In other words, a simple verification of
the IPF value should be sufficient to understand the degree of standardization of that particular
airline, which is still not the case with the equations herein depicted. In fact, the IPF index
developed herein is sufficient only to conduct comparisons between different airlines (different
fleets).
A more in depth mathematical approach, with the _ysis of sample cases in a crescent or
decreasing standardization sequence, could lead to a robust solution in helping correct the above
mentioned drawback. Meanwhile, it is the understanding of the authors that the basis for calculation
of IPF and related indexes and sub-indexes could be kept unchanged. The central point could be the
linearization of results, and the task is to find a mathematical method to perform it. The authors have
not yet used exponential factors, but it is believed that it could be a good way to achieve the desired
results. Follow-on studies are being planned in this direction.
Another important limitation that do deserve attention is the numerical compatibility between IPC
and IPM. At the present moment the values obtained for both seem to be incompatible in terms of
dimensions, while the ponderation (weight) system used has been arbitrary. The follow-on study,
now in its initial phase ("phase 2" of the entire original research project), is also being aimed at the
necessity of the final IPF be obtained from comparable and compatible IPC and IPM values, to be
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sure that the influence of cell and powerplant standardization are correctly balanced and accounted
for. A reasonable form to pursue is to adequate _1 and _2 values in formula (1), thus pointing to a
change in expression (2). Nevertheless, the basis for IPF calculation will still remain the same, as the
results herein exposed remain valid for comparison purposes.
It is the understanding of the authors that a complex mathematical effort shall be employed to
develop the final formula, which would then minimize to the maximum the limitations discussed
and presented in the previous lines. This quantitative effort may include the measurement of
influences and the linearization of both IPC and IPM.
The authors encourage other researchers to collaborate in this effort, even if departuring from the
original approach taken by the present study.
4 CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
The Fleet Standardization Index (IPF), as presented in this pilot study, allows the quantification of a
highly subjective aspect: the level of standardization between airline fleets. The comparison between
two or more different fleets, from different airlines or simulating changes in an actual airline, can be
made with the IPF.
However, some drawbacks have been identified by the authors in the formulation of the IPF itself
and its components IPC (for the cell) and IPM (for the powerplant). Although limiting its
effectiveness as a sole index (when not used to comparing different fleets or carriers), the problems
identified can be minimized to a great extend. Follow-on studies to this research herein presented are
already being drafted in order to realign the formulations. When this is achieved, it will permit the
usage of the IPF index alone, without the need for comparison between different fleets and/or
carriers (as the current model dictates).
For this, the authors endorse their encouraging towards other researchers to analyze and consider in
more detail the multiple influential aspects of airline fleet standardization in order to verify the level
of influence of each factor in the fmal airline IPF.
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